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ABSTRACT
ON THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT:
THE DEVELOPING WORLD, THE FAILURES BASED ON PHYSICAL CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION AND INTERNATIONAL RESCUERS AND THE EMERGENCE
OF A NEW PERSPECTIVE
BY
Augusto Marcos Carvalho de Sena 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2000.
This thesis critically reviews the literature on economic growth and development 
focusing on the interconnections, strengthens and weaknesses of both branches. 
Questions arise if growth and development models have been of any relevance to 
developing countries. The experience with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) , 
such as the World Bank and the IMF, is also focused on to corroborate the assertion that 
the alternative answer based on stabilization-structural adjustments, sponsored by these 
agencies, has not been useful as a reasonable way to solve the most prominent problems 
of developing countries. It is concluded that both the World Bank and the IMF recipes 
and the predictions and policy implications of growth and development theories, as far as 
strongly based on physical capital accumulation, have been incomplete tools to foster 
sound growth and development strategies in the developing world. An alternative 
perspective is chosen (and evidence is provided to support it) focusing on the new 
developments of both growth and development theories as well as on the prospects of the 
new political economy literature, to establish a meaningful way to help developing 
countries to get out of the obstacles to development. Based on the lines of the new 
literature on growth, development and political economy, the main conclusion of the 
thesis translates in offering reasonable ways to give the right incentives to governments 
and policy-makers in developing countries in their attempts to foster economic growth 
and development.
x
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INTRODUCTION
Economic growth and development has been a subject of great interest since long 
ago. The contributions of the first classical economists brought about increasing concerns 
on the Wealth o f Nations and the relevant role of various factors leading to economic 
affluence1. Based upon that belief, but under a totally different real world era and 
scenario, governments and policy-makers in several developing countries have directed 
their efforts to eliminating the obstacles to growth and development during the second 
half of the 20th century.
The general unsuccessful path many African, Asian and Latin American countries 
have taken in terms of economic growth and development during the last fifty years or so 
has been related to a set of economic, social and political variables prevailing in these 
countries. Among them we can list, cloudy policy-making environments, poor education 
and distressing health conditions, poor technological attainments, corruption and income 
inequality.
►
This thesis focuses on two practices the developing world has tried to put poor 
countries in a path towards growth and development. The first refers to the practices 
conducted under the influence of growth and development theories advanced in the 
forties and fifties. Both theoretical branches have strongly influenced the actions in the 
developing world to give physfbal capital accumulation a key role in the process of
' For instance. Smith’s Wealth o f Nations (1776) and Ricardo’s Principles (1817) paid special attention to 
specialization in production and international trade, respectively, as important variables to promote 
economic growth and thus wealth. For a comprehensive treatment of the classical growth theories, 
including Smith’s and Ricardo’s, see Eltis (1984).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
economic growth. Chapter I will show that the objective of faster growth via 
accumulation of physical capital in the developing world has not been reached and the 
main reasons for this result.
The second practice relates to the experience of various developing countries with 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Since late seventies many developing countries have asked for 
help to get out of the social-economic problems linked to stagnation and poverty. Chapter 
II will investigate if the engagement of developing countries with the two International 
Financial Institutions has been satisfactory in terms of solving the most prominent 
difficulties developing countries have been facing. Anticipating some of the results, it 
will be seen that the attempt based on stabilization-structural adjustments lending has not 
given the expected results in terms of eradicating poverty in the developing world.
Two important qualifications are needed here. First, despite the fact that the two 
practices mentioned above will be treated separately in chapters I and II, they are not 
mutually exclusive. Physical capital accumulation of the type visualized by development 
practitioners and stabilization-structural adjustment programs supported by IFIs cannot 
be treated as disjoint events in the actions taken towards growth and development in 
many developing countries. The theoretical reasoning for physical capital accumulation 
has often been used by IFIs in the USA and worldwide as a pro-adjustment lending 
device. Second, the two practices are not the only ones the developing world has tried. 
Socialism, e.g., is another known attempt several developing countries experienced in the 
first decades following World War II.
Out of the two mentioned practices, an alternative perspective is conjectured using
2
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the prospects of the new growth-development theory and the new literature linked to the 
political features of undeveloped countries. Chapter III will give emphasis to the 
possibility that the new growth-development theoretical advances and the new political 
economy literature can be jointly used to envision a new way out of the obstacles to 
economic growth and development in the developing world. A general outline based on 
the key tenets of the two new branches will be conjectured and empirical evidence of its 
relevance is provided.
The importance of the study on the determinants of economic growth- 
development in developing countries is unquestionable, in as much as economic policy 
design and implementation are concerned. The present study fills a gap on this subject in 
the sense that no previous study connects comprehensively theoretical models and policy 
design and implementation taking additionally into account distortions which 
characterize most of the developing world. In this line, it is key for a successful plan that 
intends to foster economic growth-development in a certain developing country to take 
very care of eventual distortions that may impose strong constraints to such intentions. 
Therefore, a front of novelty in the present study is the concern to connect policy design 
and implementation with theoretical advances. A key contribution of this study is the 
observance that trying to understand and deal with poverty in the developing world 
without bringing under focus the main theoretical contributions on growth-development 
is useless. Policy prescriptions, design and implementation derived in connection with the 
specific theoretical advances coming from the new growth-development models, as well 
as on the new literature on political economy, are crucial points of this study.
3
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CHAPTERI
GROWTH-DEVELOPMENT THEORIES IN THE FORTIES AND FIFTIES, THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD AND THE FAILURE BASED ON PHYSICAL CAPITAL
ACCUMULATION
Introduction
Chapter I offers a summary of growth and development models advanced in the 
forties and fifties, with emphasis given to the predictions and policy implications of each 
model. The main growth models to be analyzed include the contributions of Domar 
(1946) and Solow (19S6). Regarding development models, the contributions of 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Nurkse (1953) and Hirschman (1958) are included as the 
relevant ones. The general goal is to show how physical capital accumulation has been 
selected as the key factor to foster economic growth and how the practices of 
development agencies worldwide have been accordingly designed.
In this chapter I show that the practices conducted under the influence of these 
models have not been useful to help developing countries getting out of the obstacles to 
economic growth-development. Arguments often made to justify the inappropriateness of 
growth-development models as sound policy guidance for developing countries are of 
two types. The first line stresses that growth models have been constructed under the 
assumption of marketing-clearing efficiency (countries operate close to their production 
possibilities frontiers using all the relevant available information). Because distortions of 
many kinds are the rule instead of the exception in the developing world, predictions and 
policy prescriptions based on these models would be poor tools to foster economic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
growth. For these growth models, the problems related to poor economic performance are 
due to relative scarcity of factors (physical capital, labor, natural resources) and/or 
technological stagnation. This prediction, however, would be of use if and only if 
countries operate close to their production possibility frontiers (PPFs), as mentioned 
above, which is not the case for developing countries. According to Olson (1996), it is 
not lack of capital, labor, natural resources or advanced technology that keep poor 
countries poor, but lack of sound economic policy and developed institutions, which if in 
existence would push undeveloped countries toward their PPFs.
The second type of reasoning emphasizes the misleading selection of physical 
capital accumulation as the single key growth-development-augmenting variable policy­
makers have relied on in practices conducted in name of economic prosperity in the 
developing world. Both growth and development models of the forties and fifties were 
strongly biased towards investment (physical capital accumulation) as the key variable to 
foster economic growth. According to the proponents of this view, e.g., Easterly (1998), 
important variables in the growth-development literature (other than physical capital 
accumulation) have been overlooked, as far as policy action in the developing world is 
concerned. In this view, misguided practices aimed to foster economic growth have 
occurred due to focus on wrong policy variables. I will choose this perspective to conduct 
the overall analysis to be undertaken in this thesis. It is reasonable to expea that sound 
praaices can be guided by economic theory, even if  theory itself is known to be of the 
unrealistic type under certain environments.
To present the models of economic growth and development in the 1940s and 
1950s, the first task is to derive the models and highlight the main predictions and policy
5
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implications attached to them. It will be seen that physical capital accumulation shows up 
as the main strategy to put developing countries in a path towards economic wealth. The 
second task is to evidence the failure of the practices based on physical capital 
accumulation, emphasis being given to the measurement of the predicted connection 
between output growth and investment (physical capital accumulation) in the developing 
world. Finally, an assessment on the reasons of the failure is presented and concluding 
remarks are provided.
Economic Growth Theory in the Forties and Fifties 
This section summarizes first the growth model developed by Domar (1946) and 
then the neoclassical model of economic growth of Solow (19S6). The main objective is 
to set up the mechanics of economic growth focusing on the most important variables 
said to be key to explain this phenomenon and to derive predictions and policy 
implications coming from these pioneering growth models. Despite the fact that the 
Domar model has been traditionally considered as the most influential piece on 
development practices based on physical capital accumulation, other models of growth 
and development advanced in the forties and fifties were also crucial to the goal of 
disseminating the physical capital accumulation optimism. The practices conducted in 
many developing agencies worldwide to the end of faster economic growth and 
development can be seen as strongly influenced by this general optimism towards 
physical capital accumulation.
Pomar’s Growth Model
Domar (1946) develops his growth model assuming a closed economy that starts 
at the outset in an equilibrium position, where aggregate demand Yt (national income)
6
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equals aggregate supply Pt (productive capacity). Investments It and their growth rate tut 
are the key variables upon which the whole economy will rely on to maintain its 
equilibrium over time. Assume that It impacts on both national income Yt, via the 
multiplier 1/s (s = marginal propensity to save) and on productive capacity Pt, via capital 
formation. The dual impact of It can be represented by:
•  •
(1.1) Yt = (l/s)It
•  •  •  •
(1.2) Pt = oKt or Pt = olt, since Kt = It,
where a  -  Pt/Kt is the constant output-capital ratio obtained from the linear-in-K 
production function Pt = oKt, whose differentiation with respect to time gives equation
(1.2) above and no depreciation is assumed. Clearly, labor is an unessential input (no 
shortage) in the Domar model.
To derive the economy’s growth rate we must find a growth rate for It in such a 
way to keep aggregate income Yt and productive capacity Pt expanding over time at the 
same pace, i.e., to find a growth rate for investment such that:
•  •
(1.3) Yt = Pt.
Given equations (1.1), (1.2) and (13), the determination o f the required 
investment growth rate is obtained and expressed as:
7
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(1.4) tut = It/It = os.
Thus, tut is the required growth rate of investment compatible with the economy’s 
equilibrium. To derive the growth rates for the other variables, apply logarithms and the 
time derivative to both the linear-in-K. production function and the static version of the 
investment impact on income condition [Yt = (l/s)It], respectively:
• t • •
(1.5) Pt/Pt = Ki/Kt and Yt/Y. = I«/It.
Since both productive capacity and national income grow at the same rate, 
physical capital and investment will also do so, implying that at equilibrium all growth 
rates should equal the constant required investment growth rate mt = os.
Domar’s Razor’s Edge. Now, what if the actual rate of investment, say r, is 
different from the required tut = os? The answer comes from the definition of the 
coefficient of utilization given by:
(1.6) U‘ = Lim(Yt/Pt) = r/os.
t-* O D
As long as U‘ » 1, the economy is operating under full employment equilibrium, 
both over time and in the long-run, with actual and required rates of investment being 
equalized. In other words, income and productive capacity will expand at the same pace
8
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if and only if the actual and required growth rates of investment are equal. Any mismatch 
between these two rates will lead to under or over utilization of the economy’s capacity 
and disequilibrium will result.
The main result of Domar’s model leads to a paradox. It is unquestionable the 
importance of investment projects and savings for short and long run growth in his 
model. However, if due to any event the actual investment growth rate (r) is less than that 
required to sustaining full employment (os), the solution pointing to investment increases 
may result in increases of both capital formation and national income (and thus savings), 
aggravating the disequilibrium.
Despite this instability problem, the Domar model seeks to target a growth rate for 
actual investment projects in such a way to not deviate from the one required to maintain 
full employment. And, as shown above, this required growth rate tut = os is the relevant 
one to explain the economy’s dynamics.
Domar’s Model Predictions and Policy Implications. The central focus of the 
Domar growth model relies on its premise that in equilibrium the required income growth 
rate times the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) equals aggregate savings, i.e., 
m[Kt/Pt] = St/Yt since o  = Pt/Kt and St = sYt.
From this relation Domar’s model predictions and policy implications can be 
focused on. It is worth noting that short and long runs in Domar’s growth model do not 
pose problems, in the sense that the variable elected to be key to explain growth in the 
short-run, i.e., the growth rate of investment, is the same variable relevant for long-run 
growth. What matters is the fact that productive capacity and national income expand at 
the same pace over time, which in turn is guaranteed by the equality o f actual and
9
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required growth rates of investment both in the short-run and long-run.
From the equilibrium condition stated above, it is seen that Domar’s growth 
model gives a simple prediction: output growth is proportional to the share of investment 
(savings) in the national income, i.e., production is proportional to machines -  labor has 
no role to play. This is understandable since at the aftermath of the great depression 
unemployment was a given and Domar’s main concern was the synchronization between 
aggregate demand and supply -  thus a short-run view, in tune with the Keynesian flavor 
of those days. Thus, Domar’s model predicts that by increasing investment (savings) as a 
proportion of national income (rich) countries would achieve a higher rate of output 
growth. As Letiche (1959, p. 493) poses, “By laying stress on investment requirements 
and capital output ratios, the contemporary theories of growth have relevance chiefly to 
the problem of sustaining a warranted rate of growth in developed Western economies.” 
The direct policy implication from this prediction is that governments must 
concentrate efforts to increase domestic savings and thus investment as a fraction of their 
national incomes. If private investments lack, government spending in investment will 
take the central role, as long as financing is available.
Regarding undeveloped countries, these same predictions hold too, but the policy 
implications coming from them deserve careful attention. Since it is well known that poor 
countries suffer from savings shortages, the prediction that investment needs to be 
levered in order to prompt output growth makes no sense in itself, as long as action is 
intended, unless savings from abroad are available. This opens the door to the so-called 
foreign aid enterprise, a business closely related to the policy actions both in the recipient 
developing countries’ governments and in the donors’ rich countries IFIs. Thus, after
10
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using the ICOR calculation, i.e., target growth times ICOR giving savings requirements,
the gap between the required amount and the actual magnitude of poor countries’
domestic savings should be filled with foreign aid -  the so-called “financing gap model”
in Easterly’s (1998) typology.
Considering the relevance of the application of Domar’s model to growth policies
of undeveloped countries, Letiche (1959) states:
The (Domar) analysis presumes that by increasing investments as a proportion of naU'onal 
income underdeveloped countries would achieve a more balanced and higher rate of 
growth... There is no simple mechanical relationship in such countries between increased 
investment and increased real income. They suffer from all kinds of bottlenecks and are 
quickly plagued by rising prices But in a world of imparience, when it is critically 
important for many underdeveloped countries rapidly to expand their producrivity and to 
accumulate an enlarged stock of capital, it is understandable that these models should 
have strong appeal ...But it would be irresponsible for Western economists not to point 
out the limitarions of these models for such condiu'ons. Letiche (1959, pp. 491-492).
The above citation suggests that the key variable said to be the relevant one to
foster economic growth might not be so in undeveloped economies. In the empirical
assessment to be performed later, the predicted link between growth and investment in
the developing world will be tested.
Solow’s Growth Model
Now, consider the Solow (1956) neoclassical growth model. Differently from
Domar (1946), Solow (1956) assumes a new specification for the production function.
The novelty is that labor now is one of the essential inputs and the capital-output ratio is
no longer constant, as it was in Domar’s production function specification.
To derive the basics of the Solow model, assume that a closed economy combines
two factors, capital Kt and labor L , to produce an aggregate homogenous product Yiwith
a given and constant technology Ao (no technological progress), which enters the
production function in a Harrod-neutral manner. Ki is physical capital at time t, which
11
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can be accumulated. On the other hand, Lt represents labor at time t and is assumed to 
grow at an exogenous constant rate n. The aggregate production function of this closed 
economy is given by the following Cobb-Douglas, presenting constant returns to scale 
and diminishing returns to both capital and labor:
(1.7) Y. = Kta(AAt)1_a, 0 < a  < 1.
The per capita representation of the above Cobb-Douglas production function is: 
(1.7’) yt s  kta .
•  •
Gross investment is given by It = Kt + 6Kt, where Kt = dKt/dt and 6 is the 
constant rate of depreciation on capital. Since this is a closed economy, gross investment 
equals gross savings, and given a fixed savings rate s the net investment-saving equality 
can be written as:
(1.8) Kt = sKta(AXt)I_a - 6Kt.
To represent equation (1.8) in its per capita form, divide it by AoLt and define the
capital-labor ratio as kt = Ki/AoLt. Note that the intensive-labor definition is being used
here. Taking the time derivative o f kt and substituting the result, equation (1.8) can be 
rewritten in per capita terms as:
12
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• •
(1.8’) kt = skt“  - (8 + n)kt, where n = Lt/Lc
Now, in the long-run equilibrium kt = 0. Solving for kt, the long-run level of the 
per capita capital is constant and given by:
(1.9) kt = [s/(6 + n)]m-*.
Since this a constant, the long-run per capita capital growth rate is zero. Plugging 
equation (1.9) into (1.7’), we also get that the long-run growth rate of per capita income 
is nil, i.e.:
• •
(1.10) Met = y./yt = 0.
Making use of the assumption of no technological progress (A<> is constant), 
steady-state per capita income growth is zero. On the other hand, considering the 
transitional path over time towards the steady-state equilibrium, the model predicts that 
per capita income will grow at diminishing rates with increases in kt, i.e., accumulation of 
physical capital is the relevant cause of temporary growth. To see this, apply logarithms 
and take the time derivative to equation (1-7*) to get:
•  •
(1.11) yt/yt = a(Mct).
13
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The transitional path over time of per capita income growth towards its long-run 
equilibrium is a diminishing function of physical capital accumulation. As derived 
before, in the steady-state per capita capital growth rate is zero. Therefore, per capita 
income growth will also be zero in the steady-state equilibrium, and this model is missing 
an important piece to explain the known positive long-run per capita income growth 
evidenced by the empirical record2.
The way the Solow model is upgraded to allow for long-run economic growth is 
via the introduction of technological progress. Solow (1956) assumes technical progress 
to be labor-augmenting. To show this, reconsider equation (1.7) as:
(1.12) Yt = Kta(AtLi)1_a,
where At = Aoegt is the level of technology that grows at a constant rate g > 0, i.e., g is the 
exogenous technology growth rate, and Ao is a given initial level of technology. Again, 
assume that the production function is well behaved. Applying similar derivations as 
before, equation (1.10) can be rewritten as:
(1.13) kt/kt = yt/yt = g.
In this case, the per capita capital and per capita income growth rates are positive 
and constant in the long-run. This refinement shows that the economy becomes more 
productive as a result of some (exogenous) technological process.
2 Summers & Heston’s (1988) sample included 99 out of 108 countries that grew at positive annual growth 
rates over 1960-85.
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Regarding the transitional path over time towards the steady-state equilibrium, the 
new version of equation (1-11) is:
•  •
(1.14) yt/yt = (1 - a)g + a(yt/yt),
implying that the per capita income growth rate in the transitional path over time is a 
weighted average function of capital accumulation and technical progress. Here, 
technological progress may counteract the diminishing returns on capital, and eventually, 
increasing per capita income growth can occur.
In the long-run steady-state per capita income growth equals steady-state per 
capita capital growth, both being determined uniquely by g, the growth rate of technical 
advances. Technological progress here is unexplained because g is exogenously given. In 
this model a change in government policy cannot directly affect the positive long-run 
growth rate, since it is determined exogenously by g.
Before presenting Solow’s model predictions and policy implications, it is worth 
to add two important extensions of the neoclassical growth model. The first, the 
derivation of the so-called Solow’s residual under the context of growth accounting and 
total factor productivity, the second, the determination of income distribution, mainly 
focusing on the labor share in national income and its determinants.
Total Factor Productivity: The Solow’s Residual. Now, following Solow (19S7), 
reconsider the Cobb-Douglas production function given by equation (1.12) in order to 
analyze total factor productivity (TFP). The main goal is to see how TFP can be 
determined. Applying logarithms and taking the time derivative of equation (1.12) yields:
15
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(1.15) Yt/Yt = (1 - a)g  + ay t + (1 - a)n , where y t = Ki/Kt
Equation (1.15) shows the determinants of absolute (not per capita) income 
growth over time. Income growth will occur as long as the net effect of g, Yt and n is
positive, for a given value of a . It is possible to use equation (1.15) to see how total 
factor productivity (g) is calculated. Rearranging equation (1.15), the Solow’s residual g,
is:
(1.16) g = [Yt/Yt -  {ay. + (1 - a)n}]/(l - a).
That is, total factor productivity is the difference between income growth and the 
weighted average contribution of each input used to produce aggregate output Yt. If g is 
known to be close to zero, then income growth is attributable to additions of physical 
capital and labor inputs only. In this event, no productivity gains are being realized. 
Despite g in equation (1.16) is different from g in equation (1.13) and (1.14) -  because 
the former refers to absolute magnitudes and the latter to per capita figures -  we can see 
that if no productivity gains are realized, per capita income growth in the short-run is a 
function of capital accumulation only [equation (1.14)] and nil in the long-run [equation
(1.13)].
16
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Income Distribution Determination in Solow’s Model. Now assume a general 
specification for the aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function of the closed economy, 
which has the usual factors Kt and Lt as arguments:
(1.17) Yt = F(Kt, Lt).
Assuming perfect competition and profit maximization, optimality leads to 
equalization of factors’ marginal productivity and their respective rewards, real wage and 
real rental rates, yielding:
(1.18) f  ’(kt) = R and f(kt) + f ’(kt)kt = W,
where R and W are the real rates of rents on capital and wages on labor.
In the steady-state equilibrium it is known that per capita capital is constant so 
that Solow’s equation of capital motion with no depreciation is:
(1.19) kt = sf(kt) -  nkt = 0,
where s and n are savings and the labor growth rate, respectively, already defined. Thus, 
equation (1.18) and (1.19) form a system to be solved for R, W and kt. Extensions are 
possible to be done. Assuming that workers and capital owners save at different rates, and 
allowing for Harrod-neutral-labor-augmenting technological progress, equation (1.19) 
can be rewritten as:
17
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(1.20) SwW + srRkt -  (n + g)ki = 0,
where Sw is the fraction of savings coming from the labor force, sr is the portion coming 
from the capitalists and g is the labor-augmenting productivity growth rate. Now, it is 
possible to solve the system for the three endogenous variables listed above using 
equation (1.18) and (1.20). For given values of Sw, sr and R, real wage can be solved as:
(1.21) W = f  (n, g, fa), where dW/dn < 0, dW/dg > 0 and dW/8kt > 0.
According to the second partial derivative result above (dW/dg > 0), as long as the 
labor-augmenting technological growth rate is increasing, the workers will face an 
increasing rate of real wages. Therefore, workers with reduced educational attainment 
and working in low-tech jobs (low g) will earn low wages. Unless they work in sectors 
where capital intensity is high (more likely in manufacturing than in services) or the rate 
of growth of low skilled labor supply is relatively low compared to that of labor demand, 
unskilled workers will have their income share reduced over time.
Solow’s Model Predictions and Policy Implications. The prospects of Solow’s 
model concerning predictions and policy implications are distinct of those from Domar’s. 
First, short and long runs in Solow are completely dissimilar in the sense that physical 
capital accumulation, a variable explaining temporary growth in the short-run, does not 
play a role in the long-run. In this term, income growth is a function of technology only3. 
Thus, different variables are elected as relevant for different runs and for growth itself,
3 And note that this variable was not part of Domar’s model story on the determinants of economic growth.
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and labor is not unessential. Second, it is important to add that level and growth impacts
should be taken into account separately and differently, since in Solow’s model they play
distinct roles. In the long-run, investment and thus savings, as well as labor increment,
have only level effects on per capita income. Technological progress is the unique
permanent source of long-run growth. On the other hand, in the short-run both investment
and population growth have transitory impact on growth.
It is important to stress that for long-mn growth there is no useful policies advise,
since technological progress is the only source of growth and it is given exogenously.
Therefore, in Solow’s model no government policy can directly affect long-run growth.
The only room for policy action, as far as growth is concerned, is in the transitory phase,
via investments (savings), i.e., policy here can only have temporary growth impact.
As long as the developed world is concerned and investment is the relevant
variable, Solow’s model short-run predictions and policy implications mirror Domar’s,
i.e., the larger the investment share in national income the higher the respective country’s
income growth -  a temporary effect. Regarding population growth, reduction of labor
contingents has a positive temporary effect on income growth, again, not a permanent
long-run impact4 -  in the long-run both investment and population growth have only level
effects on per capita income.
As referring to these predictions, Valdls (1998) states:
The S&S (Solow-Swan) model thus predicts that countries with a higher rate of savings 
(therefore a higher proportion of real GNP devoted to investment), should tend to also 
have a higher level of per capita income... The Solow-Swan model thus predicts that 
countries with higher rates of population growth should tend to have lower levels of per 
capita income (both being long-run effects). Valdes (1998, pp. 33-35).
4 Note that this prediction refers to per capita income. If absolute income is considered, population growth 
has a positive impact
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What if the underdeveloped world is the target area? What policy prescriptions 
can be drawn from Solow’s model? As long as temporary impacts are concerned, the 
importance of investment is transparent. Private and/or government spending efforts must 
be directed to increase the share of investment in the country’s GDP. This is not different 
from Domar’s model advises. But, here also, the constraints on poor countries’ savings 
have to be considered. To fill the gap between what poor countries have available in 
domestic savings and what is really needed, foreign aid is welcome.
For poor countries, due to their urgency for fast physical capital accumulation, the 
long-run level effect of investments and population growth on per capita income is 
irrelevant. Thus, what is central from Solow’s model short/medium-run predictions and 
policy implications coming from them is the role investments play as a source of wealth, 
even if it is the temporary character of it that is involved. Moreover, given the urgency 
for poor countries to get out of the obstacles to development, short-medium-run 
perspective is much more important than long-run terms. Later in this chapter an 
empirical section will report what the data show on the prediction concerning the short- 
run role of investment in the undeveloped world during the sixties and seventies.
Economic Development Theory in the Forties and Fifties 
The 1940s and 1950s are famous in the field of economic development for having 
witnessed the appearance of important contributions by many authors. Among them are 
the pioneering piece by Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), who emphasizes the role of 
complementarity in the industrialization process and the relevant contributions by Ragnar 
Nurkse (1952 and 1953) on ‘vicious-virtuous’ circles, upon which the formation of 
capital in underdeveloped areas is subjected. Also, Albert Hirschman’s (1958)
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contribution on economic growth fostered by industry linkages is key in any account of 
the process of development theory advances in this phase.
The general goal in this section is the same as that of the growth models’ 
summary detailed in the previous section. First, derivation of development models is 
presented and policy implications drawn. Second, emphasis is given to the way physical 
capital accumulation shows up as the key device to prompt economic growth. I claim that 
development models of this period have contributed substantially to the general optimism 
towards physical capital accumulation as the key growth-development augmenting 
variable.
The ‘high development theory’ period (1940s and 1950s) witnessed at least two 
trends. First, the balanced-growth doctrine, represented by the Rodan-Nurkse theory, 
recognizes the simultaneous injection of physical capital into different industrial sectors 
as an important way to foster sustained economic growth. Second, Hirschman’s rejection 
of the formulations advised by the balanced-growth proponents points out to the 
relevance of linkages establishment among sectors to spur a wave of rapid 
industrialization. Hirschman’s concepts of backward and forward linkages play an 
important role in the basics of his unbalanced-growth characterization of the 
industrialization process5.
Rodan-Nurkse’s Theory of Economic Development
It is fair to say that the general purpose of the Rodan-Nurkse theory is to set up a 
way for underdeveloped areas to start a process o f capital formation leading to
5 Another important contribution on development in the 19S0s is the dual economy analysis of Lewis 
(1954), where a modem and a traditional sector coexist along with an unlimited supply of labor. Despite 
Marxian-flavored, Lewis’ analysis is strongly influenced by Domar’s prescriptions. In Lewis’ words, “the 
central fact of economic development is rapid capital accumulation". Lewis (1954, p. 139).
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accumulation. As Nurkse (1953) advises, looking only at capital formation is just a part 
of the story of development. According to him, economic development is much more 
related to human endowments, institutions and social-political conditions in a certain 
country, and thus, capital despite necessary lacks to be sufficient for the whole 
development process to follow the initial industrialization push. Nurkse (1953) also 
emphasizes that the relevant type of capital asset in his theory is of a specific kind: 
physical capital, such as machines, equipment and the like. The important concept of 
human investment intended to improve either labor skills, people’s education or health 
care is not part of the story.
Let us point out the basics of the Rodan-Nurkse theory. First, the supply-demand 
type of theory construction, commonly in use by neoclassical economics, is also central 
here for the definition of the ‘vicious’ circle. According to Nurkse (1953), the 
characterization of the circular nature of poverty in both the supply and demand sides is 
as follows:
It (the vicious circle of poverty) implies a circular constellation of forces tending to act 
and react upon one another in such a way as to keep a poor country in a state of poverty 
... Perhaps the most important circular relationships of this kind are those that afflict the 
accumulation of capital in economically backward countries. The supply of capital is 
governed by the ability and willingness to save; the demand for capital is governed by the 
incentives to invest. A circular relationship exists on both sides of the problem of capital 
formation in the poverty-ridden areas of the world. On the supply side, there is the small 
capacity to save, resulting from low level of real income. The low real income is a 
reflection of low productivity, which in turn is due largely to the lack of capital. The lack 
of capital is a result of the small capacity to save, and so the circle is complete. On the 
demand side, the inducement to invest may be low because of the small buying power of 
the people, which is due to their small real income, which again is due to low 
productivity. The low level of productivity, however, is a result of the small amount of 
capital used in production, which in turn may be caused at least partly by the small 
inducement to invest Nurkse (19S3, pp. 4-5).
It is clear from the above citation that the problems related to low levels of real 
income and their main determinant (low productivity) are crucial to understand the 
circular nature of the vicious circle o f poverty in both supply and demand sides.
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Regarding the demand side, the size of the market is the key variable chosen to 
address the deficiencies to induce investments. In poor countries, generally characterized 
by poor domestic markets, the inducement to invest is substantially limited. Thus, in the 
chain of relations, inducement to invest depends on the size of the market, which in turn 
depends on productivity, which determines the levels of production and real income.
Considering the supply side, the central concern is to look at the main reasons 
leading to poor countries’ low levels of savings. Here the concepts of both absolute and 
relative real incomes and living standards across countries are crucial to understand the 
problems of savings formation in poor areas. Generally, it is believed that the low 
capacity to save in an underdeveloped country is tied only to the low absolute level of 
real income caused by low productivity. But also the real incomes and living standards 
differentials across countries pose a huge burden on the propensity to save of people 
living in poor areas, mainly because of the so-called ‘demonstration-imitation’ effects in 
a contemporaneous world of wide communication nets.
Once the problems of the vicious circle of poverty are detected and characterized, 
the next step is to set up the mechanisms to break the vicious circularity. Here the use of 
the ‘big push’ industrialization strategy is the relevant anchor to eliminate low 
productivity problems. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), referring to the problems of the 
industrialization of the Eastern and South Eastern Europe, and Nurkse (1952), focusing 
on a feasible way out of the deadlock, respectively, emphasizes the pertinence of the ‘big 
push’ strategy:
Complementarity of different industries provides the most important set of arguments in 
favour of a large-scale planned industrialization ... The planed creation of such a 
complementary system reduces the risk of not being able to sell, and, since risk can be 
considered as costs, it reduces costs. It is in this sense a special case of ‘external 
economies’. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943, pp. 205-206).
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The difficult (that of lack of buying power) is not present, however, in the case of a more 
or less synchronized application of capital to a wide range of different industries. Here 
the result is an over-all enlargement of the market and hence an escape from the 
deadlock. People working with more and better tools in a number of complementary 
projects become each other’s customers. Nurkse (1952, p. 572).
It is clear from these citations that the way to get out of the vicious circle is to 
implement a wave of capital-intensive investments in various branches of the industrial 
sector simultaneously. Moreover, it must be synchronized, since there is always the risk 
of mismatched supply-demand interactions. Note that the ultimate goal is to eliminate the 
vicious circle of reduced income levels via productivity increases resulting from an initial 
wave of new investments. This will put the virtuous circle under way in both demand and 
supply sides of the economy simultaneously by eliminating both the obstacles to invest 
and to save.
Another interesting point of the Rodan-Nurkse theory is the preoccupation with 
the types of industries to be targeted and the available forms to financing the ‘big push’ 
strategy. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) explicitly emphasizes the importance of the ‘basics 
industries’, such as public utilities -  transport systems, hydro-electric power stations and 
the like - ,  in the initial push towards industrialization in poor countries, where the lack of 
such investments imposes serious obstacles to economic growth. Regarding financing 
these investments, Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) suggests putting governments in creditor 
countries in a position to guarantee private banking loans to poor countries or to lend the 
financial resources themselves, under the assurance of future interest and dividends 
payments.
These are the main points o f the Rodan-Nurkse theory of economic development. 
At least two pieces deserve mention for future purposes. Rosenstein-Rodan emphasizes 
‘external economies’ and their benefits for economic development. Nurkse builds on the
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qualification of ‘vicious-virtuous’ circles inherent to the process of capital accumulation 
in underdeveloped areas. These building blocks will be taken into account in chapter m , 
when modem models of economic growth and development will be considered.
Rodan-Nurkse’s Theory Predictions and Policy Implications. Based on the main 
prospects of the Rodan-Nurkse theory of economic development presented above, the 
clue to derive predictions and policy implications is to note the strict relation of this 
theoretical piece with that of Domar (1946). Despite the emphasis on external economies, 
capital increments are the key to prompt economic development in poor areas. Nurkse 
(1953) recognizes that physical capital accumulation (investment in machines) is only a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for development, since other factors such as human 
capital, institutions and social-political conditions in a given country play an important 
role. Both Rosenstain-Rodan (1943) and Nurkse (1953) give credit to the synchronized 
application of investments in different industries to spur a wave of physical capital 
formation as a way to foster economic growth. However, they differ in the way this 
should be accomplished. First, in the beginning of the industrialization process 
Rosenstain-Rodan (1943) put the State in the front position. According to him, the 
industrialization process would be based on international investment and capital lending 
and the State would be, temporarily, the principal unit in this business. Rosenstain-Rodan 
(1943) states:
If the industrialisation of international depressed areas were to rely entirely on the normal 
incentive of private entrepreneurs, the process would not only be very much slower, the 
rate of investment smaller and (consequently) the national income lower, but the whole 
economic structure of the region would be different... (And) Industrialisation of 
international depressed areas, once it is accomplished, may create an equilibrium, from 
which onwards normal private incentives may operate successfully. But it seems hopeless 
to rely on them before that point is reached. Rosenstain-Rodan (1943, pp. 206-207).
Another distinctive feature in Rosenstain-Rodan (1943) is the way he sees the
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enlarged economic unit to be the locus of the simultaneous injection of investments. He
advocates the formation of economic blocs in the search for economic development of
Germany, Russia and Italy. To achieve an efficient industrial enterprise, thus, the territory
of the economic unit must be sufficiently large.
Nurkse (1953) asserts neither the temporary role the State should play in giving
the initial push to industrialization nor the propensity of some region’s countries to form
economic blocs. He visualizes the State as an important entity in the whole process, but
says nothing on its active participation. Also, the way he visualizes the breaking of the
vicious circle of poverty, i.e., via the simultaneous injections of capital investment, has
nothing to do with economic bloc formation. They only converge in opinion in one sense
-  industries’ complementarities are feasible only with financed (from abroad)
synchronized investments in various industries. And on this matter, both are strongly
influenced by the predictions of the Domar’s growth model regarding filling the gap
between the actual and required amounts of investments with foreign aid.
In terms of policy prescriptions, the goal of implanting new complementary
industries in poor countries, as well as the foreign money entering into the country to
finance it, are relevant aspects. On this matter, the so-called foreign aid enterprise is
again at center. Regarding the type of financing, Rosenstain-Rodan (1943) states:
Private investors ...will probably not be willing to lend monies in sufficiently large 
amounts of low rates of interest to enable national development in debtor areas to get off 
to a good start. The alternative is for governments in creditor countries to guarantee the 
loans, or to lend the funds themselves... (However) Governments in creditor countries 
will not guarantee the loans or shares unless they see how interest or dividend service is 
assured. Rosenstain-Rodan (1943, pp. 208-209).
Therefore, in terms of policy action the Rodan-Nurkse’s theory brings the same 
lessons as in Domar’s: increased investments foster growth and opens doors to foreign
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money to make further growth. It is worth adding that Rosenstain-Rodan (1943), three 
years before Domar (1946) had already made use of the ICOR calculation. In reference to 
Eastern Europe necessities of capital increment, he was concerned that a rise of 4% in 
national income and a rate of 12% of investment would lead to a capital supply of only 
three million British Sterling, which would be insufficient given Eastern Europe needs. 
Hirschman’s Theory of Economic Development
Another important contribution in the ‘high development theorizing’ phase is 
Hirschman’s (1958) account of the unbalanced character of industrialization and 
economic development and his prospects on the establishment of the so-called linkage 
effects to that end. Hirschman’s critique on the balanced character of economic growth 
and development, the key tenet of the Rodan-Nurkse model, intends not to invalidate the 
logic o f the synchronized injections of investments, but to emphasize that in poor 
countries the basic elements to apply the ‘big push’ are lacking.
The building blocks of Hirschman’s (1958) work rely on his perception that more 
important than the balanced synchronized injections of the ‘big push’ strategy are the 
unbalanced features of capitalist economic growth. According to him, economic growth 
and development is fostered by a chain of disequilibria, a process in which positive 
private profits under free competition, while prompting entry and exit, leads to 
investments in various sectors of the economy, as long as industrial sector 
interconnections are present. This is the basic tenet of Hirschman’s (1958) formulation of 
the backward and forward linkages. He thus clearly disagrees with the proponents of the 
balanced growth strategy by stating that what is relevant is not a simultaneous injection 
of investments in various industries, but a careful attention on the propensity of a chain
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formation among industrial sectors. What is necessary is a concentrated effort, as policy 
action is concerned, on few sectors and their linkages to others in order to initiate an 
industrialization wave. If a certain industry is known to have a wide range of links, both 
of the backward and forward types, with other industries, then economic authority and 
thus policy implementation in developing countries should give priority to it.
In terms of the definitions of both backward and forward linkages, the importance 
of industry sectoral interrelations in Directly Productive Activities (DPA) is key, as can 
be seen in Hirschman (1958):
... two inducement mechanisms may be considered to be at work within the DPA sector:
1. The input-provision, derived demand, or backward linkage effects, i.e., every 
nonprimary economic activity, will induce attempts to supply through domestic 
producU'on the inputs needed in that activity. 2. The output-utilization of forward linkage 
effects, i.e., every activity that does not by its nature cater exclusively to final demands, 
will induce attempts to utilize its outputs as inputs in some new activities. Development 
policy must attempt to enlist these well known backward and forward effects; but it can 
do so only if there is some knowledge as to how different economic activities “score” 
with respect to these effects. Hirschman (1958, p. 100).
Hirschman (1958) goes further in the definition of the linkage effects by offering 
a way to quantify the potential importance as well as the strength of a specific industry in 
terms of its linkage effects. He then states the relevant question:
What do we imply when we speak of the linkage effects emanating from industry A 
toward industry B? ... we may have in mind the potential importance of the linkage 
effect in terms of, say, the net output of the new industries that might be called forth; or 
we may mean the strength of the effect, i.e., the probability that these industries will 
actually come into being. The total effect could be measured by the sum of the products 
of these two elements; in other words, if the establishment of industry W may lead, 
through linkage effects, to the establishment of n additional industries with net outputs 
equal to Xj (i = 1, 2...n) and if the probability that each one of these industries will 
actually be set up as a result of the establishment of industry W is p: (i = 1, 2...n), then 
the total linkage effect of industry W is equal to 5)i"*iPi Hirschman (1958, pp. 100-101).
These measures can be used to quantify both backward and forward linkage
effects and also to label a certain industry A, for instance, according to the magnitude of
the importance (the x’s) and strength (the p’s) of its respective linkage chains. For
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example, if the x-magnitude is small and the p-magnitude is large, then this specific 
linkage effect leads to ‘satellite’ industry agglomeration. This agglomeration is 
established in the wake of the main industry A, but it is relatively less important than 
industry A itself. Also, arguments on external economies are present in Hirschman’s 
work. According to him, the combined effects of two industries are larger than the sum of 
their effects taken in isolation. With this enlarged effect, it becomes feasible to account 
for the cumulative feature of economic development in the way advanced by Hirschman
(1958):
When an industry A is first set up, its satellites will soon follow; but when industry B is 
subsequently established, this may help to bring into existence not only its own satellites 
but some firms which neither A nor B in isolation could have called forth. And with C 
coming into play some firms will follow that require the combined stimuli not only of B 
and C but of A, B, and C  This mechanism may go far toward explaining the acceleration 
of industrial growth which is so conspicuous during the first stages of a country’s 
development. Hirschman (1958, p. 104).
Hirschman’s Theory Predictions and Policy Implications. The role of both 
government and private investments are clearly stated in Hirschman’s contribution. The 
industrialization strategy tied to the unbalanced linkage chains is one in which 
governments and planners play an important role. To make industrialization possible a 
concentrated policy effort should be made in order to encourage investments in branches 
of industrial production where both backward and forward linkages are expected to 
flourish. And this is the key-motor to speed up economic growth in backward countries. 
Therefore, despite the differences in the means to initiate and speed up growth, policy 
implications are very similar, as compared to Rodan-Nurkse’s model policy implications 
-  to implant an industry with wide range of linkages prior investment and thus savings 
are needed.
However, one distinctive character emerges when Hirschman (1958) gives
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emphasis to the possibility of various types of linkages, which in terms of policy, would 
involve a lesser need for large amounts of capital investment, and hence, foreign 
financing money. If one type of industry is known to have many intersectoral links, 
policy action should concentrate efforts on it. The spillover effect will function by itself 
aftermath. In this event, the only wave of investments required would be that applied in 
that linkage-powerful industry. This activity could be seen as involving less necessity of 
financing money, if compared to those related to the ‘big push’ strategy.
To end up this prospect on policy implied by both growth and development 
theories considered up to here, it is worth noting that, in general, it is investment 
(savings), or better, physical capital accumulation, the key variable to spur economic 
growth. Despite sharp dissimilarities, these theories have the common view that put 
physical capital accumulation at the center of the arguments. Also, it is foreign financing 
that underdeveloped countries have chosen to make the quest a reality. The empirical 
evidence for the sixties and seventies on the suggested interconnection between growth 
and investment in the developing world is presented next.
The Predicted Interconnection Between Growth and Investment:
Empirical Evidence for the Developing World / 1960-1980
If it is true that growth-development models advanced in the 1940s and 1950s 
influenced the practices of many developing agencies and governments worldwide, it is 
possible to setup an empirical way to check if the general optimism towards physical 
capital accumulation receives support. The empirical evidence on the predicted growth- 
investment connection in the developing world is presented next. Starting with the 
assumption that production is directly related to the share of investment spending in 
GDP, data for three regions of the world on these variables -  the developing countries’
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regions: Africa, Asia and Latin America -  are used to show that the predicted connection 
is flawed. Note that the prediction that physical capital accumulation is the relevant 
variable for growth is common to all growth-development models summarized in the first 
part of this chapter. Despite of this fact, we can say that the Domar model is the one 
considered to be the most influential in terms of shaping development practices. This is 
so due to its practical device embodied in the ICOR-calculation, as Easterly (1997) 
pertinently states:
Economists applied it (and still do apply it) [Domar’s model] to poor countries from 
Albania to Zimbabwe to determine a “required” investment rate for a target growth rate.
The difference between the required investment and their own savings is the Financing 
Cap ... This is not a story about the long-run relationship between investment and 
growth -  it’s a story about a model that promised poor countries growth in the short-run 
through aid and investment. Easterly (1997, p. 2).
From this citation, development practices in the developing world could be seen 
as strongly influenced not only by theoretical constructions such as Domar’s, but also by 
other growth-development models that put physical capital accumulation at the center of 
the arguments. I will test here if such practices deserve merit as relevant means to foster 
economic growth in the developing world. Note that the practices are singled-based 
towards physical capital accumulation, and for this reason, I use a unique explanatory 
variable (lagged investment).
One way to establish the growth-investment link is to assume that production at 
time t (Yt) is directly related to the amount of machines and equipment available at the 
beginning o f that year t (Kt-i). In growth terms, we have:
(1.22) Yi-Vt-i = Po + Pi[It-i/Yt-i], since [Kt-i - Ki-2] = In  and Kt-2 * Ym,
Ym
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where 0o is the constant and is included to capture autonomous growth, i.e., growth not 
connected to investment, and Pi measures the impact of lagged investment on growth and 
is expected to be positive.
The evidence that follows will bring the developing world fragmented by regions. 
Data from Summers & Heston (1995) -  The Penn World Table, Mark 5.6 -  on output 
growth and lagged investment, ranging from 1960 to 1980, will be used for 47 African 
countries, 21 Asian countries and 25 Latin American countries6.
This aggregated analysis is important because it avoids a country-by-country 
analysis. It is well known that the specific complexities of developing countries pose 
strong constraints to the objective of reaching generality. The empirical exercise that 
follows has as its main goal to establish a general proposition in terms of the predicted 
connection between growth and investment in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
An important warning is needed here. In what follows, I will not test any single 
model summarized in the first part of this chapter. The empirical evidence has a single 
purpose: to show that investment has not been positively related to economic growth in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America, and thus, the practices conducted under the general 
optimism towards physical capital accumulation should not receive credit. The question 
is: Is investment positively and significantly related to output growth in the developing 
world?
Africa
The relation to be focused on here is that expressed in equation (1.22): output 
growth is determined by to the share of lagged investment in national income. I will use
6 A list of all 47 African, 21 Asian and 25 Latin American countries and respective regression’s results are 
included in Appendix I.
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data on percentage (GDPg)t and on percentage (INV/GDP)t-i, for Africa, Asia and Latin 
America.
According to the evidence contained in Table 1.1 and Figure LI (see Appendix I), 
Africa’s investment share for the period of time under focus is not positively correlated 
with Africa’s output growth. The coefficient o f correlation (-0.034) between the two 
variables is very close to zero and shows that the relationship between growth and 
investment is negative. The overall increasing trend of the lagged share of Africa’s 
investment is not associated with short-run growth -  physical capital accumulation, and 
thus, investment (savings) in Africa during the sixties and seventies is not positively 
related to economic growth. To reinforce these findings, 1 regressed Africa’s output 
growth on lagged investment to evaluate the direction, magnitudes and significance of the 
unique explanatory variable coefficient. The result for Africa, using the data set in Table 
1.1, is as follows:
(1.23) GDPg(i, = 5.62 -  0.036(INV/GDP)(,.i), R2 = 0.0012.
[1.83] [-0.15]
The estimated coefficient on Africa’s lagged investment is small, statistically 
insignificant (t-statistics in brackets) and presents an unexpected sign, with an R-square 
very close to zero. Note that the constant is significant and positive, which means that 
output growth would occur even if lagged investment vanishes.
Another way to address the short-run year-by-year character of the practices 
conducted in developing agencies is to test for the alluded evidence between growth and 
lagged investment using data on all African countries individually during the 20 years
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time span used here. This exercise relaxes the regional aggregation conducted in this 
section, and thus, it may capture eventual variations existing among developing countries. 
The resultant coefficient of correlation between output growth and lagged investment for 
this exercise including all 47 African countries, 20 observations for each, is only 0.13. A 
pooled regression with this data set was run and a positive and significant, but of very 
small magnitude, coefficient (0.13, t = 4.15) on lagged investment showed up. The R- 
square for this regression was only 0.018, showing the low explanatory power of 
investment for Africa’s short-run growth.
Is not this evidence contaminated with the very short-run character of the analysis 
undertaken here? To account for this, first remember that the practices conducted in many 
developing agencies refer to a year-by-year basis. Thus, the exercise focusing on four- 
year averages is a way to relax the year-by-year basis to see if lagged four-year averages 
have any impact on output growth in Africa. To see if the year-by-year analysis is 
influencing the outcome, averages for five four-year periods were calculated for the two 
variables in Table 1.1 and the resulting coefficient of correlation (0.47) points that less 
than 50 percent of the Africa’s growth rate was driven by lagged investment. The 
regression using the four-year averages showed up a very small positive and insignificant 
coefficient on lagged investment (0.18, t = 0.92), with a low R-square of 0.219. The four- 
year average results also show that lagged investment is not significantly correlated with 
Africa’s output growth.
In sum, the relation between short-run growth and lagged investment, both in a 
year-by-year basis and four-year averages, has not showed up as expected, at least for 
Africa, as the empirical evidence for the 1960s and 1970s suggests.
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Asia
Now, let us perform a similar exercise for Asia’s 21 countries. This region may be 
of special interest since some of the most successful -  in getting out of the obstacles to 
growth and development -  developing countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
South Korea) are included in the sample.
According to Table 1.2 and Figure 1.2 (see Appendix I), the expected link between 
short-run growth and investment fails too here. The coefficient of correlation (-0.068) 
between (GDPg)t and (INWGDP)i-i is close to zero and, as it was the case for Africa, it is 
negative. A regression of output growth on lagged investment was performed using the 
data included in Table 1.2 and the result for Asia is not dissimilar o f that for Africa:
(1.24) GDPgw = 6.81 -0.112(INV/GDP)(t.i), R2 * 0.0047.
[1.14] [-0.29]
Again, the predicted short-run relation between output growth and lagged 
investment in Asia seems not to hold. A very small insignificant with wrong sign 
coefficient on the explanatory variable showed up together with an R-square very close to 
zero.
The evidence using data for all 21 Asian countries, during the 20 years time span 
confirms the previous results obtained for Africa. A coefficient of correlation of only 
0.09 is obtained when output growth and lagged investment for each individual Asian 
country is considered for the two decades. The pooled regression estimates presented a 
positive significant coefficient on lagged investment, but again, of very small magnitude 
(0.09, t = 1.9), coupled with a low R-square of 0.008, clearly showing the low
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explanatory power of investment on growth.
When four-year averages are calculated for Asia, the correlation coefficient 
between the two variables is 0.62, meaning that more than sixty percent of Asian output 
growth was correlated with lagged investment when periods of four-year averages are 
considered. For this region, lagged four-year averaged investment is positively and 
significantly related to output growth. The regression for this exercise presents a highly 
positive and significant coefficient (0.44, t = 1.37), with an R-square of 0.387, indicating 
a positive association between Asia’s investment and output growth.
Therefore, four-year averaged investment has shown a positive and significant 
association with Asia’s output growth. But, the other pieces o f evidence suggest that 
there is no significant positive short-run, in a year-by-year basis, relation between output 
growth and lagged investment in Asia for the two decades under focus.
Another set of exercises was performed for Asia to see if the predicted short-run 
relation between output growth and lagged investment would be confirmed for a subset 
of Asian countries, those said to have had success in their attempts to grow in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The four Asian Tigers -  Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan -  
were selected and similar calculations were performed. As Figure I.2A (see Appendix I) 
shows, the evidence does not give support to the short-run expected relation, even 
considering that these countries have been said to “getting the prices right”. The reasons 
for the outstanding growth of these four Eastern Asia countries seems not to be related to 
short-run increments of physical capital (the coefficient of correlation between growth 
and lagged investment for the two decades analyzed here was only 0.16). Thus, even 
being said to be more efficient in their absorption o f short-run physical capital, to account
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for growth, other variables should be considered to explain the Asian Tigers successful 
performance.
All regressions for the Asian Tigers showed insignificant coefficients on the 
explanatory variable, all of them presenting very small magnitudes, coupled with very 
small R-squares. For these countries both the year-by-year and the four-year average 
exercises predicted the failure of the growth-investment link (see Appendix I).
Latin America
The evidence for Latin America showed similar results. In general, there is no 
evidence supporting the short-run positive interconnection between growth and 
investment. According to the evidence from Table 1.3 and Figure 1.3 (see Appendix I), 
Latin America data do not support the predicted positive proportionality between growth 
and lagged investment share in GDP. For this region the coefficient of correlation is 
again negative and close to zero (-0.029).
A regression of growth on lagged investment was run for Latin America, using the 
data contained in Table 1.3, and the result pointed to the same conclusion: the evidence 
on the significant positive relation between output growth and lagged investment fails in 
Latin America as well, during the sixties and seventies. The estimated equation is:
(1.25) GDPg(i) = 6.48 -  0.031(INV/GDP)(l.i), R2 = 0.0008.
[1.34] [-0.12]
Considering the individual country’s data for the whole 20 years time span, the 
correlation between output growth and lagged investment points that only around 8% of 
the former was correlated with the latter in the very short-run perspective used here. The
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pooled regression resulted in a significant coefficient on lagged investment of only 0.08 
and a disappointing R-square of 0.008.
For the exercise using four-year averages the evidence again seems to confirm 
that there is no significant relation between output growth and lagged four-year averaged 
investment -  coefficient of correlation for this exercise is only 0.47. The estimates for the 
four-year averaged regression were obtained and a positive of small magnitude and 
insignificant coefficient (0.21, t = 0.92) on lagged investment showed up, with a low R- 
square of 0.22. Latin America’s four-year averaged investment growth is not statistically 
significantly different from zero.
To sum up, it can be said that in all three regions -  considered here to be the bulk 
of the developing countries homeplaces -  analyzed in this empirical section on the 
propelled short-run interconnection between growth and investment, as suggested by 
growth-development theories and embodied in the practices of developmentists, evidence 
seems not to give support to the positive and significant expected relation. Output growth 
in the developing world is not signicantly associated with investment for the two decades 
under analysis, both in a year-by-year basis and in four-year averages. Except for Asia, 
where the four-year averaged regression showed up a higly positive and significant 
coefficient, almost all regressions detected an statistically insignificant relation between 
output growth and lagged investment, many of which presented negative and of very 
small magnitudes coefficients. Therefore, the answer for the question raised at the 
beginning of this section is no -  physical capital accumulation is not positively and 
signicantly related to economic growth in Africa, Asia and Latin America in the two 
decades under focus.
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Growth-Developroent Theories in the Forties and Fifties: Were Not There Anv Sound 
Predictions and/or Policy Prescriptions for Developing Countries?
In this section, answers for the following two questions are tried: i) What are the 
main reasons for the failure of the realization of the predicted relation between output 
growth and investment in the developing world? Or, was the failure due to misguided 
policy practices or because of the non-realism of the theoretical models used to support 
development practices, or both? ii) What could we have gotten out of growth- 
development theories as relevant to have visualized sound practices to sustained 
economic growth and why developing countries governments and policy-makers did not 
try them? To answer the first question I will rely on the arguments advanced by Letiche
(19S9) and Olson (1996), who emphasize the inappropriateness of the basic assumptions 
of growth theories, as far as application of them in undeveloped countries is concerned. 
Also, Easterly’s (1998) arguments that development practitioners have overlooked key 
variables said to be of crucial importance to base policy in developing countries will be 
under focus. The answer for the second question follows the sequence of the arguments 
in Easterly (1998) to answer the first and the conjectures advanced by Krugman (1995) 
on the non-mainstream feature of the development models summarized in the first part of 
this chapter.
The first set of arguments to explain the growth-investment fallacy for the 
developing world gives emphasis to the non-realism of the assumptions of growth 
models. The proponents of this vein affirm that market-clearing, efficiency (countries 
will operate very close to the production possibility frontier) and stability are all 
theoretical assumptions that have no correspondence in poor countries. Since growth 
models are constructed under these assumptions, any attempt to apply them to developing
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countries would be ineffective: poor countries are plagued with various types of
distortions and no market-clearing or efficiency conditions could be seen as relevant in
such distorted environments. Letiche (1959) states:
The analysis (coming from Domar’s model) presumes that by increasing investment as a 
proportion of national income underdeveloped countries would achieve a more balanced 
and higher rate of growth. Most of these countries of course require greater investment, 
but the post-Keynesian models are least applicable to their environments. There is no 
simple mechanical relationship in such countries between increased investment and 
increased real income. They suffer from all lands of bottlenecks and are quickly plagued 
by rising prices. Letiche (1959, p. 491).
It is surprisingly interesting the way Letiche (1959) advances many of the key 
aspects of the new growth-development theory (see chapter III) in the continuation of the 
above citation:
They (poor countries) require the inducement mechanism, the catalysts of economic 
development: A satisfactory balance between ego-centered and community-centered 
incentives for effective leadership in organizing their economies for efficient and rapid 
advance; minimum standards of administration and education; development of 
investment and saving institutions. Letiche (1959, p. 491).
In the same line of arguments, Olson (1996) directs attention to the features of all 
models of economic growth, including the ones of the new growth theory, in being of no 
relevance for undeveloped countries. His basic argument relies on his belief that the 
internal theoretical assumptions of these models make them useless for undeveloped 
countries, entities characterized by various sorts of distortions.
Easterly (1998), on the other hand, gives emphasis to the fact that looking at 
physical capital accumulation only has not been a correct way to make use of growth- 
development theory to base policy actions. According to him, in both branches of 
theories important variables have been left unrealized -  the external economies embodied 
in the development theoretical pieces and the technological progress focus of the Solow 
growth model. Regarding the latter, in his conception, technology adaptation would have
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been of much more relevance for developing countries than physical capital 
accumulation.
To conclude, it seems fair to say that the failure based on physical capital 
accumulation in the developing world, is much more related to theories misuse as base 
for sound development practices, as stated by Easterly (1998), and less related to theory’s 
unrealistic assumptions, as suggested by Olson (1996). Of course, the two prospects are 
interrelated in several ways, but the benefits o f sound (theoretically based) practices 
seems to be very important to developing countries, even if the involved theoretical 
models are known to be unrealistic under poor countries’ environments.
Easterly (1998) prospects on this matter give us a bridge to tackle the second 
question proposed above. According to him, the short-run practices related to physical 
capital accumulation and filling the finance gap with foreign aid (the latter to be 
considered in the next chapter) has not been shown an appropriate tool to foster economic 
growth in poor countries.
Considering the growth models summarized in the first part of this chapter, and 
the appropriateness of their application to the developing world, Easterly (1998) would 
advocate as sound practice an emphasis on technology adaptation and imitation -  the 
Solow long-run perspective, not the short-run singled optimism towards physical capital 
embodied in all growth-development models advanced in the forties and fifties. 
Regarding development models, he would have emphasized the external economies 
coming from synchronized investment and capital accumulation (of various types) to 
eliminate poverty traps as a relevant way to base government practices in developing 
countries. Also, it is worth noting that several key policy-related variables of new
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growth-development models of the nineties had been used by the authors of the 
development theory of the 1940s and 1950s, and that many policy-makers in the 
developing world have overlooked several relevant ones to guide practices aimed to 
foster economic growth in the undeveloped world.
Now, why the overlooked relevant policy-related variables from these growth- 
development of the forties and fifties have not showed up as sound guides to base 
development practices worldwide? To answer this last question it is needed a critical 
account of the short-run necessities of the developing world. It is unquestionable that the 
urgency in accumulating capital made the governments, policy-makers and private sector 
of poor countries to embrace the short-run operations embodied, mainly, in the Domar’s 
model ICOR-calculation. Even the warning of the Solow model that suggests only a 
temporary impact of savings on output growth has been overlooked. If undeveloped 
countries’ governments and policy-makers had changed the focus, in terms of visualizing 
the long-run aspects of economic growth, adaptation or imitation of new technologies 
would have deserved more attention. But, as already emphasized, this more long-run 
perspective was not in tune with the developing world urgency to develop.
Regarding development models, the perspective embodied in the ‘external 
economies’ concept has been overlooked in favor of the determination to accumulate 
physical capital. Of course, physical capital accumulation is not incompatible with the 
external economies, indeed it is the origin of them, but the emphasis on investment made 
such development models and practitioners overemphasize the pure physical capital 
accumulation process. Again, this is in tune with the urgency to develop, in vogue in 
many poor countries since the fifties.
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Another explanation for the failure of extracting relevant growth-lever variables
from development theories comes from Krugman (1995):
... the reason that the development theory that emerged in the 1940s ... failed to "make 
it” into mainstream economics was the inability of their creators to express their ideas in 
a way suitable for the modeling techniques available at the time ... Between 1960 and 
1980 high development theory was virtually buried, essentially because the founders of 
development economics failed to make their points with sufficient analytical clarity to 
communicate their essence to other economists, and perhaps even to each other. Krugman 
(1995, pp. 6-7).
Clearly, Krugman (1995) suggests that the non-analytical style of development 
models advanced in the 1940s and 1950s -  mainly Nurkse (1953) and Hirschman (1958) 
-  is the cause for misuse of the right policy-related variables. Therefore, he addresses the 
role of modem-fashion modeling as the reason for the declining importance of the so- 
called ‘high development theory’ prospects of the 1940s and 1950s, and consequently, for 
the unsound or misuse of those prospects as support to guide policy action. Despite 
Krugman’s arguments may have a role to play, a more plausible argument to explain 
development models shortcomings is that poor economic performance developing 
countries presented in terms of growth and development in the second half of the 20th 
century discredited those models as relevant tools. In general, such poor performance 
could be seen as a consequence of policy actions guided by the short-run prospects of 
growth-development theories, as already mentioned. This second possibility is more 
appealing than Krugman’s, mainly if we recognize that formalization by itself neither 
guarantees theoretical success nor policy action appropriateness.
Cpnglysjop
Chapter I addressed important aspects on the analysis of the link between 
economic growth and physical capital accumulation in the developing world. A summary 
of growth-development models of the 1940s and 1950s was presented, with em phasis
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given to the models’ predictions and policy implications. The growth models o f Domar 
(1946) and Solow (1956) were considered as the relevant ones to the analysis. In both 
models, it was showed that the prediction that output growth goes with physical capital 
accumulation made them important support for practices in the developing world, mainly 
when the short-run perspective was considered. Also, the development models by 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Nurkse (1953) and Hirschman (1958) were treated as the 
major developments in this field during the forties and fifties. From these models, despite 
their dissimilarities in pointing to different routes to capital formation and accumulation, 
the prediction that growth was driven by investment was transparent. Based on this, I 
claimed that a general optimism towards physical capital accumulation permeated the 
practices o f many developing agencies and governments around the world. For this 
reason, the empirical exercise focused on the predicted link in reference to these 
practices, as strongly influenced by the general optimism, which in turn can be seen as a 
consequence of the focus growth and development models put on physical capital 
accumulation.
The empirical evidence, both in a year-by-year basis -  in this case, considering 
both the regional aggregation framework and the individual country-by-country setup -  
and in four-year averages, showed that the short-run prediction that output growth would 
be positively and significantly related to lagged investment was not confirmed. Thus, the 
development practices based on the single variable physical capital were said flawed, as 
far as the three undeveloped countries’ regions -  Africa, Asia and Latin America -  are 
concerned.
Different types of arguments were suggested to explain the reasons for the failure
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of the short-run prediction on the growth-investment connection in the developing world. 
First, reasoning on the irrelevance of growth theory’s assumptions for poor countries, if 
such models are to be applied in these countries, was used to justify the failure. However, 
a more appealing line of arguments seemed to be that arguing that important growth-lever 
variables have been overlooked as sound guides for policy action in the developing 
world. Technology in Solow’s model, external economies in both Rodan-Nurkse and 
Hirschman’ models, and other important aspects of these models related to distinct types 
of capital [the human endowments warning in Nurkse (1953), and the educational and 
institutions preoccupation in Letiche (1959)] are factors that have not deserved attention7. 
Only recently these aspects have been seen as relevant for growth in a policy context -  
the branch of the new growth theory that asserts sound economic policy having a strong 
impact on long-run growth.
The evidence presented in this chapter on the failure based on physical capital 
accumulation directs us to another attempt developing countries have tried towards 
growth-development, that based on the role of International Financial Institutions as 
rescuers of distressed countries.
7 More important, all those overlooked variables said to be relevant to foster growth-development are 
related to the long-run, term not envisioned by growth-development based policy in the developing world.
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CHAPTER n
POVERTY, FOREIGN AID, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
THE FAILURE BASED ON STABILIZATION-STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
PROGRAMS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Introduction
Chapter II deals with issues related to the role of rich country governments and 
their financial institutions as rescuers of developing countries in difficulties. It was 
mentioned in chapter I that the link between investment and foreign aid could be 
considered as important as the predicted interconnection between growth and investment 
derived from the models summarized there. It was seen that the practice chosen to close 
the difference between poor countries domestic savings and the required amount of 
investment needed has been to attract foreign money, mainly in the form of aid. Thus, aid 
was expected to impact positively on investment.
This chapter accesses first the issues related to the aid enterprise, i.e., the common 
practice of developing countries in absorbing foreign money as concessional loans from 
advanced-rich country governments and their financial institutions. Implicit in this 
practice is, as mentioned above, the belief that aid is positively related to investment in 
developing countries. Second, the practices of two important International Financial 
Institutions -  The World Bank and The International Monetary Fund (IMF) -  will be 
considered. These institutions have been conducting a wide range of activities related to 
stabilization-structural adjustment lending to poor countries in the second half of the 20th 
century. It should be said in advance that a large part o f the money attached to
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stabilization adjustment lending (highly non-concessional loans) differs substantially 
from that related to foreign aid (100% concessional).
The basic questions to be raised and answered in this chapter are the following: i) 
Is it reasonable to assume that foreign aid is positively related to investments in the 
developing world? And, is it reasonable to conjecture that aid together with investment 
have a positive impact on output growth in the developing world? ii) Regarding 
stabilization-structural adjustment lending, have the active roles of the World Bank and 
IMF been positive in terms of solving the most prominent difficulties of poor countries in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America?8 The answers to both questions will be given in the 
empirical sections on foreign aid and the social-economic conditions prevailing in the 
developing world in the first half of the nineties, respectively.
The empirical exercise on foreign aid will make use of a new improved data set 
developed by Chang et al. (1998) in the World Bank (The Effective Development 
Assistance-EDA data set) to evidence the failure of the suggested link between aid and 
investment in poor countries between 1975 and 1990. Additionally, this data set will be 
combined with those from the Penn World Table 5.6 to extend the empirical exercise. 
The growth-investment-aid link in the developing world will also be taken into account. 
Regarding the roles of the two international financial institutions in the developing world, 
an overview of the empirical findings on the effectiveness of stabilization-structural 
adjustment lending will be presented. I anticipate that the failure based on these
8 We recognize that the main purpose of the World Bank and the IMF is more directly related to stabilizing 
and structuring the economy. Macro variables, such as the balance of payments, current account, inflation, 
fiscal budget and GDP growth are, in general, the targets. Thus, despite the main goal of these institutions 
is not related to poor countries’ domestic social difficulties, at least in the perspective of the developing 
world, it is expected that economic stabilization-structuring will translate into better social-economic 
conditions in these countries.
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stabilization-structural adjustment lending as well as on foreign aid will be evidenced via 
a very simple empirical account relative to poor countries’ conditions in the nineties.
Chapter II is structured as follows. Next section reports the developing world’s 
poverty status given by the Head-Count Index defined as the percentage of people, in a 
given country or region, living below a limiting poverty line of $370 per capita annual (in 
198S-PPP dollars). The following section will investigate both the investment-aid 
connection and the growth-investment-aid link in the developing world from 197S to 
1990. The section on the reasoning and assessment of the Word Bank and IMF’s 
stabilization-structural adjustment programs follows and an empirical account of the 
social-economic conditions prevailing in the developing world in the first years of the 
nineties is presented. Concluding remarks on the overall issues close the chapter.
A Word on Poverty Worldwide 
In an analysis on the role of rescuers, helpers, donors, etc, it is important to take 
into account the quantitative measurement of poverty worldwide, as far as scarce rich 
countries financial resources needed are concerned. It is doubtful that the genuine goal of 
foreign aid and/or money lending rich countries and their financial institutions allocate in 
the developing world is to reduce poverty, but we can contend that alleviation of 
difficulties in needed countries are implicitly considered when programs are conjectured 
and disbursements made.
The first task in measuring poverty worldwide is to find a definition of that 
concept. Squire (1993) uses the Head-Count Index as a measure o f absolute poverty. This 
index labels a person living in a given country or region as poor if he or she makes less 
than $370 annually. Therefore, the Head-Count Index gives the percentage of persons
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whose annual incomes are below that established poverty line.
Chart 1 shows the Head-Count Index for the developing world in 1990. Chen et 
al. (1992) calculated these figures from data on 31 countries, representing around 80% of 
the population in the developing world. According to Chart 1, the three undeveloped 
regions focused on in this chapter -  Africa, Asia and Latin America -  are very 
representative in terms of their evidenced poverty. East Europe shows a far smaller Head- 
Count Index compared to the other regions -  only 7% of the population in East Europe is 
below the poverty line. On the other hand, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia present 
the impressive figure of almost 50%, meaning that around half o f the population in these 
two regions is classified as poor by the Head-Count Index.
CHART I
POVERTY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD -1990
[Source: Chen et al. (1992)]
Regions Head-Count Index (%)







The Asian Tigers’ region (East Asia) has also a comparatively small figure: only 
11% of its population earns less than $370 per year. Regarding Latin America, one 
quarter of the its people remains below that line in 1990. The aggregate figure points out 
that one-third of the developing world population -  more than one billion people in 1990 
-  lives below the poverty line, and a larger fraction is obtained if East Europe is 
excluded.
The relevant question that must be asked is: What can we say on the effectiveness
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and necessity of foreign aid and/or stabilization-structural adjustment lending in the past, 
present and future? Looking at Chart 1 figures is not an appropriate way to address the 
issue, since the Head-Count Index in 1990 may be reflecting improvements if compared 
to figures of past years, as a consequence of eventual actions of foreign rescuers. If this is 
the case, may be foreign aid and/or stabilization-structural adjustment lending have had 
and still have a role to play in the developing world. Despite this section is not conclusive 
on the effectiveness and necessity of aid and/or adjustment lending, its main goal is to 
explicitly evidence the poverty status of the developing world. The route we take to 
approach the broader issue related to aid-lending effectiveness in the developing world 
comes next, first considering the investment-aid and the growth-investment-aid 
connections and then assessing the practices of the World Bank and the IMF.
Investment-Aid and Growth-Investment-Aid in the Developing World 
One feature of the analysis to be conducted in this chapter is that there are no 
theoretical developments influencing policy practices, as was the case in chapter I when 
growth-development models were said to influence the practices of developing countries 
towards physical capital accumulation. Despite there is a large literature on the politics of 
aid and on the prospects related to the International Financial Institutions’ neo-liberal 
ideology, we assume away all aspects attached to them and focus on the empirical 
interrelation between investment-aid and growth-investment-aid in the three selected 
developing country regions. Therefore, matters related to the roles of the IMF and the 
World Bank as poor country rescuers will not be analyzed as part o f the broader issue 
relative to ideological-based theoretical constructions or to any mechanism that connects 
theoretical models with interventions.
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The first task towards the assessment of the role of foreign aid in the developing 
world is to give a meaningful definition of what does constitute aid and what does not, as 
well as to state the donor and recipient parties. Recipients in the analysis that follows are 
the developing countries of the three regions studied in chapter 1 - 4 0  countries from 
Africa, 14 countries from Asia and 23 countries from Latin America9. These regions 
house the bulk of poor countries’ population living below the poverty line defined by the 
Head-Count Index above. On the other hand, donors are basically OECD and other 
European countries10. Foreign aid can be given either directly by national governments or 
their national financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF in the USA. Aid 
disbursements are given upon policy reforms commitment of recipient countries. One 
important distinction to be made is that only part of the financial institutions’ loans to 
developing countries should be considered as aid. For example, the IMF’s highly 
concessional loans such as SAF (Structural Adjustment Facility) and ESAF (Extended 
SAF) are not one hundred per cent computed as foreign aid, since there is a small fraction 
that is not a grant and must be repaid in the future. On the other hand, standard IMF’s 
loans (highly non-concessional stabilization lending) cannot be considered as aid at all, 
since future repayments of principal and interests are contractually explicit.
This distinction serves to the goal of giving a sound definition to foreign aid. In 
this chapter, foreign aid is defined as the sum of the grant part plus the concessional 
portion of all official development loans given to developing countries. This is to say,
9 This is a shorter list of countries per region compared to the list of chapter I. Because of missing data, 7 
countries were dropped from Africa, 7 from Asia and 2 from Latin America. Hence, the list of countries in 
chapter II is a subset of that in chapter I.
10 For the ranking of the top 20 donors in three different periods of time (1981-85,1986-90,1991-95), see 
Chang et al. (1998, p. 39, Figure 4.8).
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portions of the aid package that recipient countries need to repay in the future are not 
considered as aid. This is one of the major improvements made by Chang et al. (1998) in 
their new data set on foreign aid, called Effective Development Assistance. The standard 
measure of foreign aid -  the OECD’s Net ODA (Official Development Assistance) -  
mostly used in previous studies on aid does not make the needed adjustments to take into 
account the non-concessional portions of official development loans, and for this reason, 
it overestimates the true amount of aid disbursed. In what follows the EDA data set will 
be used to evidence the fallacy that foreign aid is positively related to investment in 
developing countries.
Africa
Now let us go through the empirical evidence on the aid-investment connection in 
Africa. Starting with the assumption that aid is positively related to investment, the 
equation to be estimated is given by:
(2.1) INV(t)/GDP(i) = p0 + Pi[EDA(.)/GDP(.)],
where Po is the constant and is included to capture investment not connected with aid and 
Pi measures the impact of foreign aid on investment and is expected to be positive.
Data on the dependent variable are from Summers & Heston (199S), the Penn 
World Table Mark S.6, and on EDA from Chang et al. (1998). Missing data for 1990 in 
the Penn World Table for Angola, Botswana, Niger, Somalia, Swaziland and Zaire were 
filled in with data from the World Bank web site 'Africa Live Database’11.
u  The web site to access this database on Africa is: http://www.worldbank.org/html/extiib/aldb.htm.
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According to the evidence contained in Table II.A1 and Figure II.A1 (see
Appendix IIA), it is clearly seen that foreign aid given to Africa during the 1975-90
period is not positively correlated with investments. Actually, the correlation is
significantly negative, which is in accordance with the view that stresses the bad
incentive structure free money can impinge upon economic activities. For instance, The
Economist issue of August 19, 1995, referring to the Kenyan experience with
disbursements of foreign aid, states:
The steps are: One, Kenya wins its yearly pledges of foreign aid. Two, the government 
begins to misbehave,... Three, a new meeting of donor countries looms with exasperated 
foreign governments preparing their sharp rebukes. Four, Kenya pulls a placatory rabbit 
out of the hat. Five, the donors are mollified and aid is pledged. The whole dance then 
starts again. The Economist (1995, p. 72).
The coefficient of correlation between investment and foreign aid in Africa is 
close to one (-0.74) and detects a negative relationship between investment and aid. The 
increasing trend of foreign aid is not matched with increasing investment. Instead, 
investment as a proportion of Africa’s GDP is decreasing in the period under 
investigation. To reinforce this finding, I regressed Africa’s investment on foreign aid to 
evaluate the direction, magnitudes and significance of the explanatory variable. Using the 
data in Table II A l ,  the estimated equation for Africa is:
(2.2) INV(o/GDP(q = 16.3 -  3.7[EDA«/GDP(t)], R2 = 0.55.
[13.4] [-4.1]
The estimated coefficient on foreign aid given to Africa is statistically significant 
(t-statistics in brackets) and presents a negative sign with a reasonable R-square figure -  
aid has explanatory power, but it is negatively related to investment. Thus, foreign aid is 
negatively correlated with investment in Africa, a fact that is consistent with the
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viewpoint that aid has not given the right incentives to African countries’ economic 
activities. The highly significant and positive constant points out that investment in 
Africa would be substantial even when foreign aid vanishes12.
Now, an extension will be performed to see whether or not both investment and 
aid have impacted positively on Africa’s output growth. The equation to be estimated is:
(2.3) GDPgw = Po + Pi [INV/GDP](,.i) + p2[EDA/GDP](t l)
The estimation yields:
(2.4) GDPftt) = -9.71 + 0.7[INV/GDP](l.i) + 1.36[EDA/GDP](l.,), R2 = 0.177.
[-1.241 [1.51] [0.59]
The estimated equation shows a positive but insignificant coefficient on foreign 
aid and a positive and significant coefficient on investment with a low R-square. Thus, 
aid has not significantly impacted on Africa’s output growth either.
These empirical results are consistent with other related works on the impact of 
foreign aid on African countries’ economic performance. The earlier citation on the 
behavior of the Kenyan government and the aid donor countries [The Economist (1995)] 
already gave us a flavor on the incentive structure foreign aid has propitiated in Africa. 
Regarding the relation between aid, investment and growth, Easterly (1998) states that 
the most spectacular failure of the aid-investment-growth connection can be exemplified
12 The pooled regression -  regressing investment on foreign aid using data on all African countries 
individually during the 16 years time span -  showed a significant and unusually high positive coefficient 
(46095) on EDA, but a very close to zero R-square (0.049).
54
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
by the Zambian case. Zambia has had one of the highest aid shares in Africa and has 
increased neither its investment nor its per capita growth rate in the 1960-90 period. 
Burnside & Dollar (1997), also referring to Zambia, state that Zambian government 
policy deteriorated continuously from 1970 until 1993, despite the large amount of aid 
flowing into this country -  recall that foreign aid is given upon policy reforms 
commitment.
Asia
Let us now perform a similar exercise for Asia. Because of missing data, only 14 
Asian countries are considered here. Missing data for 1990 in the Penn World Table 
Mark 5.6 for Myanmar were filled in with data from the WorldFact Book (1990). From 
Table II.A2, foreign aid given to Asia as a share of the region’s GDP is of smaller 
magnitude compared to that given to Africa between 1975 and 1990.
According to Table II.A2 and Figure II.A2 (see Appendix II.A), the expected 
positive correlation between investment and foreign aid fails here as well. The overall 
increasing trend of Asia’s investment is not positively associated with foreign aid: for the 
whole period foreign aid has showed to be constant. Note that the coefficient of 
correlation between the two variables is also negative (as it was for Africa), but here it is 
very close to zero. This is confirmed by the estimated equation for Asia given by:
(2.5) INV(t)/GDP(t) = 19.7 -  2.9[EDA(«)/GDP(«)], R2 = 0.034.
[19.9] [-0.7]
For this region, the relation between foreign aid and investment is negative too, 
but we cannot reject a zero coefficient on the explanatory EDA variable. Here the
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explanatory power of aid is very small (R-square = 0.034) and, as was pointed out earlier 
for Africa, even if all aid vanishes, Asia’s investment would be significantly positive, as 
given by the constant term (t-statistics in brackets)13. Therefore, foreign aid cannot be 
said being positively correlated to Asia’s overall increasing investment. There is a large 
literature on the outstanding economic performance of East Asian countries in the period 
1975-90 that emphasizes technological advances, educational attainments and industrial 
policy as the key explanatory variables for the economic prosperity of this region. 
Connection with foreign aid, however, has not been reported as a relevant cause of the 
whole process. Among the countries included in the sample here are one of the big four 
tigers (South Korea) and three small ones (Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand).
The evidence for the other link relating output growth to both investment and aid 
reinforce these results. The estimated equation for Africa is:
(2.6) GDPg(i) = 8.52 -  0.25[INV/GDP](l.,) -  2.02[EDA/GDP](t.l), R2 = 0.016.
[0.73] [-0.43] [-0.22]
According to the estimated equation, neither investment nor foreign aid has been 
significant to explain output growth in Africa. Note that both coefficients are negative 
and the value of the R-square is very close to zero.
Latin America
For Latin America, missing data for 1990 in the Penn World Table Mark 5.6 for 
Barbados were filled in with data from the WorldFact Book (1990). The evidence for this
13 The pooled regression for this region mirrors these results. An insignificant and negative coefficient on 
aid (-28339, t = -1.3) shows up with a significant and positive constant (17.2, t = 31) and an R- square of 
0.007.
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region showed similar results of that of Africa. From Table II.A3 and Figure I1.A3 (see 
Appendix II.A), it can be seen that foreign aid is significant and negatively related to 
investment. The correlation between the two variables is very close to one and negative (- 
0.88), pointing out to the fact that in Latin America, as was the case for Africa, the bad 
incentives behind the aid enterprise can also be conjectured.
It is evident from Table II.A3 that Latin America is the region with relatively 
smaller amount of foreign aid in this period, if compared to either Africa or Asia. It 
should be mentioned that the highly non-concessional loans disbursed by the IMF to 
Latin American countries are not considered as foreign aid. As was said earlier, a feature 
of the EDA data set used here is that it excludes the portions of the loans that involve 
repayments. This is one of the reasons for the relative smaller figures on aid Latin 
America reports in the EDA data set.
Using the data on Table II.A3, the estimated equation for Latin America is:
(2.7) INV(t)/GDP(t) = 23.7 -  75.7[EDAw/GDP(t)], R2 = 0.78.
[24.9] [-7.04]
As can be seen, foreign aid has showed a negative relation to Latin America’s 
investment14. A highly significant and negative coefficient on foreign aid with a high R- 
square points out to the poor incentive structure foreign aid may have on Latin America’s 
investments. The overall increasing trend of aid flows into this region was not associated 
with increasing investment in the period 1975-90.
14 The pooled regression for Laun America also mirrors these results: a positive and significant constant 
(15.8, t = 50.1) and a significant and negative coefficient on aid (-43295, t = -2.5), with an R-square of 
0.017.
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The extension relating output growth with investment and aid for Latin America 
presents the following result:
(2.8) GDPg(i) = 38.9 -  1.46[INV/GDP](t.i) -  156.9[EDA/GDP](t.i), R2 = 0.59.
[3.8] [-3.42] [-4.3]
For Latin America, both investment and aid impact negative and significantly on 
output growth, confirming the already evidenced results.
The overall results of the empirical exercise performed here, therefore, do not 
support the expected positive relation either between foreign aid and investment or aid, 
investment and growth in the developing world. For two of the three regions, the 
estimated impact of foreign aid on investment has showed up significantly negative 
during the period 1975-90. Even if it is not possible to affirm that foreign aid has been 
bad for investment -  because other relevant variables, such as external shocks, internal 
natural catastrophes, etc, are missing in the empirical specification -  we can neither 
contend that it has been positively related with investment in the developing world. As an 
implication of this finding, we disapprove the practices o f development agencies around 
the developing world through the calculation of the financing gap to be filled with foreign 
aid. Implicitly in that practice is the fact that aid impacts positively on investment, a 
prediction that is not supported by the empirical exercise performed above. Therefore, the 
answer for the first question raised before is no -  it is not reasonable to assume that 
foreign aid is positively related to investment in the developing world.
Various authors have found similar results in different contexts. Boone (1994) 
finds a zero coefficient on aid in a cross-section investment regression using data on more
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than one hundred developing countries and points out that foreign aid has not been 
effective in fostering investment at all. Easterly (1997), conducting an empirical exercise 
in a country-by-country basis, finds that sixty percent of the developing countries in his 
sample of 88 countries presents a significant and negative coefficient on foreign aid, 
when regressed against the dependent variable investment. Only six countries -  Hong 
Kong, China, Tunisia, Morocco, Malta and Sri Lanka -  showed a positive and significant 
coefficient on foreign aid, the first two countries with a trivial amount. On the other hand, 
Burnside & Dollar (1997), using the EDA data and a panel data set on 56 developing 
countries over six four-year time period from 1970-73 until 1990-93, state that foreign 
aid has had no impact on economic policy in developing countries. Moreover, they find 
that on average aid has had no impact on growth in these countries. Burnside & Dollar
(1997) rely on past and recent worksls that point out to the fact that foreign aid has had 
no significant positive impact on investment and economic growth in developing 
countries. However, they introduce a tripartite index of economic policy -  budget 
surplus, inflation and trade openness -  and interact it with foreign aid and growth to 
conclude that in developing countries where good policy coincides with foreign aid, the 
latter has a positive and significant impact on growth. This is an important finding to base 
foreign aid related activities in donor and recipient countries in the present and near 
future. Chapter III will bring policy-related issues back, but under the influence of the 
new growth-development theory and the new literature on political economy, a 
perspective not envisioned by Burnside & Dollar (1997).
The next section brings the activities of two important financial institutions whose
15 For example, Griffin (1970), Weisskopf (1972), Chenery & Syrquin (1975), Mosley et aL (1987), Levy 
(1988) and Boone (1994,1996).
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active role as rescuers in the developing world has been widely questioned. There is a 
general rancor, at least as far as the developing world economies and their people are 
concerned, that the foreign help has not been effective in solving the most prominent 
difficulties of poor countries. The question then is: have the active roles of the World 
Bank and the IMF been positive in terms of solving the most prominent difficulties of 
poor countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America?
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund: Reasoning and Assessment 
In this section I assess the roles of the Word Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund as lenders of funds to finance stabilization-structural adjustments in the developing 
world. Despite the two institutions perform both types of lending, the most important role 
related to the World Bank is as a programmer of structural adjustment programs. The 
IMF stands as an important source of funds for both purposes. In practice, it is hard to 
separate the influences related to IMF-supported stabilization-structural policies to those 
of World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment plans because of superposing and 
concurrency between the two. Conway (1991), attempting to measure the impact of the 
World Bank-supported structural adjustment programs in developing countries’ 
economies, states that his measures should be interpreted as the joint impact of the two.
Another warning refers to the characteristics of the financial funds disbursed by 
the World Bank and IMF in their practices as lenders. Here both stabilization and 
structural funds include grant parts, i.e., aid, in the loans disbursed, IFM stabilization 
loans, however, involving lesser amount, since it is characterized as highly non­
concessional lending. Therefore, aid is also implicitly present in the activities of both the 
World Bank and IMF as lenders of stabilization and structural money to developing
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countries. The center of the analysis in this section, however, is to address their activities 
in terms of the effectiveness and necessity of stabilization-structural adjustment programs 
in alleviating the social-economic difficulties of poor countries.
The World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs
Here I review the empirical literature on the effectiveness and necessity of the 
structural adjustment programs sponsored by the World Bank. In general, there is a 
dichotomy in the literature. On one side, proving the effectiveness and necessity of the 
sponsored programs is the most relevant objective -  it does not matter the social- 
economic conditions of the developing countries, what matters is the effectiveness of the 
programs, after controlling for domestic distortions, external shocks, etc. The usual 
practice to measure effectiveness in this front is to look if the trend of key- 
macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, exports, fiscal budget, savings, and GDP 
growth are responding in accordance to what is expected. On the other side, there is a 
large amount of writings emphasizing the perverse results attached to the implementation 
of structural programs in developing countries. The common viewpoint here is the 
opposite. Looking at the deteriorating conditions of the social-economic reality of poor 
countries without filtering what is consequence of implemented foreign-supported 
programs and what comes from the turbulence of external and internal shocks specific of 
each developing country is the way critical appraisals arise. In this front, looking at 
macro aggregate variables is an irrelevant way to access effectiveness.
I interpret the first side of the dichotomy -  the effectiveness reasoning -  as an 
important force supporting the continuation of the stabilization-structural adjustment 
practices by International Financial Institutions. Despite its relevance and unquestionable
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validity, this approach brings the shortcoming of not recognizing that in the developing 
world, distortions, vulnerabilities, weaknesses, bottlenecks, etc, are the rule instead of the 
exception. Therefore, lending programs sponsored by International Financial Institutions 
should recognize and internalize these features connected to the third world. It is ease to 
preview that after controlling for all the potential distortions related to poor country’s 
realities the effectiveness of those programs would be a certainty. In the extreme, i.e., 
after controlling for everything bad, it would be like applying such programs to a rich 
country environment.
Note also that methodologically, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
unambiguously measure the economic adjustment poor countries incur as a consequence 
of the implementation of structural adjustment programs. The only feasible measurement 
empirical exercises can report is that of the effect of adjustment lending on these 
countries, not the adjustment itself -  as it is well known, adjustment lending is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for adjustment16. Simple comparisons of before-after or with- 
without structural adjustment programs are not conducted without problem. In the former, 
it is hard to isolate the effect of other things common to developing countries -  nature, 
distortions, corruption, domestic and international shocks, politics, etc. In the latter, it is 
problematic to choose a controlling group of countries without programs -  a common 
practice in the empirical literature -  with similar features of those where programs are 
being implemented. Even if we can find countries being similar in some features to 
others, the specific internal and external environments which the controlling group 
countries interact with poses strong constraints to any attempt to measuring the
16 Chile has been successful as a reformer without any adjustment lending, while Zambia, despite tons of 
adjustment lending, has not showed up as a promising reformer.
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effectiveness of structural adjustment programs in the developing world via the with- 
without approach.
On the other hand, under the perspective of the developing world itself, it is
crucial to look at the social-economic conditions and ask if the roles o f the international
rescuers have been positive, in terms of helping poor countries to get out of the most
prominent social problems they face. For instance, suppose that poor social-economic
conditions of developing countries are due to nature, distortions and the like, and thus not
because of the effects of sponsored stabilization-structural programs. In this event, we
can contend that the latter have their role minimized as effective instruments to help in
solving the prominent difficulties of poor countries under distortions, and thus, claim for
neither effectiveness nor necessity, even if key-macro aggregates are showing the aimed
trends. I will follow this perspective later to evidence the failure based on the application
of stabilization-structural adjustment programs in the developing world. Before going on
to the empirical account of the social-economic conditions o f the developing world
visited by the World Bank -  the three regions Africa, Asia and Latin America -  I will
summarize the empirical findings on the effectiveness-necessity of the structural
adjustment programs sponsored by the World Bank in these regions.
To begin, it is important to mention that the presence of the World Bank in the
developing world dates since the time of its creation in the middle forties. But, it was in
the late seventies and eighties that its role became important as a promoter of changes in
developing countries. As Summers & Pritchett (1993) state:
The last decade (1980s) has witnessed dramatic changes in economic policy in the 
developing world ... The design of structural adjustment programs directed at the four 
“ ...ations” -  stabilization, liberalization, deregulation, privatization -  has become a 
cottage industry ... Efforts at structural adjustment have been assisted and encouraged by 
the international community, most directly through multilateral financial institutions ...
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Structural-adjustment lending (lending conditioned on specific economic policy changes) 
has emerged as a major instrument of World Bank support to developing countries ...
Given the extent of economic change that structural-adjustment programs have wrought, 
it is hardly surprising they have been controversial. Summers & Pritchett (1993, p. 383).
This citation contains various important aspects. First, it shows the neo-liberal
ideology common in the practices of International Financial Institutions during the
seventies and eighties. Second, structural adjustment programs sponsored by the World
Bank are supposedly given upon developing countries commitment to good policy. Third,
because of the wide range of chains structural adjustment programs contemplate they are
potentially controversial in terms of their eventual effectiveness. Thus, it should be
pointed out upfront that the issues related to the role of the World Bank in helping poor
countries to get out of the economic difficulties via structural adjustment lending are very
complex.
Five important results coming from the empirical literature in the nineties on the 
impact of World Bank-supported structural adjustment programs in developing countries 
can be listed17:
i) In general, faster GDP growth, higher exports and lower fiscal deficits are 
realized in countries experiencing structural adjustment programs;
ii) Aggregate measures of inflation and investment in developing countries with 
structural programs have not behaved as expected. As far as investment is 
concerned, this is consistent with the first section finding that foreign aid has had 
no positive correlation with investment in Africa, Asia and Latin America;
iii) Regarding short-run and long-run trends, while employment, wages, exports and
17 These empirical results are summarized from Kaufmann (1991), Conway (1991), Corbo & Fisher (1991), 
Faini et al. (1991), Corbo & Rojas (1992), Elbadawi et al. (1992), The World Bank (1992) and Summers & 
Pritchett (1993).
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prices can adjust relatively quickly, growth-oriented adjustments take time to 
show up. One of the most important issues related to structural adjustment 
programs is that related to the trade-off between short and long-run trends o f key 
macroeconomic variables. For instance, reduction of employment and wages in 
the short-run may pose strong obstacles to the long-run goal of a higher growth 
rate of output, because of the unpopular consequences of unemployment and 
wage reductions on people’s living conditions;
iv) Structural adjustment programs have been more successful in middle-income 
countries than in low-income countries. This finding is consistent with the 
viewpoint that where good policy is combined with consolidated institutions and 
foreign aid economic performance tends to be better18. Note that this conclusion 
may limit the relevance of structural adjustment programs in the developing 
world. On the one hand, since low-income countries are majority in the 
developing world, effectiveness of adjustment programs sponsored by the World 
Bank is potentially exposed to failure when applied in such countries. On the 
other, since middle-income countries are better equipped with tools to combine 
good policy with their solid institutions, why then is it necessary to ask for 
structural adjustment lending from abroad? As Summers & Pritchett (1993, p. 
384) state, “countries whose economies are doing well do not have difficulty 
attracting capital from abroad and (should not) undertake adjustment programs”;
v) Structural adjustment programs have helped, but not solved the most prominent 
difficulties, including long-run growth, of most low-income countries in the
>K This is the culprit of Olson's (1996) analysis in explaining the economic success of some middle-income
countries. He, however, does not connect his reasoning to any prospect related to foreign help.
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whole developing world, and mainly in Africa. This last finding coming from the 
empirical literature on the prospects of World Bank-sponsored structural 
adjustment programs applied to the developing world is very relevant to sound the 
exercise to be performed later in this chapter. I will select a set of social indicators 
of development from poor countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to address 
the failure based on structural adjustments as a mean to alleviate poor countries 
most prominent difficulties.
Another important empirical investigation recently conducted by Dollar & 
Svensson (1998) on World Bank’s structural adjustment programs rinds that the 
probability of success or failure of these programs are uniquely determined by internal 
social-political conditions within developing countries. They conclude that no matter 
what the efforts of the World Bank in preparing, perfecting, analyzing and supervising 
are, the success of structural adjustment programs are significant and positively related to 
domestic economic stability, internal social cohesion and democratically elected 
governments. If internal poor country’s conditions are vulnerable, the predicted ability to 
detect a program failure is on average 80%. Despite Dollar & Svensson (1998) rind this 
evidence as an important support in rethinking a better way to disburse money connected 
to structural adjustment lending sponsored by the World Bank, it is not less important in 
terms of the developing world itself. It is the ultimate characteristics of a given country 
that determine the extension of success of a World Bank supported program. Moreover, 
since internal vulnerabilities are the rule instead of the exception in the developing world, 
reasons for being skeptical with adjustment lending of the type analyzed here can be 
easily conjectured.
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The country’s social-political perspective advanced by Dollar & Svensson (1998), 
in their assessment of the reasons explaining the success or failure of World Bank’s 
structural adjustment programs in the developing world, is an important aspect to base the 
analysis of the next chapter. I will highlight that perspective as the main stream of the 
new literature on political economy in the nineties and combine it with the advances 
recently reached in the new growth-development literature to setup a general outline 
aimed to guide development practices in developing countries. Also, Dollar & Svesson’s
(1998) perspective is convergent with that of Burnside & Dollar (1997) on the 
effectiveness result coming from the combination of good policy, solid institutions and 
foreign aid in the economic activities of developing countries. The two perspectives 
together can be used to claim either radical change in the conduction of foreign lending to 
the developing world or non-viability at all of these activities. Before going on this, let us 
now introduce another rescuer -  The International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The IMF-Supported Adjustment Programs
The IMF’s role in the developing world is far more controversial than that of the 
World Bank. One of the reasons is that IMF-supported adjustment programs bring a more 
complex mix of short-run stabilization and long-run structural reforms as compared to 
those of the World Bank. Moreover, as was mentioned earlier, stabilization lending from 
the IMF involves highly non-concessional loans, which implies due future payments on 
participating developing countries, many of which already suffering from external debt 
problems. Also, the recent occurrence of financial crisis in developing countries has 
enlarged the amount of money involved in bailouts given by the IMF to distressed 
countries, and as a consequence, social, political and economic turbulence in these
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countries can inflate the controversies linked to the IMF presence as a rescuer.
The appearance of the IMF in developing countries dates from long ago. As the 
World Bank, the IMF came into existence in the Bretton Woods era and has its roles 
designed accordingly. More recently, there have been at least two trends of the IMF’s 
roles in the developing world. They are pertinently stated by Bordo & Schwartz (1999) as 
follows:
... the rescues mounted in the 1990s differ from their predecessors, ... Unlike their 
predecessors, these arose because of capital account, not current account, reversals.
Capital flight produced the crisis in each country, beginning with a devaluation of the 
nau’onal currency that had fixed or crawling peg U’ed to the dollar or a basket of 
currencies. The intemau'onal rescues of the 1990s mark a watershed in the purpose, size, 
and term of the funds provided to (sic) countries in distress. The loans in the era before 
the 1990s were extended to help monetary authorities in their attempt to preserve a peg, 
while loans of the 1990s were made after the peg collapsed and to bail out investors and 
lenders who would otherwise have suffered from the fall of the exchange rate. These 
bailouts have been justified on the ground that they will prevent contagion spreading to 
other countries. Bordo & Schwartz (1999, pp. 4-5).
This citation stresses an important difference in IMF’s recent practices as a 
rescuer, as well as when compared to those of the World Bank summarized above. Before 
the nineties, the standard was to disburse money to avoid economic problems connected 
to an eventual disturbance of a pegged exchange rate. In the 1990s, the practice has been 
intended to protect investors and lenders, after the disruption of the pegged exchange 
rate, contagion elimination being the rationale for the disbursement of the bailout. 
Despite the importance of this fact to highlight IMF’s practices, deep financial crises in 
developing countries are not at center of the analysis in this chapter. The main purpose is 
to investigate, as was the case for the World Bank, what the empirical literature has to 
show us on the effectiveness and necessity of IMF-supported stabilization-structural 
adjustment programs in the developing world.
In general, the prospects are not different from those of the World Bank’s
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structural adjustment programs. The effectiveness issue is approached via the use of 
before-after or with-without program methodologies. The general empirical problems 
related to the measurement of programs’ effectiveness, as already mentioned in relation 
to World Bank-supported programs, apply here too. The difficulties linked to the internal 
characteristics of developing countries and the external environment where these 
countries are inserted impose strong restrictions upon the objective to evidence programs’ 
effectiveness. Even with the development of modern and sophisticated econometric tools, 
the construction of an ideal counterfactual is very complex19. Also, the broad 
macroeconomic aggregates -  balance of payments, current account, inflation and output 
growth -  are the key variables to access effectiveness. The main empirical results coming 
from the assessment of the IMF’s role as a source of stabilization and structural 
adjustments lending for developing countries are as follow20:
i) The most successful results relate to trade liberalization. In general, the empirical 
results show that either balance of payments or current account have significantly 
improved as consequence of IMF-supported stabilization-structural adjustment 
programs in the developing world;
ii) Regarding inflation and investment, the evidence is disappointing. It is found that 
reduction of the general price level is not being realized as a direct effect of IMF- 
supported programs. Also, private investments have not responded in accordance 
to what is expected. Like for the World Bank evidence, price stabilization and
19 See U1 Haque & Khan (1998) on the Generalized Evaluation Estimation methodology aimed to minimize 
the problems with the construction of an ideal counterfactual in with-without program empirical approach.
20 These empirical results are summarized from Connors (1979), Donovan (1981, 1982), Killick (1984), 
Loxley (1984), Zulu & Nsouli (1985), Goldstein & Montiel (1986), Pastor (1987), Gylfason (1987), Khan 
(1990), Conway (1994), KOlick et al. (1995), Bagci & Perraudin (1997), Dicks-Mireaux et al. (1997) and 
U1 Haque & Khan (1998).
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investment accumulation have been disappointing;
iii) Considering the impact of IMF-supported programs on output growth, there is no 
consensus -  some authors find a significant and positive relation, others no 
relation and some others negative impact in the short-run and positive in the long- 
run.
This evidence shows how controversial is the assessment of the IMF-sponsored 
stabilization-structural adjustment programs effectiveness. Even considering the key 
macro variables said to be the main target of IMF’s plans, the empirical evidence is 
unambiguous to pointing to failures. In terms of the objective of looking at internal 
social-economic conditions in poor countries visited by the IMF, it is also reasonable to 
expect failure, even if under the perspective of the IMF, this is not the main goal behind 
disbursing money attached to stabilization-adjustment programs.
Having summed up the main results coming from the empirical literature on the 
effectiveness-necessity of stabilization-structural adjustment lending sponsored by the 
World Bank and the IMF, there are at least three sets of criticisms commonly made by 
dissidents in the developing world and worldwide. First, stabilization-adjustment 
programs, due to their implied short-run ties and consequent recessions, have imposed a 
disproportionate burden on the poor, exacerbating income inequalities. Cuts to balance 
the fiscal budget are often directed to health, education and social security sectors, all of 
which the poor mostly depends on. Moreover, the strong austerity embodied in the 
programs has overcome any aim on longer ran increases in investment and productivity. 
Second, the liberal bias of stabilization-structural adjustment programs has pushed poor 
countries to the wide oscillations of the world trade markets. It has not been recognized
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that in some successful developing countries, e.g., the Asian Tigers, it has been the 
superiority of sound government intervention, not laissez-faire, that has prompted these 
countries to economic prosperity. Third, stabilization-structural adjustment lending has 
gifted bad policy governments in developing countries, perpetuating misguided economic 
policy choice. In that sense, stabilization-adjustment lending is not different in essence 
from foreign aid. In the first part of this chapter, empirical evidence on the lack of 
positive relation between aid and investment in the developing world was explicitly 
reported. In neither of the regions -  Africa, Asia and Latin America -  foreign aid seemed 
to be positively related to investment. Contrarily, the correlation was shown to be 
significantly negative. Also, as evidenced in Burnside & Dollar (1997), aid has had no 
effect on economic policy in developing countries.
From these three fronts of criticisms, I will focus on the first set -  the one related 
to the vulnerable social-economic conditions of the poor in the developing world -  to 
assess next the empirical evidence supporting it. The main concern will rely on the 
social-economic distress in the visited developing countries and the failure of the rescuers 
in solving the most prominent difficulties they have been facing.
Social-Economic Distress in the Visited Developing World: An Empirical Assessment 
Subject to the qualifications made in footnote 8 at the beginning of this chapter, 
have the active roles of the World Bank and the IMF, or foreign aid in general, been 
positive in terms of helping developing countries to get out o f their most prominent 
difficulties? I claim that the answer is no, and in terms of the developing world, this is the 
relevant issue no matter if key-macro aggregates behave as targeted by implemented 
stabilization-structural adjustment programs.
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The main objective in this section is to evidence the poverty status of the 
developing world, after many years of foreign helpers’ presence. In the empirical report 
that follows, I show that social-economic conditions in the visited developing world are 
precarious. All countries included in the sample have experienced either concessional 
foreign aid or stabilization-structural adjustment programs, or both. Several variables 
related to education, health and access to basic services are included as indicators of 
social conditions. Consumer price and unemployment are the only two economic-related 
variables included in the analysis. The figures for these variables in the three investigated 
regions are used to evidence the disastrous social-economic situation developing 
countries have been facing. Among the social indicators of development, I report figures 
on literacy, school life expectancy, access to basic services (safe water and adequate 
sanitation), life expectancy and mortality rates. In general, the arguments will be made in 
a way to avoid focusing on specific country characteristics. That is to say, the overall 
social-economic status of a specific region will be reported by ranking in-region countries 
on the variables selected. Also, no attempt will be made to relate the distressed social- 
economic conditions in a specific country to the presence or absence of stabilization- 
structural adjustment programs.
The empirical report is based on the World Bank (1996) database titled ‘Social 
Indicators of Development’ and the United Nations (1999) data set titled ‘Social 
Indicators’21. The years covered in the empirical investigation below range roughly from 
1990 to 1995.
21 Internet availability for the World Bank database at http://www.ciesin.ory/lw-ltmn/yuides/sid.htinl. For 
the United Nations data set go to http://www.un.org/Depts/unsd/social/main2.htm. See Appendix II.B for 
the whole collection of data on Asia, Latin America and Africa.
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Ma
Education-related variables -  literacy and school life expectancy -  are the first set 
to be focused on. In 1990, in 8 out of the 12 Asian countries selected in Table IIJ31 (see 
Appendix ILB), the percentage of illiterates ranges from around 20% to 65%. Only 2 out 
of the 12 countries have illiteracy rates inferior to 10% - Thailand and South Korea. In 
Pakistan, India and Bangladesh between 50% and 65% of the respective population is 
constituted by illiterates. In 1995, the situation is not different. Table II.B2 shows the 
literacy rate by gender for 15 Asian countries. Assuming that each country’s total 
population is shared equally by males and females, we see that 11 countries present total 
illiteracy rates in the range of 15%-63%. Again, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India are 
among the most precarious situations, with total illiteracy rates far above 40%. Out of the 
15 countries, only 4 present illiteracy rates inferior to 10%, among them Thailand and 
South Korea. In this table we also see how disastrous is the female situation in terms of 
literacy in Asia. In Nepal, for example, the female illiteracy rate is around 80% in 1995.
Regarding school life expectancy, Table II.B3 shows figures for only 6 Asian 
countries. School aged population in 3 countries -  Bangladesh, Syrian Arab Republic and 
Indonesia -  has 10 or less years of schooling. The extremes are again Bangladesh and 
South Korea, the former with 5 years of schooling, the latter with 14 years.
Health-related variables -  life expectancy and infant mortality -  are the second set 
to be reported. As Table II.B4 shows, in 1993, out of 12 Asian countries with data, 9 
present life expectancy between 56 and 70 years. People in Bangladesh and India live, on 
average, 15 and 11 years, respectively, less than in South Korea, where life expectancy is 
71 years. Infant and under 5 years mortality rates for these 9 countries range from around
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30 to 105 per 1000 and 40 to 137 per 1000, respectively. Out of the 9 countries under 
consideration, 4 present infant mortality above 80 per 1000 and under 5 years mortality 
above 110 per 1000. Note that there is a sharp negative correlation between mortality 
rates and the number of years of life expectancy. The United Nations (1999) estimated 
life expectancy by gender, for the period 1995-2000, in 15 Asian countries showed in 
Table 1I.B5. Assuming again that each country’s population is 50% shared by males and 
females, out o f the 15 countries listed, 11 present life expectancy, for the respective total 
population, between 57 and 70 years. The overall ranking of the countries is not 
substantially altered as compared with that in 1993 and the situation related to life 
longitudity in Asia seems at odds. Infant mortality estimates are also problematic for the 
period 1995-2000. For these 11 countries the number of infant deaths varies from 33 to 
83 per 1000 of live births, with the exception of Thailand (29 per 1000).
Regarding access to basic services, such as safe water and adequate sanitation, the 
situation is far worse in rural areas. Despite the general picture is not too bad in terms of 
the number of countries in extreme difficulties, as Table II.B6 shows, in 6 out o f the 12 
countries listed, provision of safe water and adequate sanitation is precarious for both 
urban and rural areas. In Nepal, for instance, around 40% of the population, both in urban 
and rural areas, does not have access to safe water and more than 80% of the rural 
population has no access to adequate sanitation. For the remaining 6 countries in the 
bottom of Table II.B6, safe water and adequate sanitation are guaranteed to almost 100% 
of urban population only. For rural areas, between 15% and 25% of the population of 
these 6 countries is constrained to use safe water.
To complete this section on the social-economic conditions prevailing in Asia in
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the middle nineties, a couple of economic variables, strict related to the living status of 
people, specially the less fortunate, is considered. Note also that inflation and 
unemployment are key variables in foreign-supported stabilization-structural adjustment 
plans implemented in the developing world. Inflation is reported in Table II.B7 for 12 
Asian countries from 1990 to 1993. In spite of the fact that inflation is not acute in Asia 
(as compared to Latin America [see next section]), in 10 countries consumer price index 
has increased substantially. Malaysia and Thailand are the ones with the smallest rates of 
inflation between 1990 and 1993 -  108.2 in 1990 and 122.5 in 1993; and 115.9 in 1990 
and 132.1 in 1993 (1987 = 100), respectively. All others present sustained and highly 
increasing inflation, as measured by the consumer price index in the 1990-93 period.
Unemployment in Asian countries is reported in Table II.B8. For this region 
unemployment is not a huge problem. Out of 10 Asian countries with data on this 
variable, only 4 present unemployment rates between 5% and 11% (Sri Lanka). In 
Thailand, for instance, the unemployment rate in 1997 was less than 1%. A more serious 
problem in the Asian labor markets relates to the female unemployment rate. In the 4 
countries with total unemployment rates between 5% and 11%, the range for the female 
rates is 14%-17%.
Latin America
Now let us show a similar report on Latin American countries. Starting with 
education-related variables -  literacy and school life expectancy -  we see in Table II.B9 
that in 1990, in 13 out of the 20 Latin American countries (see Appendix Q.B), the 
percentage o f illiterates ranges from around 10% to 47%. Only 7 out of the 20 countries 
have illiteracy rates inferior to 10% - Venezuela, Costa Rica, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay,
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Guyana and Jamaica. In Haiti and Guatemala around 45% of the respective population is 
constituted by illiterates. In 1995, the situation is not different. Table U.B10 shows the 
literacy rate by gender for 23 Latin American countries. Assuming that each country’s 
total population is shared equally by males and females, we see that 9 countries present 
total illiteracy rate in the range of 15%-55%. Again, Haiti presents the most precarious 
situation, with total illiteracy rate far above 50%. Out of the 23 countries, 11 present 
illiteracy rates inferior to 10%. In this table we also see that the female situation, as 
compared with that for male, in terms of literacy in Latin America is better than that in 
Asia. In 1995, the estimated adult literacy rates for male and female in Latin America are 
not so much different.
Regarding school life expectancy, Table II.B11 shows figures for 13 Latin 
American countries. School aged population in 6 countries experiences between around 9 
and 10 years of schooling. The extremes, regarding school life expectancy, are Honduras 
and Chile, the former with 8.7 years of schooling, the latter with 12.6 years.
Regarding health-related variables -  life expectancy and infant mortality -  Table 
II.B12 shows that, in 1993, out of 23 Latin American countries with data, 13 present life 
expectancy between 57 and 70 years. People in Haiti and Bolivia live, on average, 17 and 
14 years, respectively, less than in Chile, where life expectancy is 74 years. Infant and 
under 5 years mortality rates for these 13 countries range from around 36 to 85 per 1000 
and 45 to 130 per 1000, respectively. Out of the 13 countries under consideration, 3 
present infant mortality above 60 per 1000 and under 5 years mortality above 90 per 
1000. The negative correlation between mortality rates and the number of years of life 
expectancy is clearly seen. The United Nations (1999) estimated life expectancy by
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gender, for the period 1995-2000, in 22 Latin America countries shown in Table II.B13. 
Assuming again that each country’s population is 50% shared by males and females, out 
of the 22 countries listed, 12 present life expectancy, for the respective total population, 
between 53 and 70 years. The overall ranking of the countries is not substantially altered 
as compared with that in 1993 and the situation related to life expectancy in Latin 
America is precarious. Infant mortality estimates are also problematic for the period 
1995-2000. For these 12 countries the number of infant deaths varies between 30 and 68 
per 1000 of live births.
Regarding access to basic services (safe water and adequate sanitation), the 
situation in Latin America, as it was in Asia, is far worse in rural areas. The general 
picture here is worse than that in Asia. As Table II.B14 shows, in 11 out of the 19 
countries listed, provision of safe water and adequate sanitation is precarious for both 
urban and rural areas in 1995. In Haiti, for instance, around 40% of the population, in 
urban and rural areas, does not have access to safe water and around 85% of the rural 
population has no access to adequate sanitation. For the remaining 8 countries at the 
bottom of Table II.B14, safe water and adequate sanitation are guaranteed to almost 
100% in urban areas (except for Nicaragua and Uruguay, regarding adequate sanitation). 
For rural areas, the situation is disastrous -  between 35% and 95% of the population, in 
each of the 11 countries in better situation, does not have access to safe water, except 
Venezuela. In terms of adequate sanitation, the range of rural population without access 
is from 35% to 85%.
Consumer price index is reported in Table Q.B15 for 23 Latin American countries 
from 1990 to 1993. Inflation in this region is acute as compared to that in Asia.
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Hyperinflation occurs in 5 countries -  Peru, Brazil, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Argentina. 
In other 16 countries the consumer price index has increased substantially. Barbados and 
Panama are the ones with the smallest rates of inflation between 1990 and 1993 -1 1 5  in 
1990 and 131 in 1993; and 101 in 1990 and 105 in 1993 (1987 = 100), respectively.
Unemployment in 21 Latin American countries is reported in Table ILB16. For 
this region unemployment is a huge problem. Out of 21 Latin American countries with 
data on the unemployment variable, 11 present unemployment rates between 10% and 
20% (Barbados)22. In Latin America, as was the case for Asia’s labor markets, the female 
unemployment rates are far above of those for male. In the 11 countries with total 
unemployment rates between 10% and 20%, the range for the female rates was 13%- 
25%.
Africa
Africa is by far the region with the most precarious social-economic conditions. 
Regarding education-related variables -  literacy and school life expectancy -  in 1990, in 
all 20 African countries selected in Table II.B17 (see Appendix II.B), the percentage of 
illiterates ranges from around 20% to 82%. In 14 out of 20 countries illiteracy is above 
50%. In Burkina Faso, for example, illiteracy rate is around 80%. In 1995, the situation 
seems to be worse. Table II.B18 shows the literacy rate by gender for 35 Asian countries. 
Assuming that each country’s total population is shared equally by males and females, we 
see that 29 countries present total illiteracy rate in the range of 25%-86%. Niger is the 
African country with the most precarious situation, with total illiteracy rate above 80%. 
Out of the 35 countries, only 1 presents illiteracy rate inferior to 20% (Zimbabwe). In this
22 It is interesting to note that the two countries with the smallest rates of inflation -  Barbados and Panama 
-  present very high levels of unemployment This inverse relation is true also for Brazil and Peru.
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table we also see bow disastrous is the female situation in terms of literacy in Africa. In 
1995, in all countries the female illiteracy rates are far above those for male.
Regarding school life expectancy, Table II.B19 shows figures for only 13 African 
countries. School aged population in 11 countries has around 10 or less years of 
schooling. The extremes in terms of school life expectancy are Mali and Swaziland, the 
former with 1.8 years of schooling, the latter with 11.6 years.
Health-related conditions in Africa -  life expectancy and infant mortality -  are 
also disastrous. As Table II.B20 shows, in 1993, out of 25 African countries with data, 18 
present life expectancy between 44 and 54 years. Only Lesotho and Mauritius have life 
expectancy above 60 years. Infant and under 5 years mortality rates for these 18 countries 
range from around 80 to 157 per 1000 and 120 to 290 per 1000, respectively. Out of the 
18 countries under consideration, 12 present infant and 15 under 5 years mortality rates 
with 3 digits. Again, there is a sharp negative correlation between mortality rates and the 
number of years of life expectancy. The United Nations (1999) estimated life expectancy 
by gender, for the period 1995-2000, in 39 Asian countries shown in Table II.B21. 
Assuming that each country’s population is 50% shared by males and females, out of the 
39 countries listed, 32 present life expectancy, for the respective total population, 
between 40 and 60 years. The overall ranking of the countries is not substantially altered 
as compared with that in 1993 and the situation related to life expectancy in Africa is 
disastrous. Infant mortality estimates are also problematic for the period 1995-2000. For 
these 32 countries the number o f infant deaths varies between 58 and 138 per 1000 of live 
births.
Regarding access to basic services, the situation is also precarious both in urban
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and rural areas. As Table II.B22 shows, in 23 out of the 37 countries listed, from 20% to 
80% of the population does not have access to safe water in urban areas and from 40% to 
95% in rural areas. For the 8 countries in the bottom of Table II.B22, safe water and 
adequate sanitation are guaranteed to almost 100% of urban population only. For rural 
areas, between 25% and 80% of the population of these 8 countries is constrained to use 
safe water and between 40% and 60% has no access to adequate sanitation, except in 
Mauritius, where both urban and rural population are supplied with both safe water and 
adequate sanitation.
To finish this section on the social-economic conditions prevailing in Africa in the 
middle nineties, inflation and unemployment is considered. Inflation is reported in Table 
II.B23 for 22 African countries from 1990 to 1993. Inflation is acute in 16 countries 
between 1990 and 1993. In 3 out of the 22 countries -  Seychelles, Burkina Faso and 
Togo -  inflation remained stabilized -  107.5 in 1990 and 114.7 in 1993; 102.9 in 1990 
and 103.9 in 1993; and 100.0 in 1990 and 100.8 in 1993 (1987 = 100), respectively. In 
other 3 countries at the bottom of Table II.B23 -  Senegal, Niger and Gabon -  inflation, as 
measured by the consumer price index, has decreased between 1990 and 1993.
Unemployment in African countries is reported in Table II.B24. For this region 
we can not say a lot because of the small number of countries with data. But, based on the 
experience of the 6 African countries included, unemployment is a huge problem. For all 
countries with data on this variable, unemployment rates range between 10% and 25% 
(Algeria). Regarding the proportion of unemployed female, the unemployment rates are 
also above those for male. In 5 out of the 6 countries, female unemployment rates are 
between 21% and 24%.
80
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
What should we say about the evidenced situation in the developing world? First, 
whatever the causes for the poor social-economic conditions in Asia, Latin America and 
Africa, we see that the situation is problematic. Second, all countries included in this 
empirical investigation have experienced either foreign aid23 or stabilization-structural 
adjustment programs, or both. Third, no matter if the problematic social-economic 
conditions in the developing world are a consequence of internal or external 
vulnerabilities prevailing in undeveloped areas, foreign helpers must review and 
internalize poor country’s weaknesses, vulnerabilities, bottlenecks, etc, if effectiveness -  
measured not only via trends of macroeconomic aggregates, but also via people’s social 
conditions -  is the objective. World Bank and IMF’s presence in the developing world, as 
well as any sort of international aid aimed helping poor countries to alleviate social- 
economic difficulties, must bring fundamental changes if they want to be effective.
Conclusion
Chapter II addressed important issues on the role of international rescuers in 
developing countries. The first part of the chapter investigated the relation between 
foreign aid and investment in the developing world and concluded that the expected 
positive correlation between the two did not materialize in any of the three regions 
studied. Aid, defined as effective development assistance, has not being positively related 
to investment in the developing world.
Second, the specific roles of the World Bank and IMF as international rescuers 
were brought to the analysis and a summary of the main findings regarding effectiveness 
was conducted. The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of both World Bank-
23 As showed in the first part of this chapter, Latin America has been gifted with relatively small amount of 
foreign aid as compared to both Asia and Africa.
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supported adjustment programs and IMF-sponsored stabilization-structural adjustment 
plans is ambiguous. Many works find effectiveness o f these programs in terms of macro- 
aggregates, such as current account and balance of payments, others find ineffectiveness 
in terms of investment and inflation, and some others claim that output growth is 
negatively affected in the short-run, but shows an increasing trend in a longer run.
The third part of the chapter makes use of a different way to ask about 
effectiveness of foreign-sponsored programs. The simple empirical assessment conducted 
looked at the social-economic conditions prevailing in the developing world via 
observance of several indicators of development, using data from the World Bank itself 
and the United Nations, two international institutions involved in the aid concession 
enterprise. The evidence showed that social-economic conditions in Asia, Latin America 
and mainly in Africa are disastrous. Education-related variables showed the poor 
educational status of the developing world, health-related figures showed that number of 
years of life expectancy are in general less than 70 and mortality rates are very high in all 
3 regions and specially in Africa. The evidence also showed that safe water and adequate 
sanitation are far from being part of many populations in poor countries. Regarding 
inflation and unemployment, the situation is also problematic. The great majority of 
developing countries in the 3 regions suffer from high inflation and unemployment, 
mainly in relation to female unemployed labor force. Thus, precarious social-economic 
conditions are what the data showed in the empirical investigation. Bottom-line, no 
matter what the causes for the disaster are, radical changes must be undertaken if 
international helpers are aimed to be effective.
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CHAPTER HI
THE NEW GROWTH-DEVELOPMENT THEORY, NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 
LITERATURE, POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: 
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW PERSPECTIVE
Introduction
Chapter III goes through the task of constructing a general outline to serve as a 
solid base to guide practices aimed to helping the developing world to get out of the 
obstacles to development. It will be conjectured that a sound route can be envisioned via 
the use of practical guides coming from different theoretical branches. Specifically, the 
advances of the new growth-development theory in the nineties and the recognition of the 
important role attached to the new literature on the political economy of developing 
countries have made possible to search for alternative ways towards economic growth 
and development in undeveloped areas.
The prospects to be developed in chapter III minor those detailed in chapter I. 
Policy prescriptions based on new growth-development models are derived and combined 
with some variables attached to the prospects of the new political economy literature to 
conjecture a more realistic route towards economic growth-development in poor 
countries. It will be seen that focusing on a wide range of policy-related variables, all of 
which drawn from the mentioned theoretical branches, is a more plausible way trying to 
understand and get out of stagnation and poverty than the ones discussed in previous 
chapters. The single practice attached to concentrated efforts towards physical capital 
accumulation, as detailed in chapter I, as well as the other conjecture based on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
International Financial Institutions as rescuers of distressed developing countries, have 
showed to be insufficient to help developing countries to solve their most prominent 
difficulties. Chapter 1 showed the fallacy of the investment-growth connection in the 
developing world from 1960 to 1980 and the empirical account of the distressed status of 
developing countries worldwide performed in chapter n  denies any conclusion of 
effectiveness of both the World Bank-supported structural adjustment programs and the 
IMF-sponsored stabilization-structural adjustment plans as means to help poor countries 
to eradicate poverty.
The perspective sought in chapter III mirrors that of chapter I, in the sense that the 
emergence of a new wave of optimism, now not singled based, but involving a broader 
set of policy-related variables other than physical capital, is seen as of fundamental 
importance to base new practices in the developing world.
Chapter III is organized as follows. Next section summarizes the developments of 
the new growth-development theory and their related policy prescriptions. Advances in 
the growth theoretical branch are shown to prompt a resurgence of development theory, a 
branch facing an unsolvable ‘impasse’ since the late sixties. An alternative construction 
to development is also envisioned in this section -  the grassroots approach -  and an 
attempt is made to treat all branches as part of a conciliatory approach. The following 
section presents the new political economy literature whose main features relate to 
developing countries’ internal socio-political characteristics. The recent recognition that 
specific internal features of developing countries are among the most relevant aspects to 
understand poor countries’ problems and visualize solutions gave to the new literature on 
political economy an important status. A  section devoted to the task of combining the
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prospects o f the new growth-development theory with those coming from the political 
economy literature follows. The goal is to envision a scheme based on a general outline, 
where practices to be conducted in developing countries can rely on. Also in this section, 
empirical evidence on the economic growth performance of developing countries is 
provided to show both the relevance of sound theoretical-based policy actions and the 
constraints imposed by relevant variables introduced by the new political economy 
literature. Finally, concluding remarks are given on the overall prospects.
The New Growth Theory and the Resurgence of Development Theory
There are two main branches in the new growth theory, which are of interest to 
developing countries, as far as policy is concerned. The first refers to models featuring 
technological advances that endogenously generate externality effects. Here the 
production function presents increasing returns to scale due to the presence of spillovers 
effects coming from various sources. The second relates to models using the AK- 
technology, where constant returns to scale, due to the accumulation of all types of 
capital -  physical, human and knowledge -  are present24. Beyond these new models there 
are at least two extensions that deserve mention, mainly if economic policy is concerned: 
Growth-cum-government as in Barro (1990) and Growth -cum - Trade as in Grossman & 
Helpman (1990). These models will be summarized and policy implications derived.
The main objective here minors that of chapter I. The review of the new growth- 
development models will serve the goal of highlighting the emergence of a new wave of 
optimism -  that related to the raise of a broader set of policy-related variables -  said to be
24 Other models of the new growth theory are endogenous population growth models and endogenous 
bonder technology creation models, the former being relatively less relevant in the new growth literature, 
the latter of reduced relevance to developing countries.
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of fundamental importance to base development practices in the developing world. 
Instead of putting the single physical capital variable at the center of the analysis, these 
new models give emphasis to a broader set of variables, such as education, human 
capital, skills, knowledge, government provision of infrastructure, trade, institutional 
arrangements, internal social-political conditions. I claim that this process forms a basis 
for the emergence of a new wave of optimism towards growth-development in the 
developing world.
Regarding the first branch of the new growth theory, the works of Romer (1986) 
and Lucas (1988) are the most important to highlight the relevance of human capital, 
education and knowledge. The second branch is well known as the AK-Technology 
frame, which Rebelo’s (1991) model is an example. Regarding the extensions, 
government expenditures and international trade are two powerful features to be 
introduced in policy-based growth models to be summarized below.
Next section presents the Romer-Lucas model. The novelty, beside the 
endogenous character of technical advances, is the presence of externality effects, both 
from Lucas’ introduction of human capital and Romer’s consideration of knowledge 
spillovers. External economies are key to new growth models, in the sense that non­
decreasing marginal productivity of capital, now broadly defined, is obtained and 
sustained long-run growth realized.
Skills-Leamine-Knowledge Spillovers: The Romer-Lucas Model
Production. Following Romer (1986), consider a generic production function for a 
firm i in the economy, where output for this firm is a function of its physical capital and 
intensive labor stocks, i.e., labor corrected by the state of knowledge at time t, At:
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(3.1) Yu = F(Kii, AtLu).
Let Gt, the stock of experience at time t, be a function of past investments of all 
firms in the economy, such that assuming no depreciation it equals to the aggregate level 
of capital stock Kt:
Moreover, assuming that technology is endogenously generated by At = Gtn 
(r)<l), i.e., the state of knowledge is a positive but decreasing function of the stock of 
experience -  Arrow’s (1962) leaming-by-investing hypothesis -  equation (3.1) can be 
rewritten as a Cobb-Douglas:
This production function for firm i presents constant returns to scale in Ku and Lu, 
if K t, the aggregate level of capital stock (which equals the stock of experience at time t), 
is being held constant, but increasing returns result if all three inputs are considered 
together. Now assume that there is a large number of firms in the economy and that every 
firm takes the aggregate stock of capital as given, even though each firm contributes to it, 
in such a way that the Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function for the whole 
economy is:
(3.2)
(3.3) Yu = F(Ku, Lu, Kt) = Ku°LupKtn.
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(3.4) Yt = F(Kt, Li, Kt) = KtaLtpKtn,
where Yt = 2iNYu, Kt = 2iNKu and L< = ^ jNLti and N is the number of firms in this 
economy. To get its intensive representation, divide equation (3.4) by Lt and use the 
constant returns to scale condition on the two rival inputs (Kt, Lt) to yield:
(3.5) yt = ktaKtn.
Consumption. In this model, consumption is modeled with households 
maximizing an intertemporal constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function 
given by:
(3.6) U,(c,) = [ e l ! ]/[1-|],
where ct is per capita consumption and 0<£<1 represents the parameter of intertemporal 
substitution in consumption. Needless to say, Ut(a) has all nice properties to be eligible 
for a maximization problem.
Solution. The dynamic optimization problem is:
m
(3.7) Maximize U,(ct) = / 0 {[©l 'fy [ l- t]} e  "dt.
Subject to kt = ktaKtn - ct,
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where r is the discount rate and kt = Kt/Lt, i.e., kt is the capital-labor ratio. To solve this 
dynamic maximization problem consider the current Hamiltonian:
(3.8) Hc * [ct1 + ^t(ktaKrtn - ct).
The maximum principle conditions are:
(3.9) 3HC/dct = 0.
pt = ptr - dHC/dkt 
kt = ktaKtn - ct
The objective is to maximize the present value of the CES utility, which is a 
function of the control (policy) variable ct, subject to the capital accumulation equation. 
This equation connects the state variable kt to the control variable ct. Obviously, the 
optimal paths of ct will drive both the state variable kt to its optimal path and maxim ize 
the present value of the objective functional utility. Note that because this problem is a 
dynamic optimization involving the infinite horizon time framework, transversality 
conditions, i.e., terminal point constraints do not have a role to play.
Combining the results of the first two conditions in equation (3.9), the long-run 
per capita consumption growth rate is:
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(3.10) ct/ct = [akt(a_1)Ktr’ - r]/|.
The positiveness of the long-run per capita growth rate of consumption depends 
on the difference between the marginal productivity of capital and the discount rate, since 
the intertemporal parameter % is less than one but positive. Using the third condition in 
equation (3.9), it is straightforward to show that the long-run per capita capital growth 
rate is the same as that of consumption. Also, using equation (3.5), the long-run per 
capita income growth equals the long-run per capita capital growth rate. Therefore, this 
model predicts continued long-run growth for a given country depending on how 
productive its technology is, i.e., how high is its MPk level relative to its discount rate. 
Also note that the marginal productive of capital (on the rival input kt) is decreasing, but 
it is increasing in K t, the non-rival input.
One salient feature arises when reconsidering equation (3.5) in the context of the 
Romer-Lucas model. Assuming that Kt includes both physical and human capital, as in 
Lucas (1988), or the stock of knowledge, as in Romer (1986), externalities will be present 
due to the non-rival (public good) character of skills-learning-knowledge. The 
implication is that the production function [equation (3.5)] exhibits increasing returns to 
scale (a  + q > 1). The reason for this is that with the presence of non-rival inputs, a 
doubling of output can be achieved by a doubling of only the rival inputs. In this case, 
marginal productivity of capital, broadly defined, is increasing, which makes [MPK -  r] 
positive and widening over time. As a result, the long-run per capita consumption, via 
equation (3.10), as well as the long-run per capita income and capital growth rates, will
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be positive and increasing.
Policy Implications from Romer-Lucas’ Model. First, it is important to note that a 
theoretical model based on skills-leaming-knowledge, like the Romer-Lucas model, 
implies divergence among economies’ long-run growth rates. If, for instance, there are 
two activities, one giving high skill-learning-knowledge and other resulting in low skill- 
leaming-knowledge, countries that specialize in the former will grow sustainably faster 
then the ones that specialize in the latter. Thus, this model does not predict convergence, 
mainly because of the presence of skills-leaming-knowledge obstacles in lagged 
countries.
Second, as far as external economies are concerned, the public good character of
knowledge and its impact on learning and skills is crucial to let one person’s investment
in new knowledge benefits all agents in the economy. As Easterly (1998) states:
If investment in physical capital creates new knowledge (Romer 1986,1987), then there 
will be a spillover from each agent’s investments to knowledge useful for ail the other 
agents in the economy. Economies that already have high capital will have the highest 
returns for new investment ... (Also) formal and informal interactions between 
individuals impart knowledge. Then there will be a spillover from the average level of 
schooling in the economy to each individual’s productivity (Lucas 1988). More society- 
wide formal schooling will create more knowledge that informal interactions will 
disseminate. This in turn increases the incentive of the individual to invest in schooling.
If the spillover effect is strong enough, then the virtuous and vicious circles will form. In 
the virtuous circle, the level of education in the society is high, so the incentive to invest 
in education is high, so the level of education in the society is high. In the vicious circle, 
the level of education in the society is low, so the incentive to invest in education is low, 
so the level of education in the society remains low. Public policy could shift the 
economy from the vicious circle to a virtuous one by removing taxes on investment in 
schooling or by subsidizing schooling. Easterly (1998, p. 12).
This citation is important in two fronts. First, it highlights the importance of the 
Romer-Lucas model as a sound basis to guide public policy. Education, knowledge, 
learning and spillovers may push the economy into a virtuous circle. Second, it is explicit 
the recognition of the importance of externalities for growth and development, a key tenet 
of development theories o f the forties and fifties detailed in chapter I. This fact has made
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possible the resurgence of development theory in the nineties. It will be shown later that 
the modem multiple equilibria development models have brought back several variables 
strictly related to the pioneering development models discussed in chapter I, which in 
turn, are key aspects of the new growth theory.
Accumulation of All Types of Capital: The Rebelo AK-Technologv Model
Production, consumption and the solution of Rebelo’s (1991) model derive in a 
similar way as in the Romer-Lucas model summarized above. The distinctive aspects are 
Rebelo’s AK production function and his assumption on the types o f capital agents in an 
economy can accumulate. It is assumed that an individual can accumulate all types of 
capital -  physical, human, knowledge, learning, etc. In consequence, constant returns to 
scale are obtained and positive long-run per capita growth rates for capital, income and 
consumption result.
The intensive representation of Rebelo’s AK production function is:
(3.11) yt = Aki, a - 1 .
Marginal productivity of capital, the unique input, is constant and equals to A, the 
technology parameter. Note here that capital is broadly defined, including not only 
physical but also human capital, the main reason for the presence of non-decreasing 
marginal productivity. Following similar derivations as performed in the Romer-Lucas 
model, the long-run per capita growth rates for consumption, capital and income are:
•  •  •
(3.12) ko = ct/ct = kt/kt = yt/yt = [A - r]/|.
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Positiveness of all long-run growth rates is guaranteed as long as the marginal 
productivity of broadly defined capital is greater than the discount rate.
Differently from Romer-Lucas’ model, Rebelo (1991) derives the long-run 
savings rate, with relevant implications for economic policy. The optimal long-run 
savings rate, defined as a fraction of the aggregate per capita output, can be obtained in 
the following way:
•  •  •
(3.13) st/yt = kt/yt = [kt/kt][kt/yt] = Xo[l/A], since kt = It = St and yt = Akt.
Now, substituting for Xo, the final expression for the savings rate is:
(3.14) st/yt = [A - r]/£A ] = [ l£ ]  - r/[|A].
Solving for Xo (the optimal long-run growth rate of per capita output) in equation
(3.13), the long-run growth rate of the economy investigated can be expressed as:
(3.15) Xo = A[st/yt].
Therefore, the long-run growth rate of a country depends on its savings rate, 
which depends on £ and r, and on how productive its capital is. Since savings are 
investments, which is capital accumulation, we have the theoretical result that capital 
accumulation impacts positively on growth, a return to the models detailed in chapter I.
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But here, there is an important difference: physical capital is only a fraction of the whole 
capital stock of an economy.
Policy Prescriptions from Rebelo’s Model. Regarding policies related to savings, 
interesting implications can be drawn. Looking at equation (3.14), it can be predicted that 
the more patient a country is (low r), the larger is its saving rate and thus its long-run 
growth rate [via equation (3.15)]. Also, the more willing a country is to substitute 
intertemporally (low |) ,  the higher its long-run savings and growth rates. Therefore, 
policies that have impact on savings are crucial for long-run growth. For example, if East 
Asian countries price present consumption at a very high level (low §) and/or discount 
future consumption at a very low rate (both causing higher savings) relative to Latin 
American countries, then the long-run growth rates of the former are expected to be 
greater than those of the latter.
Considering the MPk among countries, the higher the marginal productivity of the 
broadly defined capital of a country is, the more apt it is to save and thus speed up its 
long-run growth rate. This is an important variable to understand the growth path many 
developing countries have experienced in the last five decades or so. According to this 
model, e.g., if it is reasonable to assume that Brazil has a relatively small MPk (relatively 
low capital productivity) compared to other more developed countries, it would be 
expected the former having a lower long-run growth rate.
Next, two extensions of the new growth theory come under analysis. The first is 
due to Barro (1990) and deals with the government fiscal actions and their effects on the 
rate of growth, and the second to Grossman & Helpman (1990b) who deal with trade and 
its impact on growth. The two extensions are important in terms of policy implications, as
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long as economic growth is concerned, since both government intervention and 
international trade are two powerful tools often used by policy makers.
Two Extensions of the New Growth Theory: Government and Trade
Barro’s Model of Growth-cum-Government. Barro (1990) modifies Rebelo’s 
model to incorporate a public sector. Let gt be the quantity of public services provided by 
the government to each private producer in the economy. The main objective is to link 
the role of these services, as inputs to private production, to the growth performance of a 
country. A generic representation of the aggregate production function for the economy 
in its intensive form is:
(3.16) yt = <Kkt, gt) = k«Kgi/kt).
This production function is assumed well behaved and all variables are defined in 
the same way as in Rebelo (1991). It presents constant returns to scale in kt and gt 
together, but decreasing returns to kt itself. Thus, the source of the non-rival input now is 
the presence of gt, a public good, which is assumed to be measurable by the per capita 
quantity of government purchases. Thus, even using a broad definition of kt, i.e., 
including physical and human capital as in Rebelo (1991), production here involves 
decreasing returns to the rival inputs if government inputs do not expand in a parallel 
way. A Cobb-Douglas specific form for equation (3.16) is:
(3.17) yt= <Kg</kt) = A(gt/kt)a, where 0< a< l and A = technology.
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Now assume that the government finances its expenditures via a flat-rate income 
tax which, after normalizing the number of households to unity and using equation (3.16), 
yields:
(3.18) Gt = Ti = xtyt = xtkt$(gt/ki),
where Tt is the government revenue and xt the tax rate. It is clearly seen that equation
(3.18) implies a balanced budget, i.e., the government can neither finance deficits via 
issuing of debt nor run surpluses via accumulation of assets.
Now it is time to derive the long-run growth rate for this economy. The step-by- 
step solution for the dynamic optimization problem is similar to the ones performed 
earlier in the Romer-Lucas and Rebelo models, resulting in long-run growth rates given 
by the difference between the MPk and the discount rate divided by the parameter of 
intertemporal substitution in consumption. Here, using the generic representation for the 
aggregate production function in equation (3.16) in the presence of government, the long- 
run growth rates are:
•  •  •
(3.19) yt/yt = kt/kt = ct/ct = Xo = [(l-xt>fr(gt/ktXl-6) * r]/|,
where the term inside the brackets and to the left of the minus sign is dyt/dkt = MPk and 6 
is the elasticity of yt with respect to gt. As long as xt and thus gt/yt is constant, gt/kt and 6 
and the economy’s growth rates will be all constant, implying that in the long-run the 
economy is always in a position of steady-state growth in which all variables grow at the
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rate Xo shown in equation (3.19). But in terms of the government size, i.e., of the 
magnitudes of xt and consequently gi/yt, the model predicts a negative impact of tax 
increases and a positive effect of government expenditures. However, since government 
expenditures are financed by tax, what matters is the net effect of both impacts. If the 
government is small, then the second effect dominates, i.e., government purchases speed 
up the economy’s growth rates. On the other hand, if the government is large, then the 
first force dominates and taxes will affect the economy’s growth rates negatively.
This result can be seen when the specific Cobb-Douglas production function
(3.17) is considered. To get the effect of the government size in the economy’s growth 
rates in this case, it is required that the elasticity 6 = a  be a constant, as it is for a Cobb- 
Douglas. Under the conditions that xt = gt/yt and gt/kt = (gi/yt^gi/kt) the derivative of K> 
with respect to gt/yt is:
(3.20) dXo/d(g«/y.) = [4 fe /b X + -l)]fc
Therefore, <J>’>1 or <|>’<1 will define if the impact of gt/yt on the economy’s growth 
rate will be positive or negative. If gt/kt is small, which leads to $ ’>1, growth is speeded 
up with increased government purchases of public services. On the contrary, if the 
government size is large, which leads to $ ’<1, the economy’s growth rate is hurt via high 
rates of taxes.
Thus, based on this model, the government has an important role to play via its 
provision of public services used as productive inputs in the private sector producers’ 
production functions. Also, note that to be qualified as growth-augmenting, government
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purchases must be productive inputs for private agents in the economy. As long as the 
government size is not too large, government purchases are a potential way to speed up 
growth. Otherwise, taxes will negatively affect the economy’s long-run growth rate.
Grossman-Helpman ’s Model of Growth-cum-Trade. Grossman & Helpman 
(1990b) develop a model emphasizing the process of accumulation of knowledge capital 
coming from trade engagement. Their main objective is to investigate how international 
trade causes economic growth in partner countries and how trade policy can be 
implemented to that end. The model of growth-cum-trade relies on the fact that put 
knowledge generation-accumulation at the center. The economy’s growth rate is 
determined via allocation of productive factors in a specific sector known to produce 
knowledge and international trade is the mean to spread the generated knowledge.
Assume that a two-sector economy produces only two goods using the two rival 
productive factors available, land (T) and labor (L), and the aggregate stock of existing 
knowledge (K), a non-rival public good. The constant return to scale production function 
is given by:
(3.21) X, = KFiCTi, L,), i = 1,2.
Accumulation of knowledge occurs with the production of Xi in the following
way:
(3.22) K = bXi.
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Here, the leaming-by-doing hypothesis is being used and the benefits coming 
from accumulated knowledge are entirely external to the firms in sector 1, i.e., new 
knowledge is a pure public good. Equation (3.22) shows that technological progress is 
endogenously generated in the production of Xj.
Now, assume that a small open economy trades the two goods, Xi and X2, at 
given relative prices p = pi/p2 and no spillovers from abroad are present. The equilibrium 
for this small economy is given by:
(3.23) MRTxi,x2 = P-
From equation (3.21) and (3.22), the growth rate o f output in each sector is 
constant and given by:
(3.24) g = bFi(Ti, Li).
Now, let one of the factors in the production function increase. By the Rybczynski 
Theorem, if the increased factor is intensively used in the production of Xi, the 
knowledge-generating sector, then the economy’s growth rate increases. But, if the 
increased factor is the one intensively used in the production of X2, then the economy’s 
growth rate falls.
Trade enters in this model via equation (3.22). If Xi is one of the products traded, 
partner countries can absorb the benefits of new knowledge generated abroad. Assume 
that the world has only two countries, production is given by equation (3.21) and
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knowledge generation by equation (3.22). If, for any reason, factors in one country, say
country A, shift to the production of Xt, which would lead to an increase in the
economy’s growth rate, in country B the movement is the opposite and a reduction of the
growth rate would result. Thus, what is important is the net effect of these shifts to
determine if trade is growth-augmenting. A priori, the net effect o f technical (knowledge)
progress is uncertain. But, if either country A or B is known to have comparative
advantage in the production of Xi, an increased flow of productive factors into this
sector, would unambiguously increase the growth rate in both countries.
Based on this model of growth-cum-trade and having the developing world in
mind, Grossman & Helpman (1990b) state:
Casual observation and more systematic empirical research suggest that countries that 
have adopted an outward-oriented development strategy have grown faster and achieved 
a higher level of economic well-being than those that have chosen a more protectionist 
trade stance... It seems clear that the less developed countries potentially stand the most 
to gain from their international relationships, since in principle these countries can draw 
upon the large stock of knowledge capital already accumulated in the industrialized 
world. Grossman & Helpman (1990, pp. 90-91).
Government-Trade Extensions: Policy Implications. The extensions discussed 
above have with them a concern on the role government and trade should take in terms of 
impacting on the growth process of a country. As seen above, the two extensions point to 
certain conditions under which government action and trade engagement can improve the 
growth possibilities of an economy. Here, two possibilities of economic policy 
implementation - fiscal policy and trade policy - will be presented.
Regarding fiscal policy, Barro (1990) examines the role of government 
expenditures in services that enhance productivity in the private sector. He concludes that 
these expenditures may increase the growth rate of the economy. However, if the 
government revenues are used to finance government services that have no effects on
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
productivity, or are wasted by bureaucrats, then growth will decrease. On the other hand, 
the role of taxation depends on how it alters the choices that economic agent faces. For 
instance, if the engine of growth is capital accumulation, income taxes that include 
taxation of interest income will decrease capitalist’s incentives to accumulate capital, and 
consequently, growth will be negatively affected. This will be so since the owners of 
capital will obtain only a fraction of the future benefits due to the tax. Therefore, the 
specific role government plays in a certain country is crucial for economic growth.
Considering the other economic policy branch, international trade has definite 
implications for economic growth. A large part of the literature on endogenous growth 
has evolved around this issue. Grossman & Helpman (1990a) explore de role of 
comparative advantage in the determination of trade patterns and growth performances of 
different countries in the world economy. In their model, if technological spillovers are 
global such that firms in different countries engaged in trade have access to a common 
pool of knowledge, then, eventually, relative factor endowments will determine the 
specialization of a certain country. A country that is well endowed with human capital 
may specialize in knowledge generation and develop a comparative advantage in it, 
while, on the other hand, a country with an abundance of unskilled workers may end up 
specializing in other traditional activities and will have slower growth rates.
Specifically, any trade policy that aims to protect the sector that generates new 
knowledge in a given country, e.g., a tariff on imports of Xi in the Grossman & Helpman 
(1990b) model, or a subsidy applied to its production, will lead to increased growth for 
the trade-engaged countries.
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The New Development Theory
The new development literature in the eighties and nineties includes contributions 
of several distinct branches. Development theory has been facing many problems since 
late 1960s. This has been so because the prospects of the high development theorizing 
period (1940s and 1950s) as well as the neo-Marxist third world center-periphery 
theoretical advances of the 1960s and 1970s, were unable to deal appropriately with the 
problems facing poor countries in the second half of the 20lh century. By late eighties and 
along the nineties, however, development theory reappears in a new fashion. 
Formalization of key tenets of development models advanced in the forties and fifties and 
the findings of the new growth theory related to external economies being key to prompt 
economic growth have fostered the revival of interest in this field. Among the 
contributions of the new economic development trend, multiple equilibria models based 
on external economies and spillover effects, as well as on institutional arrangements, are 
important pieces.
Resuscitating Rodan-Nurkse, Murphy et al. (1989) formalizes the so-called ‘big 
push’ industrialization in the context of multiple equilibria based on purely economic 
incentives. Another piece in this trend is the contribution by Rodriguez-Clare (1996), 
emphasizing the role of multinational corporations as a source of Hirschman’s linkage 
effects. Also, Akerlof s (1976) develops a model of castes whose multiple equilibria are 
possible in a context of institutional arrangements incentives. It is important to note here 
that these models aim to generalize the basics elements constraining development in the 
undeveloped world. A summary of Murphy et al. (1989), Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and 
Akerlof (1976) will be presented below.
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Another front in the recent trend of the new development literature is the so-called 
‘grassroots’ approach (also named locally oriented research). Due to its focus on case 
studies, no general theorizing is possible via analysis of too many distinct evidences on 
the diverse nature of the developing world. For this branch a summary of the main 
aspects will be enough in order to highlight the importance of case-by-case studies for 
future advances in development constructions and practices. Also, it will be highlighted 
the problems expected to happen when the grassroots approach is aimed to interact with 
the multiple equilibria models of economic development, a possibility to be considered 
later in this chapter.
Models of Economic Development with Multiple Equilibria.
The Return of thg Big-Push: Murphv et al.’s Model. Murphy et al. (1989) brings 
back the key tenet of Rodan-Nurkse’s theory summarized in chapter I. The ‘big-push’ 
strategy is formalized upon Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) suggestion that lack of 
industrialization in poor countries may be due to the lack of sufficiently large markets for 
industries operating under increasing returns. Under this situation, simultaneous 
injections of investments in various sectors may help create demand for all industries, 
making them profitable. According to Murphy et al. (1989), in an imperfectly 
competitive economy with aggregate demand spillovers, the ‘big-push’ realization can be 
seen as a shift from a bad equilibrium to a good equilibrium.
The key aspect of this renewed ‘big-push’ model is that industrialization of one 
sector enlarges the size of the market in other sectors via demand spillovers. If this 
industrialization process comes into existence in a coordinated manner -  simultaneous 
investments in various sectors, possibly guided by governments -  the good equilibrium
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can be reached and a poor country may escape from the vicious circle.
The basics of the model rely on the existence of a wage premium. Assume that a 
closed economy with two sectors uses two different technologies. Sector 1, the cottage 
sector, produces good c using a standard constant returns to scale technology and sector 
2, the factory sector, produces good f  operating an increasing returns to scale technology. 
To attract workers from the cottage sector, producers of good f must pay a positive 
premium v. Firms in sector 1 form a competitive fringe and a monopoly firm operates the 
increasing returns to scale technology in sector 2. Aggregate income y, which equals the 
total amount of profits, which in turn, are earned by consumers, is totally spent on goods
c and f. Labor supply is fixed at L and wages in the two sectors are:
(3.25) wc = 1 and wr= 1 + v.
Profits are normal in the competitive fringe of firms in sector 1. In sector 2, the
monopolist profit is given by:
(3.25) n m = pmy -  F(1 + v),
where pm = [1 — (l+v)/a]; y is aggregate output and F is units of labor used in the factory 
sector, a  is the number of units of output produced by an additional unit of labor in the 
factory sector. The monopolist will operate whenever profits are positive, which implies 
the following condition:
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(3.26) a  > 1 + v.
If this condition does not hold, profits will be non-positive and the monopolist will not 
operate, whatever the level of aggregate income y.
Two equilibria are possible in this economy. In the first, no firm operates in the 
monopolist sector because of the possibility of non-positive profits (a  < 1 + v). This is 
the bad equilibrium, where everybody works in the cottage production using the constant 
returns to scale technology and earning wc = 1. In this equilibrium, income is L (the wage 
bill Lwc) because no profits are being realized. Therefore, for the no-industrialization 
equilibrium to take place, profits must be:
(3.27) nm = pmL - F ( l + v ) < 0 ,
which implies pmL < 0 or a  < 1 + v. This means that a monopolist will not want to set up 
a factory if the required factory wage is Wf = 1 + v.
In the second equilibrium, all firms operate using the increasing returns to scale 
technology and industrialization via the ‘big-push’ strategy is realized. In this case, 
condition (3.26) holds and profits are positive. This is the good equilibrium, where all 
sectors industrialize and everybody works in the factory sector. Now, aggregate income 
equals a (L  -  F) and pm = 1. Since the only input is labor, total wages equals L(1 + v). 
Therefore, for the industrialization equilibrium to take place, profits must be:
(3.28) n m = a(L  -  F) -  L(1 + v) > 0.
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When equation (3.28) holds, all firms expect positive profits via high level of 
income and sales, which has been made possible as a result of simultaneous 
industrialization. Now, all firms can afford to pay the required factory wage wf = 1 + v, 
because a  > 1 + v.
Equation (3.26), (3.27) and (3.28) assure that there exist some values of F such 
that the bad and good equilibria exist. Thus, it is possible for an economy in the bad no­
industrialization equilibrium to move towards the good self-fulfilling industrialization 
equilibrium, the requirement being all sectors synchronically coordinate investments. It 
should be said that the main reason for the existence of multiple equilibria in Murphy et 
al. (1989) model is the wage premium a factory sector producer pays to attract workers 
from the cottage sector. It is this wage premium (demand-augmenting extra wages) that 
enlarges the size of the markets for producers of other manufactures.
Multinationals and Linkage-Effects: Rodriguez-Clare’s Model. This model makes 
use of the key tenet of Hirschman’s (1958) theory detailed in chapter 1. Hirschman’s 
linkage effects are formalized in a way to highlight the importance of multinationals in 
generating backward and forward linkages in developing countries’ industrial sectors.
Multiple equilibria arises because of the manner multinationals operate in the host 
economy. When backward and forward linkages materialize, the undeveloped economy 
may experience the good equilibrium, where high specialization (deep division o f labor) 
and wages are realized and demand for specialized inputs spillovers to self-sustain 
economic development. On the other hand, if such linkages fail to materialize, the poor 
economy may end up in the bad equilibrium, where specialization and wages are low and 
aggregate demand is not sufficient to generate development.
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The main aspect of Rodriguez-Clare’s (1996) model is the measurement of the 
relative impact that multinational firms have in terms of generating linkage effects as 
compared to those that would emerge via domestic firms. This measure can be obtained 
via use of the linkage coefficient of a firm, defined as the ratio o f employment generated 
by the demand for specialized inputs by multinationals to that generated by local firms. A 
higher variety of specialized inputs arise in the good equilibrium as a consequence of the 
increase of the linkage coefficient, i.e., multinationals generate more employment than 
domestic firms, in which case, they are said to have positive linkage effects. In the bad 
equilibrium, however, multinationals generate relatively less employment, and 
consequently, they are said to have negative linkage effects.
The model is constructed under three premises. First, productivity increases with 
the use of a wide variety of specialized inputs, which is guaranteed via assuming ‘love of 
variety’ in the production of final goods. Second, it is of crucial importance for many of 
the specialized inputs that suppliers and users are not located far away from each other, 
which is guaranteed by assuming that local firms buy all their inputs domestically. 
Finally, the availability of varieties of specialized inputs is limited by the size of the 
market, which results by assuming that the production of these inputs occurs under 
increasing returns to scale.
Under these premises, if a firm producing a final good increases its demand for 
specialized inputs, it also helps to increase the availability of such inputs economy wide, 
thus generating positive external economies to other final good producers. On the other 
hand, increased local production of more specialized inputs increases the production of 
more final goods that use these inputs intensively, leading to a greater availability of
107
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
more complex final goods. In the first case we have the establishment of backward 
linkages, in the second, the occurrence of forward linkages.
Assume that there are two small open countries, A and B, and that labor Li (i = A, 
B) is internationally immobile. Two tradable final goods, z and y, with prices p* and py, 
and one non-tradable intermediate good x are produced. The intermediate good x posses a 
large number of varieties, each priced p'j, i.e., variety j in country i has a price p j. Since x 
cannot be traded in the world market, the only way a firm can get it is by becoming 
multinational. The production of the two tradable final goods uses labor and intermediate 
inputs as given by the following Cobb-Douglas:
(3.29) Qs = 6sLspsXs1'ps,
where s = z, y; 6S, ps e (0 ,1 ) are constant parameters and X is a composite intermediate 
good. Also, it is assumed that (5Z > (3y, i.e., the y-industry is X-intensive relatively to the z 
industry, thus it has a relatively stronger ‘love of variety’.
The market structure for firms producing the two tradable final goods is perfect 
competition, while monopolistic competition characterizes production of the non-tradable 
intermediate good x. For country A, the rich country, assume that varieties of x produced 
(nA) and the number o f multinationals (M) are exogenous. For country B, the poor 
country, assume that there are no multinationals, and that multinationals coming from 
country A will produce only the final good y. Given that domestic production in country 
B is completely specialized in final good z, the full employment condition for country B 
is given by:
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(3.30) L = n + nvz(n)U  + nvm(n)L,„(M) + U  + Lm(M),
where n is the number of varieties of x; vz is the quantity of each variety of x that 
domestic producers of z purchase per unit of labor hired (L*) and vm is the quantity of 
each variety of x that multinationals demand per unit of labor hired (Ln,).
Let the total demand for labor by producers of x in country B be:
(3.31) L»(n, M) = nvz(n)Lz + nv^nJL m ^).
Plugging equation (3.31) into (3.30) yields:
(3.32) Lt(n,M) = (L-n-UMJ-UJtnv^nVfl+nv^nJD+tnv^nVl l+nVl(n)l}L(M).
To determine if the linkage coefficient is positive our negative it is enough to 
check the sign of dLx/dM in equation (3.32). The sign of the partial derivative o f L* with 
respect to M is the same as the sign of [nvm(n) - nvz(n)], where nvz(n) and nvm(n) 
represent the level of employment generated in the x sector per unit of labor hired by 
local and multinational firms, respectively. If nvm(n) > nvz(n), then the linkage coefficient 
is positive and multinationals may prompt development in country B. Otherwise, 
multinationals do not generate the right linkage, and development remains unrealized.
The main result o f Rodriguez-Gare’s model is that the positive linkage coefficient 
emerges when i) m(y) > m(z), i.e., the number of multinationals producing the more 
complex good y (recall this final good is x-intensive) is greater than that specialized in
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the production of z; ii) the communication cost between the host and home countries is 
high; and iii) the level of n in the undeveloped country is low compared to that in the rich 
country (nA > nB).
Two types of equilibria are possible in this setup. In the bad equilibrium the 
negative linkage coefficient materializes and the undeveloped economy is trapped in the 
production of simple final goods. In the good equilibrium the economy is specialized in 
the production of a wide variety of specialized inputs x, which are used in the production 
of the final good y, and the positive linkage coefficient that results from multinational 
productive operations may push the undeveloped economy towards economic 
development.
The Economics of Caste: Akeriofs Model. Akerlofs (1976) model of the 
economics of caste offers a simple and interesting illustration of how institutional 
arrangements can lead to multiple equilibria in an undeveloped economy. The model 
starts by depicting an economy in which three types of jobs co-exist: skilled (s), unskilled 
(u) and scavenging (c). The economy produces n goods using these three types of labor. 
Each product i has a linear production function of the following type:
(3.33) qj — Oglu + 0ul„j + Qclci, i = 1» 2, ... , n,
where 0j is the productivity of labor type j (j = s, u, c) and Iji is the amount of labor type j 
used in the production of good i. It is assumed that all workers have the same ability, but 
their productivity may differ if they are assigned to different jobs, and that 0S > 0„ > 0C. 
The utility function for all workers is also the same and given by:
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(3.34) U = 2i max [x,-, a],
where x; is the consumption of good i and a  is a positive parameter. Each worker in the 
economy can work on the production of only one product. Entry of firms into the market 
is free and each firm specializes in the production of one product. Assume that the price 
of good i is 1 (pi = 1) and that a worker in a skilled job is not sufficiently productive to 
reach the maximum utility limit no, i.e., n a  > 0S.
Now, suppose that there are two types of workers that are differentiated by birth, 
although the difference in their appearance has no consequences for their abilities. The 
first type of worker belongs to a dominant caste represented by d, and the second to other 
non-dominant caste denoted by n. Both types of workers may become member of a third 
caste denoted o (scavengers) if they do not follow the institutional rules of the society. 
These rules are called caste codes. They dictate that the members of caste d, n and o may 
only work in skilled, unskilled and scavenging jobs, respectively. In addition, any worker 
who purchases from firms that violate the employment caste codes will be outcasted.
Regarding rewards, if everyone believes that the caste codes are effective and 
there are no outcastes at the beginning of a given period, i.e., no workers buy from firms 
that violate the rules, then the wage rates of the three types of workers are determined by 
their respective productivities. Thus, Wd = 0S, w„ = 0U and w0 = 0C. Moreover, the prices 
of all goods will be 1, which implies that the wage rates represent the utility levels of the 
workers.
For this outcome to be an equilibrium, a violating firm hiring workers of caste n 
to fill skilled positions should not be able to attract customers and make a profit. Suppose
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that a violating firm has a wage w0 < 0S to offer. Note that profits for this firm is at most 
p6s -  w0 and is non-negative if and only if p > wJBs. Since only outcastes purchase from 
this violating firm, they find this firm’s products cheap and buy from it all they can (i.e.,
a ), spending the rest of their income on other goods, which gives them w0 - ap  units of
those goods. As a result, their utility will be the following:
(3.35) w0 - ap  + a  < w0 - awJBs +■ a .
The level of utility in equation (3.35) will not induce any member in caste n or d 
to purchase from the violating firm if:
(3.36) 0„ > w0 - awo/0s + a  or a  < (0„ - 0C)/(1 - BJBS).
Since the right-hand side of the first expression in equation (3.36) is increasing in 
w0, this condition is most likely to hold when w0 = 0C, which is the lowest wage the 
violating firm can pay to an outcaste. Therefore, an equilibrium exists if  a  < (0„ - 0C)/(1 - 
0c/0s). That is, if the amount of goods that workers of a violating firm can buy from it is 
sufficiently small, then no caste member would want to become an outcaste and thus 
would avoid buying from firms that violates the caste code. In this situation, no firm 
would offer a wage higher than 0C to outcastes because even with w0 = 6C the break even 
price is too high to attract caste members.
If there are some outcastes at the beginning of a given period, i.e., there are 
workers purchasing from firms that violate, then the violating firms that hire workers and
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sell products to them can make a profit when w0 = 0C. As a result, the firms will bid up 
the wages of outcastes until w„ = 0S and the price of the product reaches p = 1, beyond 
which the firm could not attract any customers. However, even before the wage rate 
reaches such a level all members of caste n would want to drop out of the caste system. 
This another equilibrium, where some workers disobey the caste codes and work 
according to their productivities and wage incentives.
Recalling the case where there are no outcastes, still a coalition of firms can break 
the caste equilibrium. Suppose k firms producing k different products decide to jointly 
violate the caste code. Then, a worker buying from them expects a utility 6C - ap k  - ak, 
which may exceed 0„ if ak  > (0„ - 0C)/(1 - QJBS). The caste equilibrium is sub-optimal 
because the economy can in principle employ everyone in skilled positions. The model 
has another equilibrium where everyone is employed in this way, i.e., the Pareto optimal 
equilibrium, which may not be attainable due to the constraints of the institutional 
arrangements of the caste codes. In this model no one gains from the caste system. 
Akerlof (1976) believes that while it is possible for a deviant to get a positive return, 
economic rewards seem to favor those who follow the institutional codes embodied in the 
social custom. This may give good reasons why such social customs may last over long 
periods of time.
Multiple Equilibria Development Models: Policy-Related Issues. More important 
than the specific policy prescriptions coming from economic development models with 
multiple equilibria is the recognition of the possibility an undeveloped country has to 
escape from a poverty trap via use of appropriate policy. A consensus now exist that 
adequate policy actions may raise the threshold of a given initial condition, below which
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a poverty trap forms.
In the first model summarized in the previous section, we saw that 
industrialization of one sector may lead to increase aggregate demand for the 
manufactures of other sectors, making production in these other sectors more attractive. If 
this industrialization process spreads economywide, an undeveloped country may escape 
from the bad no-industrialization equilibrium.
As far as physical capital accumulation is concerned in this industrialization 
process and countries in the developing world are the target, policy prescriptions coming 
from the renewed ‘big push’ model may be seen as useless -  evidence in chapter I 
showed that investment is not positively related to output growth in either Africa, Asia or 
Latin America. But, what can be seen as relevant here is the role government may play to 
shift the poor initial condition towards a better position. Note also that in the Murphy et 
al. (1989) model, the reason for the existence of multiple equilibria is the wage premium 
paid by factory sector producers. It is increased aggregate demand (via increased wages) 
the main cause for simultaneous industrialization. The higher the wage premium, the 
more likely the occurrence of the good industrialization equilibrium. Thus, in terms of 
policy prescriptions, we visualize wage incentives in certain industrial sectors as a way to 
prompt industrialization, and then, economic growth-development.
In the Rodriguez-Clare’s model of multinational linkages, the possibility for 
undeveloped countries to escape from a poverty trap is also conjectured. If a 
multinational is known to establish a positive linkage coefficient, then production of 
varieties o f specialized intermediate inputs will be larger, wages higher and 
unemployment lower, leading to a shift from the bad to the good equilibrium.
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In terms of policy prescriptions, one interesting aspect is that multinational 
location decisions are determined by the number of varieties of intermediate goods (n) 
produced in the host country. It is contended that multinationals prefer to be located in 
countries with either very high or very low n. This result is important, as far as policy is 
concerned, because there is a chance for an undeveloped country with low n to attract a 
low-linkage generating multinational. In this case, the bad equilibrium is self-reinforcing. 
Therefore, host governments must be careful in their policy decisions to attract 
multinationals as a device to promote growth-development. If it is known that the product 
a multinational produces uses intermediate goods intensively, the costs of communication 
between the multinational plant and the headquarters are high, and both the host and 
home countries are not too different in terms of the varieties of intermediate goods 
produced, then the policy actions aimed to attract this multinational firm can be seen as 
crucial for development.
The caste-class multiple equilibria model of Akerlof (1976) is different from the 
other two models of Murphy et al. (1989) and Rodriguez-Clare (1996) in the sense that 
the existence of a bad and a good equilibria is a consequence of institutional 
arrangements. In Akerlof s model, the only way to move from the inferior -  that where 
everybody obeys the caste codes -  to the superior equilibrium, where more productive 
people can find better jobs in a different caste, is via formation of coalitions.
Despite this caste-class model gives emphasis to institutional arrangements 
specific of certain countries (India, for example), it can shed light to other institutional 
mechanisms more common in many poor countries worldwide, with interesting policy 
implications. One possibility is the coexistence of power and corruption in a given
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country. Suppose that an inferior equilibrium exists in which a powerful politician (a 
Governor or even a President) misallocates resources (tax revenue) for personal purposes. 
In this equilibrium the corruption machine is established in a way that any violating 
person (an official who eventually would denounce the corrupt Governor) would be 
strongly retaliated for his/her decision to denounce the fraudulent scheme. Also, public 
scrutiny is ruled out because the powerful man has close relation with the media (TV 
network, newspaper, etc, are proprieties of the Governor’s family members, as happened 
in Brazil with President Collor). The only way to break the inferior equilibrium is via a 
coalition formation that publicly scrutinizes the powerful man activities (In Brazil the 
coalition formation was first headed by President Collor’s brother Pedro Collor, who 
brought the fraudulent scheme to public scrutiny).
As long as policy-related issues (here political-related sounds more appropriate) 
are concerned, society, incumbent government, interest groups, etc, may visualize ways 
as to eliminate the inferior equilibrium. It is interesting to note that many social 
movements can start a process to block or break institutional arrangements that are 
perverse to development in poor countries. Both governmental and non-governmental 
organizations may be seen as important entities to help in coalition formation aimed to 
eliminate bad institutional arrangements.
To sum up this section on policy issues related to multiple equilibria development 
models, we can say that escaping from poverty traps is possible via use of sound actions. 
In different models, different practices are called for, but the essential point is that sound 
policy-based practices may make an important difference in leading poor countries 
towards development.
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Locally Oriented Research and Economic Development: The Grassroots Approach
The so-called grassroots movements, included here as an alternative branch of the 
new development literature, lack the qualifications to be generally summarized. As 
Escobar (1992) put it:
Although it would be impossible to summarize even a few of these movements here, it is 
important to identify grosso modo some of their general features ... (1) They are 
essentially local movements, responses given by a group of people to particular problems 
or direct instances of power ... They concern the day-to-day experience of people ... In 
sum, they are non-party political formations which may or may not form horizontal 
networks or regional movements ... They are pluralistic struggles ... They tend to bypass 
established Development organizations, local elites and parties ... But they are by no 
means apolitical; instead of a depoliticized Development, they politicize the rights of the 
poor ...Even if they are frequently motivated by economic reasons, ... local culture, 
artistic aspects and communal aspirations are often equally important concerns ... They 
do not accept at face value the knowledge of the ‘expert’ and of government agents ...
They rely on their own knowledge or, at any rate, their knowledge occupies an 
increasingly important role in their decision-making processes. Escobar (1992, pp. 421- 
422).
From the above citation and the theoretical developments of the trend related to 
development models with multiple equilibria, it is easy to see that the theory-practice 
dilemma poses strong obstacles to the objective of conjecturing a merging development 
theory. Owing to the prospects of the development theory impasse mentioned earlier, we 
can say that one possibility out of the ‘impasse’ would be a combination of theoretical 
developments and locally oriented research in one single project. Clearly, this is hard to 
be envisioned when we put together multiple equilibria development models and the 
‘grassroots’ movements with participatory research. One of the challenges to get out of 
the problems in the new development literature is to try generalizing beyond the case 
studies without sacrificing context in terms of time and space.
Booth (1993), in his arguments on the problems of theoretical coherence, affirms 
that the discovery of diversity in the third world has been an important advance for 
development prospects in the 1990s, but at the same time, it has led to an impossibility
117
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
regarding theoretical reconstruction. Diversity, thus, has been both constructive (for
development practitioners) and destructive (for development theorizing). Booth (1993)
emphasizes the prospects of the post-impasse period as tending to ‘glorified’ empiricism
via rediscovery of diversity. He then capitalizes:
In what form are new theories of development likely to emerge? The question may be 
unanswerable at this stage. Even to establish the lands of answers we might give, it is 
necessary to consider the several issues regarding the different and possibly competing 
claims of structural, constructivist and actor-oriented research and analysis. Booth (1993.
p. 168).
The perspective of development theory in the 1990s towards merging is not so 
promising. An aspect that may be of importance would be trying to bring together 
practitioners and theorists to talk about and work on development issues. At least in one 
aspect the grassroots approach can be conciliated with multiple equilibria development 
models. The possibility of coalition formation in the caste-class model of Akerlof (1976) 
may be seen as a support for social movements in the developing world. Institutional as 
well as known poor economic arrangements can be blocked or even broken via 
participatory movements. Next section put together the two different bodies of 
development theory and combines the output with that of the new growth theory 
advances. Also, an argument is elaborated to highlight a very important trend in the 
nineties. The new growth theory has shed light towards key tenets of development theory 
as a consequence of considering external economies as the main source of economic 
growth. Before going on this, let us introduce some grassroots policy-related issues.
Grassroots and Policy. We can say that grassroots movements are related to 
broader socio-political transformations that countries in the developing world are 
experiencing. The main reasons for the emergence of such social movements are related 
to the failures toward development (two of which were addressed in chapters I and II) as
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well as the inability of governments in poor countries to respond to persistent crises,
whose perverse effects on people’s lives calls for immediate action.
In terms of public policy, one possibility for the demands of such social
movements to be attended is for representative groups or organizations having voice and
access, direct or indirect, to political power. If this is not the case, an alternative
possibility is to convince in power politicians to conduct social policy changes in favor of
the most prominent needs social movements demand.
Despite the fact that new social movements in the developing world are diverse
and constructed upon different supports, the most vivid feature of such movements
relates to day-to-day people’s lives improvements. If it is right to conceive such
emergence of social movements in the developing world as formation of coalitions, and if
such coalitions are powerful enough to bring their demands to the attention of public
authorities, social policy changes may be seen as urgent and actions accordingly taken.
In general, there is no incompatibility for undeveloped countries local
governments and policy makers to advocate social changes based on social movements’
demands, mainly if there is a consensus that actions are really needed. As Escobar (1992)
points out, referring to the Brazilian First Lady Ruth Cardoso:
There is no doubt that we are confronted with new actors engaged in direct and 
confrontational dialogue with the Suite; to decipher this dialogue, however, new ways of 
understanding are required. If, on one hand, the contemporary society rediscover certain 
forms of participation, the State, on the other, widened and diversified the field of its 
actions. Escobar (1992, p. 427).
Therefore, the State and the new social movements’ representatives may not be 
seen as opposing parties. Contrarily, they may find out a way to conciliate interests. In 
other words, social demands coming form society manifestations can and must be taken 
into account in policy-related programs in the developing world.
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New Growth and Development Theories: A Conciliatory Approach 
An important aspect of the new growth and development theories that emerged in 
the middle eighties is the specific way economic growth-development realization is 
conceived in each branch. A salient feature of all growth-development models 
summarized above (exception is the grassroots approach) is that to explain economic 
performance in different countries, either we have to assume that there are parameters 
that exogenously vary across countries or the models should contemplate multiple 
equilibria. Parameter differences are of two types: i) differences in initial conditions 
(state variables); ii) differences in inherent characteristics (environmental variables). In 
the first case, differences in growth-development performances are due to differences in 
the stage of economic development (initial conditions), implying that poor countries 
today follow the path of rich countries in their earlier stages o f development. Romer- 
Lucas’ model is an example -  initial conditions on knowledge-skills-learning determine 
the growth path and performance differentials across countries. In the second case, where 
Rebelo’s model is an example, growth differential performances are due to differences in 
inherent characteristics in different countries, such as differences in propensities to save, 
in tastes, preferences, etc.
I classify these pieces as growth models and the ones characterized by multiple 
equilibria as development models. But, both types of models are interrelated. In a 
multiple equilibria model of economic development, positive or negative shocks in state 
variables can push the economy among different equilibria, leading to different growth 
patterns. In this case, governmental policy can play an important role in moving the 
economy to a more efficient equilibrium.
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Another important aspect is that related to external economies. Both new growth 
and development models (for development models this has been so since the forties) rely 
on externalities and spillovers coming from them, as the main source for sustained 
growth-development. Spillovers coming from education, knowledge dissemination, 
government productive expenditures, trade engagement, increased wages, high 
production of intermediate goods, are all sources of economic growth-development in the 
models summarized above. Therefore, external economies can be seen as an important 
common feature of new growth-development models.
The other branch classified as part of the new development literature -  the 
grassroots approach -  must be interpreted with care, as far as the conciliatory perspective 
is concerned. I briefly mentioned that the emergence of new social movements in the 
developing world could be interpreted as formation of coalitions that might lead to 
blocking bad social-politico-economic arrangements. Also, multiple equilibria 
development models based on these arrangements would be of use in terms of 
encompassing the participatory perspective that characterizes the grassroots approach. 
Other than this possibility, nothing else could be visualized in terms of conciliating the 
grassroots approach with new growth-development models. However, at least in practice, 
governmental policy can take into account social movements’ demands, since there is 
now a consensus that poor social conditions -  in education, health, housing, etc -  are bad 
for growth-development.
The New Political Economy Literature 
The growing importance growth-development theorists and practitioners have 
given to internal features of developing countries, in terms of their social-economic-
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political environments, has propitiated the emergence of an important body of literature 
closely related to policy design, implementation and reform in the developing world.
In chapter II we mentioned that the implications coming from Dollar & Svensson 
(1998) are key in any consideration of growth-development issues in the developing 
world. They claim that the probability of success of foreign-supported structural 
adjustment programs is completely determined by internal characteristics inherent to a 
specific developing country. No matter what the World Bank staff does in terms of 
perfecting, supervising or improving the overall programs-related activities, if internal 
vulnerabilities are known to exist in poor countries, adjustment programs’ ineffectiveness 
is an almost sure result.
If this is a meaningful way in dealing with policy-related issues in the developing 
world, the main tenets of the so-called new political economy literature is of crucial 
relevance and must be considered as a core branch upon which any attempt connected to 
growth-development strategies must rely on.
Owing to this, three aspects linked to internal features of developing countries are 
considered next in four models of the new political economy literature. Each model 
addresses a different way polarization within a society can pose strong constraints on 
growth-development realization. The first piece is due to Alesina & Rodrik (1994) who 
view polarization as originating from income inequality. The second, due to Fernandez & 
Rodrik (1991) and Alesina & Drazen (1991), treats polarization as originating from 
diversity of interests in different economic groups. Finally, as in Easterly & Levine 
(1997), polarization is seen as a consequence of ethnic diversity in the developing world.
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Polarization and Income Inequality: Alesina & Rodrik’s Model.
Income inequality in a country is an important aspect to be focused on when 
growth-development issues are at center. Alesina & Rodrik (1994) explicitly model the 
perverse effects a society can experience (in terms of low economic growth) when two 
classes (capitalists and workers) stand to push the government to tax and redistribute 
income. The model they develop to show the inverse relation between economic growth 
and income inequality is as follows.
Production. The aggregate increasing returns production function is:
(3.37) y = Akag1’Bll'°, 0 < a  < 1,
where k and 1 are the aggregate stocks of capital (physical and human) and labor (raw), 
respectively, g is the aggregate provision of public services supplied by the government 
and used in private production and A is a technological parameter. Gearly, the 
production function presents increasing returns to scale because of the presence of the 
government as a supplier of basic services (e.g., law and order). It is assumed that the 
government finances its expenditures on public services from taxing capital, i.e., g = xk, 
where x is the tax rate. There is no tax on labor. Net capital and labor incomes are:
(3.38) yk = [r(x)-x]k and yi = w(x)k.
Note that both interest rate r and wage w are (positively) affected by the tax x -  
for a given level of k, higher taxes will translate in more public productive services for
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everybody in the economy. Also, since an individual can earn income from both capital 
and labor, we have:
(3.39) yf = w ( x ) k l j  +  [ r ( x )  -  x ] k { =  w ( x ) k A  +  [ r ( x )  -  x ] k j ,
where a  = lj/[kj/k], Oi e [0, »), is the ownership share of individual i in the economy’s 
aggregate stocks of capital and labor and Oj *• Oj for all individuals i, j. Here it is assumed 
that labor supply is inelastic, such that 1 = 1. In an equalitarian society, Oj = 1.
Consumption. Consumption is modeled by a logarithmic utility function with all 
nice properties for a dynamic maximization problem:
(3.40) Max Uj = /  log Ci e‘pl dt
Subject to k j =  w ( x ) k { O j  +  [ r ( x )  -  x ] k j  -  c„
where c,- is consumption of individual i and p is the discount rate.
Solution. Using the standard solution method for a dynamic maximization 
problem, the capital and consumption growth rates are:
•  •
(3.41) ki/ki = Ci/c, = [r(x) - x] - p ■ X(x).
From equation (3.41) we see that all individuals accumulate at the same rate and 
thus there is a growth rate for the economy k(x) that is independent of the initial
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distribution of factor endowments Oj. Moreover, growth is positive as long as the 
difference between the after-tax return to capital is greater than the discount rate. The 
higher this difference, the greater the economy’s long-run growth rate. But, the size of the 
tax rate plays an important role. Large magnitudes for x is bad for growth, i.e., the size of 
the government intervention is inversely related to growth. This is the same result as in 
the growth-cum-government model of Barro (1990), where for small tax rates the 
productivity-augmenting effect of public expenditure dominates and growth results. Here, 
the after-tax capital revenues increase with x, as far as the tax rate is small. But, when x is 
raised further, the after-tax return to capital starts to decrease.
The important policy issue government faces relates to what tax level population 
will support. Since both capitalists and workers earn income from capital and labor and 
since taxation affects capital only, the government may face pressure to rise x in the case 
of a society where the majority of the population earns relatively more income from the 
labor source.
Using the median-voter theorem, the main result coming from the Alesina & 
Rodrik model is that the higher the difference between the median voter share (oj = o m) 
and the equalitarian share (Oj = 1) in the stocks of capital and labor of the economy, the 
lower is the growth rate of this economy. In other words, the larger [om -  1], the more 
unequal is the society in terms of income distribution, and thus, the lower is the long-run 
growth rate. When the majority voting population receives relatively more income from 
labor activities, i.e., a high o m occurs, the pressure this fraction of the population may 
make on the government to raise x and then redistribute it among the less fortunate, may 
cause perverse consequences for economic growth. As Alesina & Rodrik (1994) state:
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For growth to be as high as possible, we need the median voter to own as much capital as 
possible, and to have as high an income (relative to the average) as possible. When a 
large segment of the electorate is cut off from the expanding and income-generating 
assets of the economy, it is more likely to be willing to tax income from these assets and 
to undercut growth. Alesina & Rodrik (1994, pp. 477-478).
As far as inequality in a society is due to earning income differences between two 
segments, such as the ones visualized by Alesina & Rodrik (1994), and majority voting 
rules are present, an unequalitarian society may experience retarding-growth policies due 
to this type of polarization.
Two Models of Interests Groups: Fernandez & Rodrik’s and Alesina & Drazen’s Models
In the Fernandez & Rodrik (1991) model, polarization originating from economic
interests groups is the major cause preventing policy reforms. The main argument is that
uncertainty about whom, in a specific group, is going to face the onus of the policy
change makes such change unlike to occur. For example, if a society is formed by two
economic interest groups (exporters and domestic producers) and nobody knows for sure
who, within the exporter group, will gain from a trade reform, then the majority can block
the reform ex-ante, even if the whole society will stand to benefit ex-post. In other words,
uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from policy reforms prevents
governments from improving upon economic policy. The greater the uncertainty, the
more acute polarization is and the smaller the government capacity to promote growth-
development enhancing policies.
Using a model to highlight the main aspects of trade policy reform in a society
formed by two different types of interests groups, the relevant conclusions coming from
the Fernandez & Rodrik (1991) model are as follows:
... uncertainty regarding the identities of gainers and losers can prevent an efficiency- 
enhancing reform from being adopted, even in cases in which reform would prove quite 
popular after the fact... there is a bias towards the status quo... in countries like Korea,
Chile, and Turkey, radical trade reforms introduced by autocratic regimes have not
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collapsed (and indeed have turned out to be popular), even though they had little support 
prior to reform. Fernandez & Rodrik (1991, p. 1154).
Alesina & Drazen (1991) address the role of economic interests groups 
differently. They conceive conflict of interest among individuals of different groups as 
the cause for delaying, not preventing, reform. According to them, the group who 
concedes first must bear the onus of the reform. If this is known in advance, each interest 
group tries to outwait the other, delaying thus policy reform.
Alesina & Drazen (1991) model a situation where a country facing a large budget 
deficit needs to implement a restrictive fiscal policy under a stabilization program. 
Although everybody agrees that the reform is necessary, no interest group individual 
knows exactly how the onus of the policy reform is to be shared. As Alesina & Drazen 
state:
... even though it is agreed that stabilization requires a change in fiscal policy to 
eliminate budget deficits, there may be disagreement about how the burden of the policy 
change is to be shared. When socioeconomic groups perceive the possibility of shifting 
this burden elsewhere, each group may attempt to wait the others out. This war of 
attrition ends, and a stabilization is enacted, when certain groups “concede” and allow 
their political opponents to decide on the allocation of the burden of the fiscal adjustment. 
Cbncession may occur via legislative agreement, electoral outcomes, or ceding power of 
decree to policy-makers... if it is the poor who suffer most in the prestabilizalion period, 
they bear the largest share of the costs of stabilization. Alesina & Drazen (1991, pp. 
1170-1171).
In the above two models, polarization is accessed via war of attrition among 
interest groups with the resultant policy reform delay, and/or uncertainty about gainers 
and losers from policy changes may prevent policy reform. In both cases, it is of crucial 
importance to understand the internal struggles among different groups or classes a 
society faces. Looking at these features is an important advance in the understanding of 
growth-development collapses in the developing world.
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Ethnic Diversity and Polarization: Easterly & Levine on Africa’s Growth Tragedy
Another possibility to address societal polarization is via ethnic diversity. Easterly
& Levine (1997) evidence a strong positive correlation between ethnic fragmentation and
poor-growth policy implementation. They claim that the existence of ethnic divisions in a
country adversely affect economic growth through poor policy choices and display
Africa’s growth tragedy in three decades (1960s, 1970s and 1980s) as empirical evidence
supporting the arguments on ethnolinguistic diversity.
Despite their empirical exercise focuses on Africa, the overall prospects can be
generally conceived. The main findings are twofold. First, ethnic fragmentation
encourages the adoption of poor-growth policies. Second, ethnic divisions prevents the
emergence of consensus for growth-enhancing public goods provision. These two
perverse consequences of ethnic diversity on policy and provision of infrastructure in a
given country are stronger than the direct impact of ethnic fragmentation on growth itself.
Ethnic diversity is measured by linguistic heterogeneity, defined as the fraction of
a given population who speaks a non-official language at home. In many countries in
Africa this fraction is above 90%.
The main conclusions coming from Easterly & Levine (1997) are as follows:
Africa’s poor growth -  and resulting low income -  is associated with low schooling, 
political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange 
markets, high government deficits, and insufficient infrastructure. High ethnic diversity is 
closely associated with low schooling, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted 
foreign exchange markets, and insufficient infrastructure. While motivated by Africa, 
these results are not particular to Africa... The results lend support to theories that 
interest group polarization leads to rent-seelring behavior and reduces the consensus for 
public goods (and sound policy choices), creating long-run growth tragedies. Easterly &
Levine (1997, p. 1241).
A General Qutline: New Growth-Development Theory. New Political Economy 
Literature. Policy-Related Issues and the Developing World
After having summarized several new growth-development models and their
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policy-related prescriptions and briefly presented the core aspects o f the new political 
economy literature, it is time to conjecture a general outline. The main objective is not to 
provide a new general model of growth-development applicable everywhere in the 
developing world. The goal is a simpler one: to list several aspects said to be crucial to 
base practices in the developing world towards growth-development. I conjecture what a 
call a general outline and claim that any attempt aimed to foster growth-development in 
the developing world via social-economic-political policy design and implementation or 
via any other mechanism, must take into account the proceeds included in this 
conjectured general outline.
To begin, I will first make use of the prospects connected to the new political 
economy literature. Observation of the internal characteristics of the wide range of 
undeveloped countries worldwide is a number one priority. Based on the main tenets of 
the political economy models selected above, we can list the following, as of fundamental 
importance for growth-development-enhancing practices in the developing world:
i) Income inequality and its related consequences. Developing countries with high 
levels of income and wealth inequality may not be able to escape from poverty 
traps as pursing growth-augmenting strategies. Redistribution may be envisioned 
first, even if it brings lower growth in the short-run;
ii) Internal attrition of interests groups in specific countries must be understood in 
advance of any attempt to formulate and implement policy. If this is not the case, 
policy reform can be prevented, delayed or, if implemented, ineffective;
iii) Countries facing ethnolinguistic fragmentation, or of any other type, must 
envision mechanisms to conciliate diverse demands and objectives. If public
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infrastructure is been poorly supplied because of ethnic diversity, governments 
must find a way out of the problems;
iv) Corruption schemes, poor institutional arrangements, rent-seeking behavior, all 
must be given special attention before any growth-development strategy is 
visualized in developing countries.
Not all of the poor arrangements existing in undeveloped countries worldwide, 
many of which the new political economy literature brings to our knowledge, need to be 
completely eliminated in order to visualize and implement growth-development strategies 
in the developing world. If this were the case, the undeveloped world would be seen as 
fiitureless -  there is no way to totally eliminate all the problems related to poverty 
worldwide. The conjecture here is that we must take into account the problems when 
visualizing growth-development programs.
Under this perspective, we now make use of the key tenets of the new growth- 
development theory in order to highlight the most important variables said to be crucial in 
fostering economic growth-development.
i) Education is seen as an important source of economic performance. Many new 
growth models brings this prediction. Schooling, skills, knowledge, learning, all 
relates to essential sources of external economies and spillovers to positively 
affect a society;
ii) The provision of productive inputs and general infrastructure as well as law and 
order by the government is key to the process of sustained economic growth- 
development;
iii) Trade engagement is another form to prompt external economies, learning,
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knowledge, etc. International trade is a powerful mechanism leading to economic 
prosperity;
All these variables and predictions are not exclusive of the new growth models of 
the nineties. Models of economic development with multiple equilibria bring the same 
optimism regarding external economies and spillover effects.
i) Wage incentives, as a source of increased demand, may lead to a process of 
industrialization and then growth;
ii) Multinationals, if known to generate positive linkage effects, may engender 
economic prosperity in poor areas. Of course, it may also engender 
underdevelopment, if negative linkages happen to occur;
iii) Coalitions formation blocking poor institutional arrangements, may translate in an 
important source of social changes in the developing world, mainly via the 
emergence of new social movements;
iv) Participatory activities are key in the process of growth-development in the 
developing world. Only recently, such perspective has been made feasible. It has 
been embraced even by standard International Financial Institutions such as the 
World Bank [see Robb (1999) on Participatory Poverty Assessments]. In this 
general outline, participatory activities in the developing world are not 
incompatible with macroeconomic adjustment programs of the types discussed in 
chapter II.
An empirical exercise on the determinants of economic growth in developing 
countries is conducted below as a way to corroborate with the general outline conjectured 
above. Cross sectional data (see Appendix III) for four key variables related to the new
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growth theory literature -  openness, primary enrollment, secondary enrollment (these two 
related to education) and government intervention -  and two other variables related to the 
new political economy literature -  strikes and purges -  are selected. The dependent 
variable GDP growth is regressed on these six explanatory variables and the estimated 
equation is:
(3.42) GDPg = -  0.605 + 0.0140pen ness + 0.031 Primary + 0.024Secondary -  0.135Gov -  1.217Slrikes -  6.218Purges
[-0.14] [0.73] [0.72] [0.51] [-1.22] [-1.92] [-1.76]
As shown, among the six selected determinants of economic growth in developing 
countries in 1990, out of the four related to the new growth literature, three present the 
expected signal, but are all insignificant (t-statistics in brackets). Thus, education 
(primary and secondary enrollment) and the degree of openness are positive related to 
growth, but we cannot reject a zero coefficient on both. Government intervention is 
significant and negatively related to growth. This may be evidence for the known fact 
that government interventions in undeveloped countries characterize by 
unproductiveness. On the other hand, both Strikes and Purges are negatively and 
significantly related to growth in the developing world. This evidence can be seen as a 
confirmation of the fact that in poor countries the constraints advanced by the new 
political economy literature may impose strong limits to the process of sustained growth 
advanced by the new growth models, as far as the developing world is concerned.
CQlKlwsjpn
The main conclusion of chapter III is that the prospects of the new growth- 
development theory as well as those coming from the new political economy literature
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are conceived as important tools to base practices in undeveloped countries. Several 
variables closely related to the constraints advanced by the new models of political 
economy showed to fulfill the predictions that economic growth in developing countries 
may not be realized if only the pure growth theoretical perspective is envisioned.
The growth performance o f developing countries is shown to be negatively and 
significantly related to some distortions as brought by important variables connected to 
the new political economy models. Therefore, it seems that there is empirical support for 
the general outline delineated above. A conclusion is thus drawn pointing out to the 
pertinence of basing policy design and implementation in poor countries connected to the 
new prospects of the new growth-development theory, with the proviso of care attention 
to the specific internal social-political-economic characteristics of a certain developing 
country.
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CONCLUSION
The main conclusions o f the study are as follows:
i) Due to internal complexities of countries in the developing world, no single
theoretical or practical device is a relevant tool to guide growth-development 
strategies in undeveloped areas. For this reason, I have conjectured a general 
outline in chapter III as guide for present and future practices aimed to help 
developing countries getting out of the obstacles to growth-development. Also, 
empirical evidence on the determinants of growth in the developing world points 
to the fact that distortions (government size, strikes and purges) may impose 
restrictions on sustained growth in these countries;
ii) The practices based on physical capital accumulation detailed in chapter I have
shown to be a failure. In general, physical capital accumulation is not positively 
related to growth in Africa, Asia and Latin America, both in a year-by-year basis 
and four-year averages;
iii) The other practice based on foreign help, whether via aid or stabilization-
structural adjustment plans supported by the World Bank and the IMF, has also 
failed to solve poor country’s most prominent difficulties. Evidence in chapter II 
shows the distressing social-economic conditions in the visited undeveloped 
countries. Poverty has not been eradicated. Also, when economic growth is 
regressed on both investment and aid the results do not change: For Africa, the 
coefficient on foreign aid is positive but insignificant. For Asia both coefficients 
are negative and insignificant and for Latin America aid and investment relate
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negatively and significantly to growth;
iv) Finally, the alternative guide contained in the general outline is a sound way to 
base present and future practices in the developing world. The combination of the 
prospects of new growth-development theory with those of new political economy 
literature to guide actions aimed to eradicate the most prominent social-economic 
problems in the developing world is a promising and challenging task. A brief 
empirical exercise on the determinants of economic growth in the developing 
world was conducted and results showed that government size, strikes and purges 
impact negatively and significantly on growth. This was said to be evidence in 
favor of constraints that distortions in developing countries may impose on the 
goal towards growth-development.
135
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX I




Growth-Investment Link for Africa -1961/1980 (47 Countries) 
ISourcet Summers & Heston (199S), The Penn World Table 5.61
Years GDPa(t) INV/GDP(t-l) GDPrftH" INV/GDP(t-l)4'
1961 2.26 10.21 4.92 9.64
1962 4.23 9.98 3.88 10.48
1963 7.51 8.87 6.02 11.68
1964 5.70 9.49 5.83 13.66
















Four-year averages for periods 1961-64,1965-68,1969-76 and 1977-80, respectively. 
Correlation for GDPg(t)-INV/GDP(t-l) is -0.034 and for GDPg(t)4-INV/GDP(t-l)4 is 
0.468.
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A frica’s Regressions
AFRICA: GROWTH-INVESTMENT /1961*1980 
Dependent Variable is GDPG 
Sample: 1 20























AFRICA: GROWTH-INVESTMENT / 1961-1980 (POOLED) 
LS // Dependent Variable is GDPG 
Sample: 1 940

















Mean dependent var 





AFRICA: GROWTH-INVESTMENT /1961-1980 (4-YEARS AVERAGES) 
Dependent Variable is GDPG4 
Sample: 1 5

















Mean dependent var 
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Asia
Table L2
Growth-Investment Link for Asia -1961/1980 (21 Countries)
Years G D Pifl) INV/GDP(t-l) G D P rfW INV/GDP(t-l)4"
1961 -4.23 15.16 3.52 12.28
1962 1.79 11.96 3.01 13.89
1963 8.07 10.36 7.13 14.72
1964 8.45 11.64 5.60 16.66
















Correlation for GDPg(t)-INV/GDP(t-l) is -0.068 and for GDPg(t)4-INV/GDP(t-l)4 is 
0.622.
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Asia’s Regressions
ASIA: GROWTH-INVESTMENT /1961-1980 
Dependant Variable is GDPG 
Sample: 1 20

















Mean dependent var 





ASIA: GROWTH-INVESTMENT / 1961-1980 (POOLED) 
Dependent Variable is GDPG 
Sample: 1 420

















Mean dependent var 





ASIA: GROWTH-INVESTMENT / 1961-1980 (4-YEAR AVERAGES) 
Dependent Variable is GDPG4 
Sample: 1 5

















Mean dependent var 





Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Asian Tigers
Table L2A
Growth-Investment Link for Asian Tigers -1961/1980 (4 Countries)
Years
|  wVUI W l  kJHIHIUVI 9  VO
GDPg(t)




1961 6.42 11.46 7.95 13.22
1962 7.04 12.22 9.20 16.56
1963 11.19 12.55 11.14 21.90
1964 7.17 16.67 9.25 23.95
















Correlation for GDPg(t)-INV/GDP(t-l) is -0.140 and for GDPg(t)4-INV/GDP(t-l)4 is
0.125.
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Asian Tigers’ Regressions
ASIAN TIGERS: GROWTH-INVESTMENT / 1981-1980 
Dependent Variable is GDPG 
Sample: 1 20

















Mean dependent var 





ASIAN TIGERS: GROWTH-INVESTMENT /1961-1980 (POOLED) 
Dependent Variable is GDPG 
Sample: 1 80

















Mean dependent var 





ASIAN TIGERS: GROWTH-INVESTMENT /1961-1980 (4-YEAR AVs.) 
Dependent Variable is GDPG4 
Sample: 1 5
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Latin America
Table L3
Growth-Investment Link for Latin America -1961/1980 (25 Countries)
Years GDPf(t)
U M »W H  ft MV
INV/GDP(t-I) GDP*(t)4
ftr V «« |
INV/GDP(t-l)4"
1961 6.40 16.93 5.23 16.57
1962 3.69 17.07 5.24 16.94
1963 3.36 16.55 6.91 17.99
1964 7.46 15.74 6.35 19.80


















Correlation for GDPg(t)-INV/GDP(t-l) is -0.029 and for GDPg(t)4-INV/GDP(t-l)4 is 
0.471.
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Latin America’s Regressions
LATIN AMERICA: GROWTH-INVESTMENT /1961-1980 
Dependent Variable is GDPG 
Sample: 1 20

















Mean dependent var 





LATIN AMERICA: GROWTH-INVESTMENT /1961-1980 (POOLED) 
Dependent Variable is GDPG 
Sample: 1 500

















Mean dependent var 





LATIN AMERICA: GROWTH-INVESTMENT /1981-1980 (4-YEAR AVs.) 
Dependent Variable is GDPG4 
Sample: 1 5
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APPENDIX H. A
THE INVESTMENT-AID AND GROWTH-INVESTMENT-AID LINKS FOR 
AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA -1975/1990
Africa
Table H.A1
Investment-Aid Link for Africa -1975/1990 (40 Countries)
ISource: Summers & Heston (1995), The Penn World Table 5.6; Chang et al. (1998)1 

















The EDA serie is multiplied by 2 for better visualization o f the overall trend.
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Africa’s Regressions
AFRICA: INVESTMENT-AID /1975-1990 
Dependent Variable is INV 
Sample: 116
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 16.26562 1.209757 13.44537 0.0000
EDA -3.696832 0.900334 -4.106066 0.0011
R-squared 0.546335 Mean dependent var 11.59375
Adjusted R-squared 0.513930 S.D. dependent var 2.358098
Duibin-Watson stat 0.650953 Prob(F-statistic) 0.001069
AFRICA: INVESTMENT-AID /1975-1990 (POOLED) 
Dependent Variable is INV 
Sample: 1 640
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 9.284768 0.398863 23.27810 0.0000
EDA 46095.45 7984.725 5.772954 0.0000
R-squared 0.049643 Mean dependent var 10.87406
Adjusted R-squared 0.046154 S.D. dependent var 7.483983
Durbin-Watson stat 0.347698 ProtKF-statistic) 0.000000
AFRICA: GROWTH-INVESTMENT-AID /1975-1990 
Dependent Variable is GDPG 
Sample: 116
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -9.712735 7.820628 -1.241938 0.2362
INV 0.704381 0.466816 1.508905 0.1552
EDA 1.361172 2.300319 0.591732 0.5642
R-squared 0.177220 Mean dependent var 0.184375
Adjusted R-squared 0.050639 S.D. dependent var 3.002861
Durbin-Watson stat 1.590354 Prob(F-statistic) 0.281412
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M s
Table ILA2
Investment-Aid Link for Asia -1975/1990 (14 Countries)
W^B
Years INV/GDPC/.) EDA/GDP' Correlation
















— f — ____ 21.1 2.2
The EDA serie is multiplied by 10 for better visualization o f the overall trend
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Asia’s Regressions
ASIA: INVESTMENT-AID /1075-1990 
Dependent Variable is INV 
Sample: 1 16
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 19.72132 0.986085 19.99960 0.0000
EDA -2.958604 4.203164 -0.703899 0.4930
R-squared 0.034181 Mean dependent var 19.04375
Adjusted R-squared •0.034806 S.D. dependent var 0.841403
Durbin-Watson stat 0.559664 Prob(F-statistic) 0.493038
ASIA: INVESTMENT-AID /1975-1990 (POOLED) 
Dependent Variable is INV 
Sample: 1 224
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 17.22246 0.550792 31.26855 0.0000
EDA -28339.63 21788.32 -1.300680 0.1947
R-squared 0.007563 Mean dependent var 16.92232
Adjusted R-squared 0.003093 S.D. dependent var 7.498770
Durbin-Watson stat 0.235588 ProtKF-statistic) 0.194717
ASIA: GROWTH-INVESTMENT-AID /1975-1990 
Dependent Variable is GDPG 
Sample: 116
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 8.521116 11.60004 0.734577 0.4758
INV •0.250515 0.578167 •0.433293 0.6719
EDA •2.018375 9.252212 •0.218151 0.8307
R-squared 0.015709 Mean dependent var 3.288125
Adjusted R-squared -0.135721 S.D. dependent var 1.737459
Durbin-Watson stat 2.036847 ProtKF-statistic) 0.902202
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Latin America
Table U.A3
Investment-Aid Link for Latin America -1975/1990 (23 Countries)


















The EDA serie is multiplied by 50 for better visualization of the overall trend.
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Latin America’s Regressions
LATIN AMERICA: INVESTMENT-AID /1075-1990 
Dependent Variable is INV 
Sample: 116
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 23.76395 0.952045 24.96094 0.0000
EDA •75.67930 10.73963 •7.046734 0.0000
R-squared 0.780069 Mean dependent var 17.46125
Adjusted R-squared 0.764360 S.D. dependent var 2.751295
Durbin-Watson stat 0.954688 ProtKF-statistic) 0.000006
LATIN AMERICA: INVESTMENT-AID /1975-1990 (POOLED) 
Dependent Variable is INV 
Sample: 1 368
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 15.80242 0.315104 50.14985 0.0000
EDA -43295.78 17262.94 -2.508019 0.0126
R-squared 0.016896 Mean dependent var 15.46033
Adjusted R-squared 0.014210 S.D. dependent var 5.488204
Durbin-Watson stat 0.578614 ProtKF-statistic) 0.012573
LATIN AMERICA: GROWTH-INVESTMENT-AID /1975-1990 
Dependent Variable is GDPG 
Sample: 116
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 38.92620 10.24395 3.799921 0.0022
INV -1.458676 0.426308 -3.421649 0.0045
EDA -156.9907 36.52867 •4.297739 0.0009
R-squared 0.595106 Mean dependent var 0.393750
Adjusted R-squared 0.532815 S.D. dependent var 3.116767
Durbin-Watson stat 1.539539 ProtKF-statistic) 0.002804
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APPENDIX n.B




Literacy and School Enrollment in 12 Asian Countries -1990  
_____________ [Source: World Bank (1996)1______________
Countries Dliteracy Rate (•/•) Gross Enrolment Ratio (%) 
Primary Secondary
Pakistan 65.2 46 21
Bangladesh 64.7 77 19
India 51.8 98 44
China 26.7 125 48
Indonesia 23.0 • •
Malaysia 21.6 93 56
Jordan 19.9 - •
Myanmar 19.4 105 -
Sri Lanka 11.6 107 74
Philippines 10.3 111 73
Thailand 7.0 90 33
Korea 3.7 107 88
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Table U.B2
Literacy by Gender in IS Asian Countries -1995
_______ [Source: United Nations (1999)1_______


















School Life Expectancy in 6 Asian Countries 
[Source: United Nations (1999)1
Countries Years Total (years) Male (years) Female (years)
Bangladesh 1990 5.1 5.9 4.2
Syrian Arab. Rep. 1994 9.5 10.1 8.8
Indonesia 1994 10.0 10.4 9.6
Philippines 1995 11.2 - -
Iran 1996 11.3 12.0 10.5
Korea 1996 14.6 15.3 13.9
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Table ILB4
Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates in 12 Asian Countries -1993  
________________[Source: World Bank (1996)1________________
Countries Life Expectancy at 
Birth (Yean)
Mortality Rates (per 1,000) 
Infant Under 5 Yean
Bangladesh 56.11 105.6 68
Myanmar 58.11 81.6 111
India 60.83 80.0 122
Pakistan 62.06 87.6 137
Indonesia 63.19 56.0 H I
Philippines 66.72 42.2 59
Thailand 68.84 36.4 45
China 69.18 30.5 54
Jordan 70.08 27.0 42
Malaysia 71.05 12.6 17
Korea 71.28 10.6 12
Sri Lanka 72.14 17.4 19
Table D.BS
Life Expectancy by Gender and Infant Mortality in IS Asian Countries: 1995*2000 
______________________[Source: United Nations (1999)|______________________
Countries Life Expectancy at Birth (Yean) Infant Mortality
Male Female Rate (per 1,000)
Nepal 57.6 57.1 83
Bangladesh 58.1 58.2 79
Myanmar 58.5 61.8 79
India 62.3 62.9 72
Pakistan 62.9 65.1 74
Indonesia 63.3 67.0 48
Thailand 65.8 72.0 29
Philippines 66.5 70.2 35
Syrian Arab Rep. 66.7 71.2 33
China 67.9 72.0 41
Iran 68.5 70.0 45
Korea 68.8 76.0 10
Jordan 68.9 71.5 26
Malaysia 69.9 74.3 11
Sri Lanka 70.9 75.4 18
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Table ILB6
Water Supply and Sanitation in 12 Asian Countries 
________ [Source; Pnited Nations (1999)1________
Countries Years Population w/ Access to 
Safe Water (•/.) 
Urban Rural
Population w/ Access to 
Sanitation (%) 
Urban Rural
Bangladesh 1995 49 96 41 36
Nepal 1996 61 59 74 18
Myanmar 1995-96 78 50 56 36
Pakistan 1996 85 56 75 24
Indonesia 1995 87 57 88 61
Sri Lanka 1995 88 65 81 70
Korea 1995 93 77 100 100
Thailand 1995 94 88 98 95
Philippines 1995 94 - - -
Syrian Arab Rep 1996 96 79 - -
Iran 1995 98 82 86 74
Malaysia 1995 100 86 94 66
Table D.B7 
Inflation in 12 Asian Countries: 1990-1993
_______________________ [Source; World Bank (1996)1___________________
Countries Consumer Price Index (1987=100)
1990 1991 1992 1993
Myanmar 173.6 229.6 280.0 369.1
Sri Lanka 154.5 173.3 193.1 215.7
Philippines 139.3 165.3 180.1 193.8
Indonesia 124.0 135.6 145.8 159.3
Pakistan 128.0 143.1 156.7 171.4
India 126.5 144.1 161.1 171.3
China 142.4 149.6 162.5 190.1
Jordan 155.7 168.4 175.2 183.5
Korea 123.0 134.4 142.8 149.6
Bangladesh 130.0 139.4 145.4 145.3
Malaysia 108.2 112.9 118.3 122.5
Thailand 115.9 122.5 127.5 132.1
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Table aB S
Unemployment in 10 Asian Countries





Sri Lanka 1996 11.3 8.0 17.6
Philippines 1997** 7.9 7.5 8.5
Syrian Arab Rep. 1991 6.8 5.2 14.0
Pakistan 1995 5.4 4.1 13.7
Indonesia 1996 4.0 3.3 5.1
China 1997* 3.0 - -
Malaysia 1997b 2.5 - -
Bangladesh 1996 2.5 2.7 2.3
Korea 1996 2.0 2.3 1.6
Thailand 1997“ 0.9 0.9 0.9
a. Persons aged 10 years and over.
b. Persons aged IS years and over.
c. Urban areas only.
d. Persons aged 13 years and over.
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Latin America
Table ILB9
Literacy and School Enrollment in 20 Latin American Countries -1990  
__________________ ISource: World Bank (1996)1__________________
Countries Dliteracy Rate (%) Gross Enrolment Ratio (•/•)
Primary Secondary
Haiti 47.0 56 22
Guatemala 44.9 79* 28*
El Salvador 27.0 76* 25*
Honduras 26.9 105* 19*
Bolivia 22.5 85 34
Brazil 18.9 108 39
Dominican Republic 16.7 - -
Peru 14.9 119b 30b
Ecuador 14.2 - -
Colombia 13.3 - -
Mexico 12.7 115 55
Panama 11.9 106 60
Paraguay 9.9 107 30
Venezuela 8.0 97 34
Costa Rica 7.2 101 42
Chile 6.6 98 74
Argentina 4.7 - -
Uruguay 3.8 108 81
Guyana 3.6 - -
Jamaica 1.6 106 62
a. Data for 1991.
b. Data for 1992.
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Table ILB10
Literacy by Gender in 23 Latin American Countries -1995
____________[Source: United Nations (1999)1___________






El Salvador 28.8 27.0
Jamaica 19.6 11.1















Trinidad and Tobago 1.5 3.4
Guyana 1.4 2.9
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Table ILB11
School Life Expectancy in 13 Latin American Countries
__________ [Source; United Nations (1999)1__________
Countries Years Total (years) Male (years) Female (years)
Honduras 1991 8.7 - -
El Salvador 1995 9.8 9.7 9.9
Bolivia 1990 9.9 - -
Colombia 1995 10.0 8.2 -
Paraguay 1996 10.0 10.0 10.0
Costa Rica 1994 10.1 - -
Jamaica 1992 10.9 - -
Venezuela 1991 10.9 - -
Mexico 1995 11.0 - -
Brazil 1994 11.1 - -
Panama 1990 11.3 - -
Peru 1993 12.1 - -
Chile 1996 12.6 12.7 12.5
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Table H.B12
Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates in 23 Latin American Countries -1993  
____________________ [Source: World Bank (1996)1____________________
Countries Life Expectancy Mortality Rates (per 1,000)
at Birth (Years) Infant Under 5 Years
Haiti 56.93 84.2 130
Bolivia 59.74 73.2 114
Guatemala 65.27 46.4 73
Guyana 65.48 46.8 69
Peru 66.24 63.0 92
Brazil 66.58 57.0 63
El Salvador 66.68 44.6 60
Nicaragua 66.96 50.6 72
Honduras 68.12 41.4 56
Ecuador 69.04 49.2 57
Colombia 69.48 36.4 44
Dominican Republic 69.87 40.4 48
Paraguay 70.20 37.4 46
Mexico 71.00 35.4 43
Trinidad and Tobago 71.83 17.6 21
Venezuela 71.94 22.6 24
Argentina 72.27 23.6 27
Uruguay 72.49 19.4 21*
Panama 73.13 24.2 28
Jamaica 73.75 13.6 17
Chile 73.95 15.6 -
Barbados 75.49 9.0 17
Costa Rica 76.35 13.6 -
a. Data for 1991.
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Table H.B13
Life Expectancy by Gender and Infant Mortality in 22 LA Countries: 1995-2000
____________________ [Source: United Nations (1999)1_____________________




Haiti 51.4 56.2 68
Bolivia 59.8 63.2 66
Guyana 61.1 67.9 58
Guatemala 61.4 67.2 46
Brazil 63.1 71.0 42
Nicaragua 65.8 70.6 43
Peru 65.9 70.9 45
El Salvador 66.5 72.5 32
Ecuador 67.3 72.5 46
Colombia 67.3 74.3 30
Paraguay 67.5 72.0 39
Honduras 67.5 72.3 35
Dominican Republic 68.9 73.1 34
Mexico 69.5 75.5 31
Argentina 69.6 76.8 22
Venezuela 70.0 75.7 21
Uruguay 70.4 78.0 18
Panama 71.8 76.4 21
Chile 72.3 78.3 13
Jamaica 72.9 76.8 22
Barbados 73.7 78.7 12
Costa Rica 74.3 78.9 12
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Table D.B14
Water Supply and Sanitation in 19 Latin American Countries -1995
________________[Source: United Nations (1999)1_______________
Countries Population w/ Access to Population w/ Access to
Safe Water (%) Sanitation (%)
_______________________Urban Rural Urban  Rural
Haiti 38 39 43 16
Paraguay 70 6 - 44
Argentina 71 24 80 42
Venezuela 79 79 74 60
Brazil 80 28 74 43
Ecuador 81 10 70 26
El Salvador 82 24 89 65
Dominican Republican 88 55 89 68
Colombia 90 32 70 27
Mexico 90* 66* 93 29
Peru 91 31 78 23
Jamaica 92* 48* 99 -
Nicaragua 93 28 88 28
Guatemala 97 48 91 50
Uruguay 99 - 56 -
Chile 99 47 95 -
Panama 99 73 99 81
Trinidad and Tobago 100 88 97 92
Costa Rica 100 99 100 95
a. Data for 1991-93.
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Table ILB15
Inflation in 23 Latin American Countries: 1990-1993 
__________ [Source: World Bank (1990)1__________
Countries Consumer Price Index (1987-100)
1990 1991 1992 1993
Peru 2,034,579 1E+07 1.8E+07 2.7E+07
Brazil 329,613 1,782,976 2E+07 4.4E+08
Nicaragua 3.8E+07 1.1E+09 1.3E+09 -
Uruguay 622 1,256 2,116 3,261
Argentina 340,010 923,712 1,537,16 1,761,39
Ecuador 413 614 949 1,376
Venezuela 336 451 592 818
Jamaica 151 228 404 493
Mexico 325 399 461 506
Colombia 208 271 345 423
Paraguay 214 266 306 362
Dominican Republic 335 515 539 567
Guatemala 174 232 255 286
Costa Rica 167 216 263 288
El Salvador 175 200 222 263
Bolivia 156 190 213 231
Chile 169 206 238 268
Honduras 141 190 206 228
Haiti 135 156 186 227
Trinidad and Tobago 133 138 147 163
Guyana 151 154 158 -
Barbados 115 122 129 131
Panama 101 102 104 105
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Table ILB16
Unemployment in 21 Latin American Countries





Barbados 1995 19.7 16.5 22.9
Argentina I996b 16.3 15.4 17.6
Trinidad and Tobago 1996 16.2 13.2 21.0
Jamaica 1996c 16.0 9.9 23.0
Dominican Republic 1997** 15.9 9.5 25.6
Panama 1997 13.4 10.7 18.1
Nicaragua \9 9 t 13.3 12.6 14.8
Colombia 1997* 12.1 9.8 15.1
Guyana 1992 11.7 8.4 18.1
Venezuela 1995 11.3 9.0 12.8
Uruguay 1995*'* 10.2 8.0 13.2
Ecuador 1997h,e 9.2 7.0 12.7
Paraguay 1996b’e 8.2 7.8 8.6
El Salvador 1997** 8.0 9.5 5.3
Peru 1997*-* 7.7 6.8 8.9
Brazil 1996b 6.9 5.7 8.8
Costa Rica 1997** 5.7 4.9 7.5
Chile 1997 5.3 4.7 6.6
Bolivia 1996**’* 4.2 3.7 4.5
Honduras \99? 3.2 2.1 1.1
Mexico 1997* 2.7 2.3 3.6
a. Persons aged IS years and over.
b. Persons aged 10 years and over.
c. Persons aged 14 years and over.
d. Persons aged 12 years and over.
e. Urban areas only.
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Africa
Table ILB17
Literacy and School Enrollment in 20 African Countries -1990  
______________ [Source: World Bank (1996)1______________
Countries Illiteracy Rate (%) Gross Enrollment Ratio (•/•)
Primary Secondary
Burkina Faso 81.8 37 8
Benin 76.6 61 11
Guinea 76.0 37 10
Niger 71.6 29 6
Mali 68.0 24 7
Mozambique 67.1 64 8
Mauritania 66.0 55* 14*
Guinea-Bissau 63.5 - -
Senegal 61.7 59 16
Angola 58.3 91 12
Togo 56.7 111 23
Uganda 51.7 71* 13*
Burundi 50.0 72 6
Nigeria 49.3 73 20
Ghana 39.7 77 38
Gabon 39.3 • •
Kenya 31.0 95 29
Zaire 28.2 70 -
Zambia 27.2 97* 31*
Madagascar 19.8 79b -
a. Data for 1991
b. Data for 1993
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Table ILB18
Literacy by Geader in 35 African Countries -1995  
________ [Source: United Nations (I999)|________
Countries Estimated Adult Illiteracy Rate (%)
_________   Male Female
Niger 79.5 93.4
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Table ILB19
School Life Eipectancy in 13 African Countries
_______[Source; United Nations (1999)1_______
Countries Yean Total (years) Male (yean) Female (yean)
Mali 1990 1.8 2.4 1.3
Burkina Faso 1993 2.8 3.5 2.2
Mozambique 1995 3.7 4.3 3.0
Chad 1995 3.9 • -
Burundi 1992 4.9 5.5 4.3
Zambia 1994 7.8 8.3 7.2
Togo 1990 8.9 11.4 6.4
Lesotho 1996 9.6 8.9 10.4
Egypt 1993 10.3 11.2 9.3
Tunisia 1991 10.6 11.3 9.8
Algeria 1995 10.8 11.4 10.1
Botswana 1995 11.3 11.1 11.1
Swaziland 1995 11.6 12.0 11.3
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Table ILB20
Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates in 25 African Countries -1993  
________________ ISource: World Bank (199611_________________
Countries Life Expectancy at 
Birth (Yean)
Mortality Rate (per 1,000) 
Infant Under 5 Years
Guinea-Bissau 43.86 137.8 235
Uganda 44.54 114.2 185
Guinea 44.89 132.0 226
Gambia 45.37 130.0* •
Malawi 45.44 141.6 223
Mali 46.37 122.0 320
Niger 46.48 157.0 217
Mozambique 46.49 145.6 282
Angola 46.96 121.6 292
Burkina Faso 47.22 128.6 •
Benin 47.82 84.6 144*
Zambia 48.28 103.0 •
Senegal 49.68 86.8 120
Burundi 50.31 100.8 178
Nigeria 50.76 82.6 191
Mauritania 51.86 99.2 202
Zaire 51.98 91.6 187
Gabon 53.91 92.2 154
Togo 55.36 83.4 135
Ghana 56.37 79.4 -
Madagascar 56.96 93.0 164
Swaziland 57.94 73.0 -
Kenya 58.46 61.0 94
Lesotho 60.94 77.0 156
Mauritius 70.53 17.4 22
a. Data for 1992.
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Table ILB2I
Life Expectancy by Gender and Infant Mortality in 39 African Countries 1995-2000
______________________ [Source; United Wationa (1999)1______________________




Malawi 38.9 39.6 138
Uganda 38.9 40.4 107
Rwanda 39.4 41.7 124
Zambia 39.5 40.6 82
Burundi 41.0 43.8 119
Central Africa Rep. 42.9 46.9 98
Guinea-Bissau 43.5 46.4 130
Zimbabwe 43.6 44.7 69
Burkina Faso 43.6 45.2 99
Mozambique 43.9 46.6 114
Angola 44.9 48.1 125
Gambia 45.4 48.6 122
Somalia 45.4 48.6 122
Chad 45.7 48.7 112
Guinea 46.0 47.0 124
Botswana 46.2 48.4 58
Niger 46.9 50.1 115
Togo 47.6 50.1 84
Congo 48.3 50.8 90
Nigeria 48.7 51.5 81
Senegal 50.5 54.2 63
Kenya 51.1 53.0 66
Gabon 51.1 53.8 87
Benin 51.7 55.2 88
Mauritania 51.9 55.1 92
Mali 52.0 54.6 118
Cameroon 53.4 56.0 74
Lesotho 54.7 57.3 93
Madagascar 56.0 59.0 82
Comoros 57.4 60.2 76
Swaziland 57.9 62.5 65
Ghana 58.3 61.8 66
Egypt 64.7 67.9 51
Morocco 64.8 68.5 51
Seychelles 65.3 74.1 7
Cape Verde 65.5 71.3 56
Algeria 67.5 70.3 44
Mauritius 67.9 75.1 15
Tunisia 68.4 70.7 30
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Table ILB22
Water Supply and Sanitation in 37 African Countries
_________ [Source; United Nations (1999)1_________
Countries Years Population w/ Access to Population w/ Access to
Safe Water (%) Sanitation (• /.)
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Congo 1995 - 11 15 4
Central Africa Rep. 1994 20 25 - -
Guinea-Bissau 1990-95 38 57 32 17
Chad 1994 48 17 74 7
Burkina Faso 1986-88 50 26 38 5
Madagascar 1991-93 54 4 64 25
Guinea 1995 55 44 24 10
Mali 1996 56“ 20“ 61 22
Uganda 1995 60 36 60 50
Gambia 1991-93 64 39 99b 79b
Lesotho 1995 64 60 76 32
Zambia 1995 66 37 66 37
Angola 1990-95 69 15 71 4
Niger 1997 70 44 79 5
Comoros 1996 74 41 40 16
Cape Verde 1989-90 75 34 42 10
Rwanda 1995 79 44 - -
Gabon 1991-93 80 30 79 67
Cameroon 1996 - 30 73c 21c
Nigeria 1996 80 39 82 42
Swaziland 1995 80 46 - -
Mozambique 1994 - 40 68 -
Togo 1995 82 41 76 22
Benin 1995 82 69 60 11
Mauritania 1996 86 41 44 19
Algeria 1986-88 86 55 - -
Ghana 1996 88 52 75 -
Congo 1995 89 26 53 6
Senegal 1996 90 44 68 12
Egypt 1996 95 74 95 49
Morocco 1991-93 97 20 97 39
Malawi 1996 97 52 94 61
Burundi 1995 97 55 71 47
Zimbabwe 1991-93 99 64 99 48
Tunisia 1994 100 76 100 50
Botswana 1995 100 77 91 41
Mauritius 1989-90 100 95 100 100
a. Data for 1995-96.
b. Data for 1989-90.
c. Data for 1991-93.
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Table ILB23 
Inflation in 22 African Countries: 1990-1993 
 [Source: World Bank (1990)1______
Countries
1990
Consumer Price Index (1987-100) 
1991 1992 1993
Zaire 676.1 15,242.3 644,621.0 13E+07
Zambia 771.1 1,485.1 4,416.5 12,764.3
Guinea-Bissau 385.4 607.4 1,030.0 1,525.5
Uganda 636.4 815.0 1,242.4 1,317.9
Mozambique 309.3 411.2 598.2 850.7
Nigeria 249.6 282.1 407.8 641.0
Kenya 145.2 173.9 225.3 328.5
Ghana 225.8 266.5 293.3 366.5
Malawi 168.3 189.6 232.6 278.3
Lesotho 142.7 168.0 196.9 224.1
Madagascar 154.6 167.9 192.2 211.5
Swaziland 135.1 149.7 162.0 189.6
Gambia 135.7 147.4 161.4 171.9
Burundi 124.8 136.1 142.2 156.0
Mauritania 122.0 128.8 141.9 155.1
Mauritius 139.6 149.3 156.5 172.7
Seychelles 107.5 109.7 113.2 114.7
Burkina Faso 102.9 105.5 103.4 103.9
Togo 100.0 100.4 101.8 100.8
Senegal 98.9 97.2 97.1 96.5
Niger 95.1 87.6 83.7 82.7
Gabon 104.9 105.2 95.1 -
Table ILB24 
Unemployment in 6 African Countries 





Algeria 1997 26.4 26.9 24.0
Botswana 1995b 21.5 19.4 23.9
Morocco 1996c 17.8 15.8 23.0
Tunisia 1989 16.2 14.7 21.9
Egypt 1995* 11.3 7.6 24.1
Mauritius 1995* 9.8 7.8 13.9
a. Persons aged IS years and over.
b. Persons aged 12 years and over.
c. Urban areas only.
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APPENDIX HI
CROSS-COUNTRY DATA ON VARIABLES RELATED TO THE NEW GROWTH 
THEORY AND THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY LITERATURE
TaMaM.1 
Croaa-country Data S at/ 1999
Sourca: lo M im  *  Haaton (1996), Tha N m  Worid TaMa I J ;  Tha Wortd Banfc(1999)
Countrias GDPg OPEN Groaa EnroNmanl-1 Groas Enroamaflt-2 G Strftoa Purgi
BURKINA FASO -1.34 42.86 33.3 75 257 0 0
BURUNDI 2.28 35.37 72.8 5.6 17.6 0 0
GABON 12.33 78.46 - - 14.3 0 0
GAMBIA 0.37 135.32 63.9 16.8 29.9 0 0
GHANA 13.48 39.4 75.3 36.4 16.4 0 0
GUINEA-BISS -3.63 52.59 54 - 27.7 0 0
KENYA -0.S5 57.56 96 24.1 253 0 0
LESOTHO •6.88 136.91 111.8 25.3 25.7 0 1
MADAGASCAR -1.92 42.74 102.9 18 18.4 0 0
MALAWI -0.77 57.6 67.9 7.7 26.4 0 0
MAURITANIA -3.1 107.13 48.7 13.7 15.8 0 0
MAURITIUS •3.16 142.14 1095 559 15.1 0 0
MOZAMBIQUE -3.92 82.63 68.9 7.6 31 0 0
NIGER -7.43 40.49 28.8 6.6 26.4 0 0
NIGERIA 6.86 64.64 91.4 24.9 23.2 0 0
SENEGAL 0.52 52.26 58.9 165 23 0 0
SWAZILAND 6.74 165.31 111.3 43.9 24.7 0 0
TOGO 2.03 93.46 109.4 23.6 25.3 1 0
UGANDA •0.95 24.67 74.5 135 14.6 0 0
ZAMBIA -9.19 70.06 98.7 24.1 355 0 0
COSTARICA 0.09 75.43 100.7 41.6 19.3 0 0
DOMINICAN REP. •12.15 59.21 96.3 - 9.8 0 0
EL SALVADOR •3.4 42.98 61.1 26.4 26.7 0 0
GUATEMALA •0.42 43.48 77.6 - 11.6 0 0
HAITI -1.52 32.31 47.6 20.9 17 0 0
HONDURAS -3.84 75.2 107.6 33 16.5 1 0
JAMAICA -15 113.44 101.3 66 14.9 0 0
MEXICO 5.31 32.72 113.9 53.3 9 0 0
NICARAGUA -3.52 88.56 93.5 37.1 31.8 3 0
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(Continued)
PANAMA 2.05 73.17 106.2 62.6 25.5 0 0
ARGENTINA -4.62 15.18 106.3 71.1 3.9 4 0
BOLIVIA •0.99 46.87 94.7 36.6 18.5 1 0
BRAZIL -5.73 12.66 106.3 36.4 13.6 0 0
CHILE -1.74 65.46 99.9 73.5 16.5 0 0
COLOMBIA •0.45 35.38 102.2 49.6 13.4 0 0
ECUADOR 0.04 60.12 116.5 49.8 15.5 3 0
PARAGUAY 6.08 75.56 105.4 30.9 12.1 0 0
PERU -2.45 26.6 118.5 67.3 16.3 1 0
URUGUAY -2.95 46.27 106.6 81.3 17.6 6 0
VENEZUELA 3.15 59.64 95.7 34.7 15.4 0 0
BANGLADESH 0.95 26.91 72 19 40.3 0 0
CHINA •2.01 25.42 125 49 15.8 0 1
INOIA 2.1 18.76 97 44 30.2 1 0
INDONESIA 8.95 52.61 115 44 14.4 1 0
KOREA. REP. 9.12 62.48 105 90 6.5 0 0
MALAYSIA 9.21 154.2 94 56 14.6 0 0
PAKISTAN -0.29 35.01 61 23 20.6 1 0
PHILIPPINES 1.2 61.46 111 73 16 1 0
SRI LANKA 2.61 67.37 106 74 18.3 0 0
THAILAND 9.67 75.83 99 30 14 0 0
OBS: Data for Nigar, Swaziland and Haiti ara for 1868.
Variabiaa GOPg, OPEN and G ara from Summara 6 Haaton (1985) Tha Pam  World Tabla 5.6. 
Variabiaa Groaa Enrollment-1, Groaa Enrofmant-2, Strikaa and Purgas ara from tha World Bank (1989).
The Determinants o f Growth in the Developing World in 1990
Cross-Sectional Regression: Determinants of Growth in LDCs - 
Dependent Variable is GDPG 
Sample: 1 50
1000
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.604016 4.248000 -0.142370 0.8875
OPEN 0.014105 0.010334 0.734180 0.4672
GE1 0.030607 0.042703 0.717321 0.4775
GE2 0.024156 0.047726 0.506148 0.6156
G -0.135208 0.110084 -1.218266 0.2304
STRIKES -1.217310 0.634000 -1.010761 0.0622
PURGES •6.218535 3.537460 -1.757000 0.0866
R-squared 0.225247 Mean dependent var 0.432826
Adjusted R-squared 0.106054 S.D. dependent var 4.821605
Durbin-Watson stat 1.150352 Prob(F-statistic) 0.107138
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